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ABSTRACT
Essays on Financial Contracting
by
Taylor Begley
Chair: Associate Professor Amiyatosh Purnanandam
This dissertation comprises three essays on financial contracting and intermediation under
information asymmetry. They examine both some of the asymmetric information problems
that contracts can mitigate as well as some of the distortions they can cause. The first essay
examines real investment distortions that occur as a result of information intermediation
through credit ratings. Credit Rating Agencies emphasize the importance of specific financial
ratio thresholds in their rating process. Firms on the favorable side of these thresholds are
more likely to receive higher ratings than similar firms that are not. I show that firms
near these salient thresholds respond to the incentive to improve their appearance on this
hard, easy to interpret dimension by distorting real investment activities during periods
leading up to bond issuance. Specifically, I find that these firms are significantly more likely
to reduce R&D and SG&A expenditures and, subsequently, are more likely to experience
declines in profitability and innovation output than observationally similar firms not near
a threshold. These distortions highlight an important cost of arms-length financing and an
adverse consequence of transparency about credit rating criteria.
The second essay examines how high-quality borrowers use the design of performance-
sensitive bank debt contracts to alleviate financial constraints. I show that borrowers use a
xviii
convex pricing grid (i.e., a contract where the increase in the loan spread following a decline
in performance exceeds the decrease in the spread following a performance improvement) to
signal their unobservable creditworthiness and receive better bank loan terms. I find that
constrained firms who use convex pricing grids receive loans that are 21-28% larger with a
spread that is 31-37 basis points lower than observationally similar borrowers who use fixed
spread loans. Consistent with the notion that a costly signal should positively correlate
with future financial health, I find that constrained borrowers who use a loan with a convex
pricing grid are one third less likely to experience financial distress during the term of their
loans.
The third essay examines the role of security design in mitigating informational frictions
in securitization markets and is joint work with Amiyatosh Purnanandam. Using a repre-
sentative sample of residential mortgage-backed security deals from the pre-crisis period, we
show that deals with a higher level of equity tranche have a significantly lower foreclosure rate
that cannot be explained away by the underlying loan pool’s observable credit risk factors.
The effect is concentrated within pools with a higher likelihood of asymmetric information
between deal sponsors and potential buyers of the securities. Further, securities that are sold
from high-equity-tranche deals command higher prices conditional on their credit ratings.
Our study provides the first in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of the equity tranche in
mitigating informational frictions in this market.
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CHAPTER I
The Real Costs of Corporate Credit Ratings
1.1 Abstract
Credit rating agencies emphasize the importance of specific financial ratio thresholds in
their rating process. Firms on the favorable side of these thresholds are more likely to receive
higher ratings than similar firms that are not. I show that firms near these salient thresholds
respond to the incentive to improve their appearance on this dimension by distorting real
investment activities during periods leading up to bond issuance. These firms are significantly
more likely to reduce R&D and SG&A expenditures compared to observationally similar
firms not near a threshold. Subsequently, they are more likely to experience declines in
innovation output, profitability, and Tobin’s Q. These distortions highlight an important
cost of arms-length financing and an adverse consequence of transparency in credit rating
criteria.
1.2 Introduction
Arms-length financing allows firms to access a deeper pool of capital and provides in-
vestors with a broader range of investment opportunities. Information intermediaries, such
as credit rating agencies (CRAs), facilitate such transactions by mitigating the inherent
information asymmetry between these two groups. CRAs bridge this gap by aggregating
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several pieces of information about a firm into a single measure of creditworthiness. If firms
know that CRAs weight specific criteria more than others in the aggregation, they may have
an incentive to reallocate some of their resources toward these dimensions to achieve a better
rating. Indeed, theoretical models such as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that agents
distort their behavior when they know they will be evaluated based on specific, easily mea-
surable dimensions.1 Moreover, survey evidence shows that credit ratings are a key focus for
CFOs and that the majority of managers are willing to forgo positive NPV projects to meet
short-term financial objectives (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Graham et al., 2005). Building
on these ideas, I ask the following question in this paper: Do firms respond to credit rating
criteria by distorting their investment behavior at the expense of long-run performance?
I investigate this question by examining firms’ investment behavior during periods when
their rating is arguably most important to them: prior to bond issuance. The identification
of rating-induced distortions, however, is difficult because a number of confounding factors
could affect the firms’ investment policies during these time periods. For example, a reduction
in R&D expenditures in periods leading up to bond issuance could be driven by changes in
a firm’s product life cycle or investment opportunity set. Hence, a simple examination of
changes in investment during periods prior to issuance stands little chance of separating firms’
endogenous response to credit rating criteria from other potential factors. To overcome this
empirical challenge, I use an institutional feature of the credit rating process that induces
cross-sectional variation in the incentives for issuers to improve on a particular dimension
that CRAs emphasize, which I describe below.
The CRAs publicly release guidelines and methodologies with specific criteria that they
focus on when assessing a given firm’s creditworthiness. One primary criterion relates to
the firm’s Debt/EBITDA ratio. CRAs publish mappings from Debt/EBITDA ratio to po-
1Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that principal-agent contracting frictions go beyond the tension
between incentives for effort provision and risk sharing. They show that contracts written on easily-measured
dimensions (e.g., manufacturing output quantity) can lead to an overprovision of effort by the agent on these
dimensions at the expense of more difficult to measure dimensions (e.g., output quality) that are important
to the principal (see also Baker, 1992). The theoretical models of Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) and Edmans
et al. (2013) illustrate a similar friction in the context of increased disclosure.
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tential credit ratings which have jumps at particular ratio thresholds (see Table 1.1). These
thresholds–which the CRAs arbitrarily place at round numbers such as 2.0 and 3.0–are
unlikely to systematically coincide with changes in drivers of optimal investment policy.
They do, however, generate cross-sectional variation in firms’ incentives to improve their
Debt/EBITDA ratio in the periods leading up to getting a bond rated. Firms in regions
near thresholds the year prior to issuance, which I refer to as High-Incentive (H-I) Zones,
face a high expected marginal benefit from Debt/EBITDA improvement. To the extent that
improvement in the ratio is costly, these firms also face a lower immediate cost to cross a
threshold relative to firms farther away.
In my analysis, I compare the pre-issuance investment behavior and post-issuance per-
formance of firms near a salient threshold to firms that are farther away.2 The identifying
assumption is that these two sets of firms face different levels of incentives to improve their
ratio while they remain similar on unobserved dimensions that drive optimal investment
policy. The presence of multiple economically arbitrary thresholds in my sample produces
an alternating sequence of “treatment” (higher incentive to improve Debt/EBITDA) and
“control” (lower incentive) groups throughout the Debt/EBITDA spectrum which lends
credibility to this assumption. In addition, I show that the two groups are well matched on
other observable factors that potentially drive investment. This research design allows me
to pin down whether firms in H-I Zones respond to the rating criteria by distorting their
investments in innovation (R&D) and organizational capital (SG&A) in the periods leading
up to getting a bond rated as compared to firms that are away from the thresholds.
Reducing these investments in long-term intangible assets provides the immediate benefit
of boosting EBITDA, while the costs of forgone investments are borne in the future. This
2Consider the salient thresholds at Debt/EBITDA=1.5, 2.0, and 2.5 as an illustrative example (there
are six such thresholds in my sample). For the Debt/EBITDA threshold of 2.0, I classify firms with
Debt/EBITDA ∈ [1.95, 2.20] a year prior to issuance as being in the treatment group (H-I Zone). I classify
firms with Debt/EBITDA ∈ [1.70, 1.95] and [2.20, 2.45] as being in the control group since they do not fall
in the H-I Zone around 2.0 or either of the adjacent thresholds. The timing of the measurement captures
the notion that firms typically recognize their financing needs in advance and then face incentives to take
actions in the periods leading up to issuance to conform to the rating criteria. Section 1.3 provides a more
thorough description of the classification process and its underlying rationale.
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fundamental tension between benefits now and costs later provides incentives for myopic
managerial behavior (Narayanan, 1985; Stein, 1989). In my empirical tests, I first examine
the effect of ratings-induced incentives on R&D and SG&A investments and then examine
the long-run consequences in terms of future innovation output, profitability, and Tobin’s Q.
I find that H-I Zone issuers are about 40% more likely to reduce R&D and 10% more likely
to reduce SG&A expenditures prior to issuance than observationally similar control firms. In
terms of the size of the reductions, these firms cut their R&D expenditures by 10% and SG&A
expenditures by 3% relative to control firms. After documenting the average treatment effect,
I estimate the impact of rating criteria on investment behavior as a continuous function of a
firm’s distance to a threshold. As the distance to a salient threshold increases, firms face a
lower expected marginal benefit from improving their Debt/EBITDA ratio and higher total
cost to reach the next threshold. Thus, the overall incentive to reduce these investments
diminishes as the distance increases. The results support this notion.
The economic benefit of appearing strong on CRA-emphasized criteria is larger during
periods of high yield spreads between ratings classes. Consistent with this view, I show that
the main effects discussed above are strongest for periods with high credit spreads. During
high-credit-spread periods, defined as above sample median Baa-Aaa spread, the likelihood
of reducing investments increases by about 30% for R&D expenditures and 80% for SG&A
expenditures over the baseline estimates. These results lend further credence to my main
claim that economic incentives driven by credit rating criteria lead to distortions in firm
behavior.
While my results so far establish a link between credit rating criteria and investment
behavior, they are silent about the long-run performance effects. Standard and Poor’s (S&P)
recognize the potential distortions that ratings can create and state the following in their
rating methodology handbook (Standard and Poor’s, 2008) [emphasis added]:
“We do not encourage companies to manage themselves with an eye toward a
specific rating. The more appropriate approach is to operate for the good of the
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business as management sees it and to let the rating follow. Ironically, managing
for a very high rating can sometimes be inconsistent with the company’s ultimate
best interests, if it means being overly conservative and forgoing opportunities.”
In my next set of tests, I examine firms’ post-issuance innovation, profitability, and
firm value to study the long-run consequences of the investment changes. First, I focus on
innovation because of its long-term nature, its connection to R&D, and because it is an
important driver of firm value (Hall et al., 2005) and overall economic growth (Solow, 1957;
Romer, 1990). I find a reduction in the raw quantity of patents produced for the first year
after bond issuance for H-I Zone issuers, though the effects are short-lived. I next consider
patent citations, which are widely considered a better measure of the quality and impact of
innovation (see, e.g., Griliches, 1990; Trajtenberg, 1990). I find that issuers near the salient
thresholds are about 25% more likely than control firms to see declines in patent citations.
This effect persists for multiple years following bond issuance. These results suggest that
although declines are not great in the quantity of patents produced, firms facing stronger
ratings-induced incentives to improve their Debt/EBITDA ratio have a considerably higher
likelihood of declines in the quality of their innovation output. I find similar results for future
profitability. Treatment firms are about 12% and 10% more likely to experience declines in
ROA (operating income/assets) and ROE (net income/shareholders equity) during the years
following issuance than the control group.
To more directly examine the consequences for firm value, I compute the differential
changes in industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q between treatment and control firms for four years
following issuance. The difference-in-differences estimates indicate a treatment effect of a
1.8% decline in industry-adjusted Q in the first year following issuance, which grows to an
approximately 3-3.6% decline by year four. Combined with the results on innovation, this
decline is consistent with Hall et al. (2005) who find that when a firm’s quality of patents
increase such that their average patent receives an additional citation, the firm’s market value
increases by 3%. Overall, these results show that there are real, long-term consequences as
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a result of incentives to look strong on credit rating criteria in the short term.
Finally, I examine how market participants interpret the issuers’ changes in investment
behavior around the thresholds. After confirming that crossing a salient threshold is associ-
ated with improvements in credit rating, I test whether the reductions in investment around
the thresholds are penalized by the CRAs or bond investors by a lower likelihood of rating
upgrade or higher at-issuance yields. I find no such evidence.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it relates to the literature
that highlights the importance of credit ratings for firm financial policies. Kisgen (2006)
shows that firms issue less debt when they are near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade.
Hovakimian et al. (2009) and Kisgen (2009) show that firms’ financial decisions are consistent
with credit rating “targeting.” While these papers show that credit ratings have a significant
influence on capital structure decisions, my paper focuses on investment decisions. Moreover,
this is the first paper to show that firms respond to credit rating criteria by distorting
behavior on value-relevant dimensions, such as R&D investment, in efforts to look strong on
the dimensions emphasized by the CRAs.
This paper also relates to the literature examining the nature of information and the
tradeoffs that arise as the informational distance between contracting parties increases. With
greater distance between borrower and lender, the incentives to produce soft information
declines and lenders rely more on hard information (Stein, 2002; Petersen, 2004; Berger
et al., 2005).3 The use of hard information facilitates arms-length transactions and can
provide firms with greater access to capital (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006b). However, as
discussed earlier, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) show that high-powered contracts based
on easily measurable outputs can have undesirable incentive effects. This issue frequently
arises in the context of measuring educational outcomes with the concern that teachers may
3Rajan et al. (forthcomingb) show that as the mortgage market transitioned from an originate-and-hold
to originate-to-distribute model, loan originators relied more on hard information such as FICO score and
loan-to-value ratios for setting interest rates on loans. Liberti and Mian (2009) show that within a large
bank, the sensitivity of loan terms to hard, objective information is greater as the hierarchical distance
between the loan officer and the ultimate decision maker increases.
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have incentives to “teach to the test.”4 In the context of this paper, the “contract” between
the issuer and CRA puts weight on the hard information dimension of Debt/EBITDA and
the issuer endogenously responds by focusing resources on improving this measure at the
expense of investments in innovation and organizational capital, which are likely to have a
large soft information component.
Finally, this paper also relates to the literature that explores potential adverse effects
of increased information disclosure. Hirshleifer (1971) shows that more information can
destroy ex-ante welfare-improving risk sharing opportunities and Dang et al. (2012) show
that increased information production can hinder liquidity in money markets. Recent work
on disclosure by Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) and Edmans et al. (2013) highlights some
costs of providing more information to investors through increased disclosure. Hermalin and
Weisbach (2012) show that increased disclosure can lead to greater agency problems in the
form of myopic behavior; managers substitute away from long-term investments to boost
short-term numbers (see also Stein, 1989). Edmans et al. (2013) present a theoretical model
that shows that an increase in disclosure can produce incentives for managers to improve
hard information at the expense of investment. My paper complements these theoretical
papers by providing empirical evidence that pressures to appear strong on clearly-delineated
rating criteria can lead to investment distortions and to long-run underperformance.
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 1.3 outlines the empirical strategy and
Section 1.4 describes the sample. Section 1.5 presents the main results. Section 1.6 presents
additional tests and robustness checks and Section 1.7 concludes.
4Jacob (2005) shows that teachers in the Chicago Public Schools strategically responded to high-stakes
testing by shifting more students into special education, preemptively retaining students and reallocating
focus from low-stakes subjects (science and social studies) to high stakes subject (math and reading). Neal
(2011) provides a helpful review of this literature.
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1.3 Research Design and Identification Strategy
Credit ratings represent an opinion of debt issuers’ ability and willingness to repay debt.
This information about relative creditworthiness plays an important role in allocating capital
to firms in the economy. Credit ratings are a key factor for firms’ cost of debt capital because
of the informational content they supply to investors (Kliger and Sarig, 2000; Jorion et al.,
2005; Tang, 2009) and supply-side frictions induced by ratings-based regulations (Kisgen
and Strahan, 2010; Ellul et al., 2011; Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012; Becker and Ivashina,
2013). In addition to their direct impact on the cost and supply of debt for firms in the
bond market, benefits of a higher credit rating include better trade credit terms (Klapper
et al., 2012), better access to commercial paper markets, overall financial flexibility, and
reputational benefits, to name a few. Further, Jorion et al. (2005) show that stock prices
have a positive response to ratings upgrades and negative response to downgrades with the
effect particularly strong for downgrades (see also Hand et al., 1992; Dichev and Piotroski,
2001). In light of all this, it is not surprising that credit ratings are one of the most important
factors affecting firms’ financial policies and are a key point of focus for managers (Graham
and Harvey, 2001).5
In their role as information intermediaries, CRAs condense many different pieces of in-
formation into a simple, easy to communicate grade of creditworthiness. Providing a simple
measure of debt serviceability and leverage, the Debt/EBITDA ratio is a prominent ratio
that CRAs emphasize, and it is the focus in this paper’s analysis. In response to this empha-
sis, firms have an incentive to appear strong on the Debt/EBITDA dimension to economize
debt costs.
While there are a number of ways that firms can affect their Debt/EBITDA ratio, I
focus on two investment decisions whose payoffs are long term in nature: R&D and SG&A.6
5See Kisgen (2006) for an extensive discussion of the importance of credit ratings to firms.
6SG&A expenditures are often seen as investments in “organizational capital” (e.g., see Lev and Rad-
hakrishnan, 2005; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013) and include spending on items such as advertising,
information technology, and employee training.
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Because they are fully expensed the period in which they occur, reducing these expenditures
allows firms to report higher EBITDA and thus have a more favorable Debt/EBITDA ratio.
Because these investments in intangible capital generate benefits that are uncertain and may
take years to realize, managers may have an incentive to myopically reduce such expenditures
to boost EBITDA even if they would be value-increasing in the long run (Narayanan, 1985;
Stein, 1989). Graham et al. (2005) provide survey evidence that 80% of managers report
they would decrease discretionary expenses such as R&D, advertising, and maintenance and
55% report that they would delay starting a new project – even if it involved sacrificing
NPV – in efforts to meet financial targets. Also, by examining R&D expenditures, I am able
to measure the consequences of changes in investment behavior by observing future patent
performance.
To study the extent to which the incentive to look strong on CRA-emphasized dimensions
affects investment, I focus on firms’ behavior during periods when they are likely to care
about their credit rating the most: prior to bond issuance. When firms recognize there is an
upcoming financing need, they can assess where they stand in relation to the CRAs’ rating
criteria and respond by taking actions to improve that standing.7 To empirically identify
the effects of the credit ratings process on investment, however, is challenging. Consider the
following basic model:
Investmentit = f(Xit) + ψ(ratings-induced incentivesit) + ηit
Even after controlling for observable drivers of investment behavior (Xit) of firm i at time
t, a na¨ive analysis of changes in firm investment leading up to bond issuance is problem-
atic because the effect of ratings-induced incentives is potentially confounded by multiple
unobserved factors (i.e., Cov(ratings-induced incentivesit, ηit) 6= 0). For example, firms may
reduce R&D expenditures simply because they are transitioning from development of a prod-
7If they wish to have assistance in this assessment, investment banks and consulting firms provide expert
advice and institutional knowledge through their “ratings advisory” services.
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uct to commercialization or may reduce SG&A expenditures because they have reached the
end of a marketing campaign. To isolate the effect of ratings-induced investment distortions
from these and other such factors that influence investment decisions, I exploit multiple
discontinuities in the CRAs’ mapping from Debt/EBITDA to credit rating which generate
cross-sectional variation in incentives for firms to improve their Debt/EBITDA ratio.
CRAs provide specific information about the ranges of Debt/EBITDA that are consistent
with different ratings. Table 1.1A presents an excerpt from S&P’s published Corporate Rat-
ing Criteria that maps an issuer’s Debt/EBITDA ratio to a set of credit ratings (Standard
and Poor’s, 2012). S&P states that their purpose in providing such guidelines is “to make
explicit the rating outcomes that are typical for various business risk/financial risk combi-
nations.” Moody’s and Fitch also place an emphasis on financial ratio thresholds in their
published methodologies. Table 1.1B presents an example from the Moody’s “Global Steel
Industry” rating methodology, which shows what ranges of Debt/EBITDA are consistent
with particular credit ratings for that industry.
While these correspondences are not the sole determinant of the final credit rating,8
Table 1.1B makes clear that it behooves steel firms wishing to get an “A” rating to achieve
a Debt/EBITDA ratio below 2.0. Firms are keenly aware of the importance of these key
financial ratios for their ratings and, in turn, the importance of their rating for their cost
and access to capital.9
The key to the research design is the cross-sectional variation in firms’ incentives to im-
prove their Debt/EBITDA ratio that is induced by the presence of multiple salient Debt/EBITDA
thresholds. Drawn from S&P’s, Moody’s, and Fitch’s ratings methodologies and press re-
leases, the salient bin thresholds in the sample are 1.25, 1.50, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0.10
8Fracassi et al. (2013) show that credit rating analysts’ optimism or pessimism can affect ratings decisions.
Griffin and Tang (2012a) provide evidence of subjectivity in the ratings for CDOs and its consequences for
rating accuracy.
9For example, in their 2006 annual report, Textron, Inc. states: “Our credit ratings are predominantly a
function of our ability to generate operating cash flow and satisfy certain financial ratios. Since high-quality
credit ratings provide us with access to a broad base of global investors at an attractive cost, we target a
long-term A rating from the independent debt-rating agencies.”
10There are some occasions when the rating agencies use guidance for thresholds other than the ones listed
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Since the CRAs arbitrarily set these thresholds at round numbers, it is unlikely that the
economic primitives that drive optimal investment policy systematically vary at precisely
these points throughout the Debt/EBITDA spectrum. That is, for my identification strat-
egy to fail, an omitted variable must drive the optimal R&D policy in this specific alternating
sequence around each threshold. While all firms have an incentive to improve and appear
strong on this dimension, firms on the cusp of advancing to a better bin face the highest
expected marginal benefit from improvement in Debt/EBITDA. To the extent that improve-
ment in the ratio is costly, these firms also face a lower cost since they have less distance to
travel to cross a threshold relative to firms farther away.
For the empirical tests, I define whether an issuer is in a High-Incentive Zone (H-I Zone)
in the following simple way. Consider the threshold at Debt/EBITDA = 2.0. I consider the
upper bound of the H-I Zone around the 2.0 threshold to be 40% of the distance between 2.0
and the next worse threshold of 2.5. This equals 2.2. To capture the incentives of those with
only a slim margin between their current ratio and a worse bin, I consider the lower bound
to be 10% of the distance between 2.0 and the next better threshold of 1.5. This equals
1.95. Thus, I consider firms with Debt/EBITDA ∈ [1.95, 2.20] to be the H-I Zone around
2.0. I follow this method for each threshold in the sample based on firms’ Debt/EBITDA
ratio a year prior to issuance.11 This timing captures the notion discussed earlier that firms
typically recognize their financing needs in advance and then face incentives to take actions
in the periods leading up to issuance to conform to the rating criteria. The figure below
illustrates the basic timeline of the analysis.
here. The presence of such lesser used thresholds in the sample may introduce noise into the estimation and
partially mask the true effect.
11The results are robust to reasonable adjustments to this bandwidth scheme.
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For each firm, I compare the relevant investments during the year leading up to getting
a new bond rated to its investments in the prior year. This first difference removes within-
firm time invariant unobserved drivers of investment. The timing of this measurement also
ensures that results are not driven by seasonality in firm policies. Next, I take the difference
between the behavior of the treatment group (those near one of the salient thresholds) and
the control group to compute the average treatment effect. Similarly, I use measures of firms’
profitability, innovation output, and Tobin’s Q a year prior to getting rated as benchmarks
for comparison when I investigate the future performance of the firms. The table below
summarizes the empirical design for firm policy Y.
t− 4 t Difference
Near Threshold (H-I Zone=1) Y treatmentt−4 Y treatmentt ∆treatment
Not Near Threshold (H-I Zone=0) Y controlt−4 Y controlt ∆control
Average Treatment Effect: ∆treatment −∆control
In addition to the average treatment effects I estimate using the classification approach
described above, I also perform tests that exploit finer variation in incentives using a contin-
uous measure of the issuer’s proximity to salient thresholds. Specifically, I estimate the likeli-
hood of reducing investment as a function of the distance between the firm’s Debt/EBITDA
a year prior to getting rated and the next better threshold (for example, 0.15 for a firm with
Debt/EBITDA = 2.15, 2.65, 3.15, etc.).
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1.4 Data and Preliminary Tests
1.4.1 Sample Construction
Firm accounting and stock return data are from Compustat and CRSP. Bond issuance
data are from the fixed income securities database (FISD). I merge these data to form a
quarterly sample from 1990-2009. Where a firm has multiple financing observations in a
single quarter (for example, a firm may issue bonds of various tenors on the same day), I
combine them to a single observation by summing the issuance amounts and computing a
dollar-weighted average yield.
Patent data are from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent Ci-
tation database.12 This data source contains information on the owner, patent application
date, patent grant date, and citation count of over three million patents granted by the
United States Patent Trademark Office from 1976-2006 along with matching tables that
facilitate merging these data with Compustat. I use two common measures of firm innova-
tion: patent count and citation count. Patent count is the raw number of a firm’s patent
applications during a given year that are eventually granted. Raw counts, however, do not
provide any differentiation in whether the innovations are marginal or new breakthroughs.
Trajtenberg (1990) argues that “patents vary enormously in their importance or value, and
hence, simple patent counts cannot be informative about innovative output” and proposes
citation-weighted patent counts are a better measure of innovation. I correct for bias in this
measure due to citation count truncation after 2006 by using the weight factors developed
by Hall et al. (2001), who use an obsolesce-diffusion model to estimate future citations based
on the patent’s year and technology category.
After dropping financial firms, utilities, and observations that are not related to a bond
issuance, the main sample contains 1770 observations from 686 firms. The sample size for
tests using R&D have fewer observations because many firms do not report R&D expen-
12See https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/
13
ditures. Tests involving patent productivity have fewer observations because the patent
database ends in 2006. I use the maximum number of observations with complete data for
each test, but my results are not substantively different if I constrain all tests to observations
with complete data across all variables.
I winsorize all variables at 1% to mitigate the effects of outliers. Table B.1 in the appendix
provides the details of the construction of variables. Table 1.2 presents sample summary
statistics and Figure 1.1 presents the distribution of the sample along Debt/EBITDA a year
prior to issuance, highlighting the H-I Zones near salient thresholds.
1.4.2 Comparability of Treatment and Control Groups
Before presenting the main tests, I examine the comparability of the issuers in H-I Zones
with those that are not. To make meaningful inferences, it is important that issuers in H-I
Zones (treatment) are observationally similar to those that are not (control) on dimensions
that drive investment independent of the incentive effects. To evaluate the comparability,
Figure 1.2 presents kernel densities of several such factors for both groups. The plots show
that the sample is well balanced along firm characteristics that represent factors such as firm
life cycle (size), financial flexibility and potential debt overhang (debt-to-asset ratio), growth
opportunities (Tobin’s Q), and ability to generate internal cash flows (cash flow-to-assets);
it is also balanced in terms of profitability as measured by ROA (operating income/assets)
and ROE (net income/shareholder equity). In unreported results, t-tests fail to reject the
null of the equality of means and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fail to reject the null of equality
of distributions for these characteristics across the two groups.
1.5 Results
Firms near salient Debt/EBITDA thresholds face a higher expected marginal benefit from
improving on this dimension (i.e., reducing the ratio) because crossing a threshold increases
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the likelihood of getting a credit rating upgrade.13 Improving this likelihood gives managers
incentives to take actions to increase EBITDA and/or decrease debt. In this section, I
exploit the presence of multiple salient Debt/EBITDA thresholds to identify the effect of
credit rating criteria on firms’ R&D and SG&A investment policies and their subsequent
performance.
1.5.1 The Effect of Rating Criteria on Investment
Figure 1.3 is a graphical depiction of the main results. It plots the probability that a firm
reduces their R&D investment as a function of their Debt/EBITDA ratio one year prior to
getting rated. I group firms based on their proximity to the salient thresholds (H-I Zones
as outlined in Section 1.3) and plot the mean probability of reducing investment within that
group. The alternating nature of the plot highlights the differential behavior of firms that are
near salient thresholds from those that are not. For example, about 56% of issuers near the
2.0 threshold reduce their R&D expenditures during the year prior to getting rated, while
about 40% and 47% in the adjacent comparison groups not near the threshold (for example,
Debt/EBITDA ≈ 1.9 and 2.3) do so. This pattern emerges around each salient threshold
throughout the Debt/EBITDA spectrum. The pattern for SG&A is similar, though the
magnitude of the differences is smaller (not shown).
Table 1.3 aggregates the treatment group (H-I Zone issuers) and control group and
reports the average probability of reducing their R&D or SG&A investment. The first column
indicates that roughly half of the firms in the full sample reduce each type of investment
in the year leading up to getting rated. The next two columns highlight the difference
in investment behavior between those firms near a salient threshold and those that are not.
About 64% of H-I Zone firms reduced R&D investment as compared to 45% of control firms.
The corresponding figures for reducing SG&A are about 56% for H-I Zone firms compared
to 51% for the controls. The results indicate that issuers in an H-I Zone, which face the
13In later tests, I explicitly show that crossing a salient threshold leads to an average rating upgrade of
approximately one-fourth of a rating (see Table 1.9).
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higher expected marginal benefit of improving their Debt/EBITDA ratio, are about 42% (19
percentage points) more likely to reduce R&D and about 10% (5 percentage points) more
likely to reduce SG&A expenditures in the year prior to issuance.
To ensure that any residual differences in the two groups along observable dimensions or
time-specific factors are not driving the differences in investment decisions, I estimate the
following model.
1{Cut [R&D,SG&A]i,t→t+4} = α + ρ(H-I Zone)it +
∑
βXit + qt + it (1.1)
I regress an indicator of whether the issuer cuts investment (R&D, then SG&A) on the
issuer’s proximity to a salient threshold. I use an indicator of investment reduction for the
main specifications because the magnitude of the reduction is likely a function of the distance
to the threshold. Firms closest to the threshold have the strongest incentives to alter their
behavior, but have to reduce investment by a smaller amount to achieve their goal. Thus,
an indicator variable more sharply captures the change in behavior. I also include a vector
of firm characteristics (Xit) to control for other potential firm-level drivers of investment
and year-quarter fixed effects (qt) to capture any economy-wide fluctuations that could drive
investment decisions. I also include specifications with industry fixed effects to ensure that
some unobserved industry factor that is correlated with both firms’ pre-issuance investments
and their proximity to a salient threshold is not driving the results. I estimate regression
equation (1.1) using a linear probability model14 and cluster all standard errors at the firm
level.15 Table 1.4 presents the results.
14I present results from estimations using a linear probability model because it does not suffer from
the incidental parameters problem in models with fixed effects (conditional logit models rely on stronger
assumptions for consistency; see, e.g., Wooldridge (2002)), its parameter estimates are consistent in the face
of various forms of heteroskedasticity, and the ease of interpretations of the partial effect estimates. The
results are similar using a logistic regression model.
15I find similar results when computing White standard errors or clustering by firm, time, or industry.
The relative invariance of the standard error estimates across differing clustering structures indicates that
any autocorrelation in the right-hand side variables and/or residuals is likely very small and that there is
not a meaningful time-specific correlation effect after controlling for year-quarter fixed effects.
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The coefficient estimates on H-I Zone mirror the results of the simple group mean anal-
ysis presented in Table 1.3. Issuers near a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior
to issuance are about 19 percentage points more likely to reduce their R&D expenditures
(Columns 1-2) and 6 percentage points more likely to reduce SG&A (Columns 3-4). The
striking similarity of the point estimates from the regression analysis in Table 1.4 to the
simple differences presented in Table 1.3 supports the notion that the intermittent nature of
salient thresholds creates a balanced comparison between firms receiving the high-incentive
treatment and the control firms.
The results above highlight the average treatment effect of receiving the high-incentive
treatment. The following test exploits heterogeneity in the strength of the treatment by
modeling the decision to reduce investment as a function of the issuing firm’s distance to
the next better Debt/EBITDA threshold. Issuers closest to a salient threshold face the
highest expected marginal benefit of an improvement and also the lowest cost because only
a relatively small movement is necessary to improve bins. Thus the likelihood of reducing
investment should be a decreasing function of distance to the next highest threshold. To
test this notion, I estimate the following specification, where dist is the distance to the next
highest bin (likewise measured a year prior to getting a bond rated) and dist2 is its square.
Columns (1)-(2) in Table 1.5 present the results.
1{Cut Invi,t→t+4} = α + δ(dist)it + γ(dist2)it +
∑
βXit + qt + it (1.2)
These results indicate that issuers closest to a threshold and thus have the highest incen-
tives to take actions to improve their ratio are most likely to respond by reducing investment.
Figure 1.4 uses the coefficient estimates to plot the change in probability of investment re-
duction. Similar to the baseline results above, the results are stronger for R&D investments.
The next tests examine a continuous measure of changes in investment rather than a
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discrete outcome of whether firms cuts their investments. Specifically, I re-estimate the
baseline regression specification (1.1) using the percent change in investment policy as the
dependent variable. Columns (3)-(4) of Table 1.5 present the results. The point estimates
on H-I Zone indicate that the average firm receiving the high-incentive treatment reduces
its investments in R&D and SG&A by about 10% and 3%, respectively. For the median
firm with Debt/EBITDA ∈ [1.25, 1.50], this degree of investment reduction, ceteris paribus,
translates to an approximate Debt/EBITDA ratio improvement of 0.07. The effect progres-
sively increases with each Debt/EBITDA bin, with the median firm with Debt/EBITDA
∈ [4.0, 5.0] achieving an improvement of approximately 0.17.
1.5.2 The Effect When Credit Spreads Are High
The incentives to cross thresholds should be stronger when firms’ benefit of improving
their credit rating is higher. The economic benefit from an increase in credit rating is greater
when the sensitivity of yield spreads to credit quality is high. That is, in high-credit-spread
times, the expected benefit of crossing a salient threshold is higher than in low-credit-spread
times, and the effects documented above should be stronger. To test this hypothesis, I
include in the baseline regression specification an interaction of H-I Zone with an indicator,
High Spread, that equals one when the Baa-Aaa yield spread exceeds the sample period
median.
1{Cut Invi,t→t+4} = α + ρ(H-I Zone)it + ψ(H-I Zone)it × (High Spread)t
+
∑
βXit + qt + it (1.3)
While there are other differences in the economy that could lead to differential firm in-
vestment policies between these two regimes (for example, lower credit spreads could indicate
more favorable investment opportunities), the level of such effects will be absorbed by the
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year-quarter fixed effects–the identifying variation is still in the cross section. Along with
the level effects of other macroeconomic shocks, year-quarter fixed effects absorb any level
effects of the credit spread on issuers’ investment decisions. Table 1.6 presents the results
with Columns (1) and (3) presenting the baseline results from earlier for comparison.
For both R&D and SG&A, the point estimate on the interaction of H-I Zone and High
Spread indicates that issuers near salient thresholds are even more likely to respond to
incentives to reduce these investments when the economic benefit of a better rating is the
higher. Compared to issuers not near a salient threshold a year prior to issuance, issuers in
the H-I Zones are about 24 percentage points more likely to reduce R&D expenditures and
11 percentage points more likely to reduce SG&A expenditures.
Overall, these results show that issuers with higher incentives to improve their appearance
on the CRA-emphasized dimension of Debt/EBITDA ratio are substantially more likely to
reduce spending on real investment activities as a means to that end. Further, the likelihood
of this response is stronger when the yield spreads between ratings is large and the economic
benefit from crossing a salient threshold is greater.
1.5.3 Future Innovation and Profitability
The evidence thus far documents differential changes in investments for firms near salient
Debt/EBITDA thresholds as compared to observationally similar control firms. This section
investigates whether these firms experience subsequent declines in innovation and profitabil-
ity. I use the issuer’s performance as of one year prior to issuance as the baseline for
comparison and construct an indicator variable equal to one when the firm’s performance τ
years after bond issuance experiences a decline relative to their benchmark and estimate the
following specification.
1{Perfi,t+τ < Perfi,t−1} = α + ρ(H-I Zone)i,t−1 +
∑
βXi,t−1 + qt + it (1.4)
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Investment in innovation is an important driver of long-run firm value, but its intangible
and long-term nature make it particularly vulnerable to short-term cost cutting. The next
tests use future patent productivity to measure the consequences of these reductions for
innovation output. I use a per annum raw count of new patents and the patent citation
counts over the two years prior to bond issuance as a benchmark for the firm’s innovation
output. To capture the long-run nature of investment on innovation, I follow the literature
(see, e.g., Cornaggia et al., 2013; Seru, 2013) and examine the average innovation output
over τ years following the event of interest (bond issuance). Panels A and B of Table 1.7
present the results.16
While the sign of the estimated coefficients on H-I Zone in Panel A suggest that these
firms are more likely to produce less patents in the future, the point estimate is statistically
different from zero only in the first year following bond issuance. This result indicates that
firms in the H-I Zone do see declines in the raw quantity of patents produced, but the
effects are relatively short-lived. Panel B presents estimates considering patent citations,
which is widely considered a sharper measure of the quality and impact of innovation. These
estimates provide evidence that H-I Zone issuers are more likely to experience a persistent
future decline in innovation. With about 20% of the sample experiencing declines in this
measure, the point estimate of about 0.05 indicates that these firms are roughly 25% more
likely to see innovation declines that observationally similar firms not near a salient threshold.
Together with the results of the tests of raw counts, this suggests though there is not a large
decrease in the quantity of patents produced, firms with stronger incentives for improvement
in Debt/EBITDA in the short run have a considerably higher likelihood of declines in the
quality of their innovation output.
I next examine future operating performance and profitability. To measure operating
performance, I use operating income scaled by assets (ROA) as suggested by Barber and
Lyon (1996). This ratio measures the productivity of the firm’s assets excluding items such
16As is typically the case in exercise such as this, the number of observations drop as the time horizon
under examination increases.
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as interest expense, special items, income taxes, and minority interest. Panel C in Table 1.7
presents the results. The coefficient estimates on H-I Zone indicate that issuers near salient
Debt/EBITDA thresholds one year prior to issuance are about 5 percentage points (10%,
based on the sample mean of about 0.50) more likely to experience persistent future declines
in ROA compared to observationally similar issuers that are not.
In Panel D, I consider return on equity (ROE) to focus on future performance from the
perspective of shareholders. Computed as the ratio of net income to shareholder equity,
this ratio measures how much profit the firm generates with the money shareholders have
invested. The estimates indicate that H-I Zone firms are more likely to have lower ROE for
three years following bond issuance.
1.5.4 Future Tobin’s Q
The above results highlight some important long-term consequences in terms of depressed
innovation and profitability. To more directly assess the firm value implications, I extend
the above analysis to examine future changes in industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (QIA) for H-
I Zone firms compared to the control firms not near a salient threshold. I compute QIAi
by subtracting the SIC 2-digit industry median QIndustryt from firm Qit. Since the sample
is well balanced between the treatment and control firms, I begin by computing a simple
difference-in-difference estimate. Panel A of Table 1.8 presents the results.
The first column shows both the treatment and control firms have QIA = 0.19. Each
following column computes ∆QIA = QIAt+τ − QIAt for each group for four years following
issuance. The difference-in-differences estimates indicate that H-I Zone firms have lower QIA
in the years following issuance as compared to observationally similar control firms. While
the control firms experience a modest increase in QIA, the differential performance between
the groups is driven more by the falling QIA of the treatment firms. Based on a sample
mean of 1.64, the treatment effect of 0.03 to 0.06 in post-issuance years 1 to 4 translates to a
1.8-3.6% decline in Tobin’s Q, though the estimate for year 3 is not statistically significant.
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I next turn to regression analysis to make sure that any residual differences between the
two groups on observable dimensions or time effects are not driving the results. I estimate
the following specification:
QIAi,t+τ = α + ρ(H-I Zone)it +
∑
βXit + qt + it (1.5)
Panel B of Table 1.8 presents the results. The regression estimates present a similar
picture to the differences computed in Panel A; H-I Zone firms experience a decline in
Tobin’s Q of about 0.03 to 0.05 relative to control firms.
In sum, reducing investment in R&D and SG&A provides the benefit of an improved
Debt/EBITDA in the short term, but it ultimately comes at the cost of reduced innovation,
profitability, and long-run value. The results in this section support my main claim that firms
respond to credit rating criteria by shifting resources away from value-relevant dimensions
to appear strong on the dimensions emphasized by CRAs.
1.6 Additional Tests
In this section, I examine how credit ratings and at-issuance bond yields respond to the
changes in investment behavior documented above. I then examine the effects of rating
criteria on investment for bond issuances that are most likely to be planned in advance.
Finally, I show that the results are not an artifact of firms cutting investment in response to
covenant violations.
1.6.1 The Market Response to Changes in Investment Behavior
To test whether crossing a Debt/EBITDA threshold is associated with better ratings,
I regress changes in credit ratings between one year prior to getting rated and the bond
issuance on changes in firm characteristics that are important drivers of default risk (e.g.,
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see Shumway, 2001b) and changes in Debt/EBITDA ratio.
∆Ratingi,t→t+5 = α + φ(Improve bin)i,t→t+4 +
∑
β∆Xi,t→t+4 + i,t
The variable of interest is a dummy variable (Improve bin) equal to one when the firm has
crossed a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold. The coefficient estimate on this variable indicates
the additional boost in credit rating a firm receives from crossing a salient threshold above
and beyond the general effect of reducing Debt/EBITDA. For example, this estimates the
benefit an issuer gets from decreasing Debt/EBITDA from 2.05 to 1.95 (crossing 2.0) above
and beyond the effect of an improvement of Debt/EBITDA from 1.9 to 1.8 or 2.2 to 2.1.
Columns (1-2) in Table 1.9 present the results.17
Column (1) presents the results without including the threshold-crossing indicator. Con-
sistent with previous literature, firms with higher stock returns, increases in profitability, and
decreases in leverage are more likely to be upgraded. Consistent with intuition, decreases
in Debt/EBITDA are also positively related to credit rating upgrades. Column (2) presents
the full specification. The coefficient estimate on Improve bin of 0.26 indicates that crossing
a salient threshold is associated with a upgrade of about one-fourth of a rating. While it is
sufficient that managers believe that improving Debt/EBITDA bin is associated with better
ratings, these results show that firms benefit from crossing a salient threshold.
If the CRAs observe that a firm advances to a better Debt/EBITDA bin, but view the
behavior that facilitated the move as a poor signal of creditworthiness, then the ratings may
not react to the firm crossing a salient threshold. To test this supposition, I regress the
changes in credit rating in the periods leading up to bond issuance on fundamental drivers
of credit ratings, a variable that indicates an improvement in Debt/EBITDA bin (Improve
bin), an indicator of whether the firm cut investment (Cut Inv), and the interaction of the
latter two terms in the following specification.
17These estimations require the issuer have an S&P rating five months prior to issuance, which leads to
a roughly 12% reduction in sample size.
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∆Rating = α + φ(Improve bin) + ρ(Cut Inv) + θ(Improve bin× Cut Inv) + Γ∆X + 
(1.6)
Columns (3-4) of Table 1.9 present the results. For both R&D and SG&A, firms that
are reduce their level of investments are less likely to receive an upgrade. However, the
point estimates on the interaction terms (θˆ) indicate the firms that cut investments and
crossed a salient threshold were not assigned significantly different ratings than those that
cut investments but did not cross a salient threshold. Next, I examine whether at-issuance
bond yields respond to this behavior.
If bond market participants observe this behavior and view it as a negative signal, they
will demand a higher yield on the bonds. To test this hypothesis, I regress the bond yield
at issuance on variables that reflect credit risk including dummy variables for each rating
class, Debt/EBITDA bin, and year-quarter fixed effects. Similar to the spirit of the previous
test, I include an indicator of whether the firm recently improved their Debt/EBITDA bin,
whether the firm recently cut investment, and the interaction of these two variables. If bond
buyers identify and penalize this behavior, the point estimate on the interaction term will
be positive to indicate a higher demanded yield. Table 1.10 presents the results.18
The point estimates on the interaction terms are not statistically different from zero.
These results indicate that firms that cut investment and cross a salient threshold do not
receive significantly different yield on their bonds at offering beyond the effects the actions
may have on credit rating. Overall, the lack of price response is consistent with the notion
that investors rely on credit ratings and that changes in investment policies are not unam-
biguously interpreted by the bond market. These findings are consistent with those of Cohen
et al. (2013), who provide evidence that stock market investors do not differentiate between
high quality and low quality R&D investment.
18Some observations are dropped because of missing yield data.
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1.6.2 Subsample Analysis and Robustness
Refinancing Bonds
An underlying assumption of the tests in the paper is that management knows in advance
that there is a financing need. In anticipation of bond issuance, management has some time
to take actions to conform to the standards of the CRAs. While issuing a bond is a major
financial event for most firms and is typically planned well in advance, there are also cases
when firms may issue bonds very quickly to fund, for example, a strategic acquisition. If such
an opportunity arises unexpectedly, a firm does not have time to take actions to improve
their appearance and simply issues the bond in their current state. The presence of such
observations in the data adds noise to the estimations and could mask the true effect. The
following test focuses on a subset of observations where management is more likely to be
planning the issuance in advance. Specifically, I focus on debt issuances that are more likely
to be refinancing transactions by computing a ratio of the amount of debt in current liabilities
(debt due within a year) the quarter before issuance to the eventual bond issuance amount.
Because of the relatively large amount of debt due soon, firms with a higher ratio are more
likely to be planning in advance of their financing need. Table 1.11A presents the results of
the base specification for the subset of observation where
debt in current liabilitiest−1Q
bond amountt
≥ 1.
For this subsample of observations, the point estimates of the coefficient on H-I Zone is
greater than the estimates from the base specification for each investment category. This
finding supports the notion that firms that foresee an approaching financing need are more
likely to take actions to strengthen their appearance leading up to getting a bond rated.
Covenant Violations
In addition to being a key metric of creditworthiness in the eyes of CRAs, the Debt/EBITDA
ratio is also used in financial covenants in bank loan contracts. When borrowers violate
loan covenants, they are in technical default and creditors then have the right to accelerate
the loan. This gives creditors a great deal of influence on the actions of the firm during
renegotiation. Chava and Roberts (2008) show that capital expenditures decline following
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violations of financial covenants. In light of their results, a possible concern may be that
firms near salient thresholds happen to be firms that have recently violated covenants and
the findings in this paper are an artifact of the effects of covenant violations on investment.
To rule out this possibility, I augment my dataset with covenant violation data generously
provided by Nini et al. (2012). Their data record whether a firm is in violation of a financial
covenant violation data during a given quarter for Compustat non-financial firms from 1996-
2009. Because the data begin in 1996 and my sample begins in 1990, these tests have fewer
observations than the baseline results.
For each investment variable, I estimate two specifications to examine whether covenant
violations drive the findings and present the results in Panel B of Table 1.11. First, I estimate
the base regression specification (1.1) including an indicator variable, Cov Violation, equal to
one if the issuer breaches a covenant during the periods leading up to getting rated (columns
1 and 3). Second, I estimate the base specification excluding the observations for which Cov
Violation equals one (columns 2 and 4).
The coefficient estimate for Cov Violation is positive for each investment type indicating
that firms in violation of a covenant are more likely to reduce R&D and SG&A investments,
but the estimates are not statistically significant. Turning to the coefficient of interest in this
paper, the size and statistical significance for coefficient estimates for H-I Zone are virtually
unaffected by covenant violation considerations.
1.7 Conclusion
Credit ratings have emerged as a key mechanism to bridge the fundamental information
asymmetry problem between firms and investors. Ratings give better access to debt markets
for firms, expand the universe of investment opportunities for investors, and are deeply
interwoven into financial regulation. Because credit ratings are an important factor in firms’
level of access to and cost of debt capital, firms have incentives to take potentially costly
actions to improve their rating.
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I use an institutional feature of the credit rating process that generates cross-sectional
variation in the incentives of firms to improve on a specific dimension that CRAs emphasize:
Debt/EBITDA ratio. I show that firms that are near salient Debt/EBITDA thresholds–
effectively receiving a high-incentive “treatment” to improve on this dimension–respond by
reducing R&D and SG&A investments in the periods leading up to getting a bond rated.
Further, I show that these firms are more likely to experience declines in innovation output,
profitability, and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q in the years following bond issuance
than observationally similar control firms. These results highlight an important cost of arms-
length financing and suggest that the benefits of policies requiring increased transparency
and disclosure of credit rating criteria should be carefully balanced against the corporate
behavioral distortions they may induce.19
19See the “Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006” and Title IX, Subtitle C – Improvements to the
Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies of the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act.”
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1.1: The Distribution of Debt/EBITDA One Year Prior to Getting Rated
This figure presents a kernel density of the sample Debt/EBITDA ratio one year prior to getting
rated. The shaded areas indicate regions where issuers are approaching a salient Debt/EBITDA
threshold and thus have a high incentive to improve along this dimension, as described in Section
1.3. In the empirical tests, I refer to the shaded regions as high-incentive zones (H-I Zones).
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Figure 1.2: Issuer Characteristics by Whether the Firm Is in the High-Incentive Zone
This figure presents kernel densities of the sample separately for those near salient Debt/EBITDA
thresholds (H-I Zone=1) and those that are not. Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construc-
tion of the variables.
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Figure 1.3: Proximity to a Salient Debt/EBITDA Threshold and Subsequent R&D
Investment
This figure presents the mean issuer’s decision to reduce R&D investment policies during the year
leading up to getting a bond rated, based on issuer’s proximity to a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold
one year prior to getting rated. Each bin illustrates the mean of the binary behavior response of
the issuers in that bin with regard to reducing investment (corresponding to a value of one) or
not reducing investment (corresponding to a value of zero). The darker bins represent issuers
near a salient threshold (e.g., 2.0, 2.5, etc.), which I refer to as high-incentive zones (H-I Zones)
throughout the paper, and the lighter bins represent issuers who are not (denoted in the figure with
a “C” to represent Control).
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Figure 1.4: Likelihood of Cutting Investment as a Function of Distance to a Threshold
This figure presents the plot of the change in likelihood of cutting R&D and SG&A investment
policies as a function of the issuer’s distance to a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold a year prior to
getting a bond rated as estimated in Table 1.5. For example, 0.1 on the x-axis represents firms
with Debt/EBITDA = (2.0 + 0.1=) 2.1, 2.6, 3.1, etc.
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1.9 Tables
Table 1.1: Business and Financial Risk Profile Matrix
This table presents excerpts from the credit ratings methodologies published by major credit rating agencies.
Panel A presents Standard & Poor’s Corporate Credit Rating Methodology Business Risk/Financial Risk
Profile Matrix (Standard and Poor’s, 2012) and Panel B presents the Debt/EBITDA to credit rating mapping
for the global steel industry by Moody’s (Moody’s Investor Service, 2012).
Panel A: Standard & Poor’s Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix
Financial Risk Profile
Minimal Modest Intermediate Significant Aggressive Highly Leveraged
Debt/EBITDA < 1.5 1.5-2.0 2.0-3.0 3.0-4.0 4.0-5.0 > 5.0
Business Risk Profile
Excellent AAA/AA+ AA A A- BBB –
Strong AA A A- BBB BB BB-
Satisfactory A- BBB+ BBB BB+ BB- B+
Fair – BBB- BB+ BB BB- B
Weak – – BB BB- B+ B-
Vulnerable – – – B+ B B- or below
Panel B: Moody’s Example Rating Grid from the Global Steel Industry Methodology
Debt/EBITDA <0.75 0.75-1.25 1.25-2.0 2.0-3.0 3.0-4.0 4.0-5.5 5.5-7.5 >7.5
Rating Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca
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Table 1.2: Sample Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the sample. All variables are winsorized at 1% prior to regression
analysis. Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables.
mean sd p25 p50 p75 count
Debt/EBITDA 2.47 1.08 1.59 2.24 3.22 1770
log(Assets) 8.32 1.62 7.19 8.31 9.54 1770
Book Leverage 0.35 0.14 0.25 0.33 0.42 1770
Tobin’s Q 1.64 0.72 1.15 1.43 1.91 1770
Cash flow/Assets 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.14 1770
log(Firm Age) 3.39 0.66 2.94 3.61 3.89 1770
Return on Assets 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.19 1770
Return on Equity 0.18 0.43 0.08 0.16 0.24 1770
R&D/Assets 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 807
SG&A/Assets 0.22 0.20 0.08 0.16 0.29 1770
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Table 1.3: Proximity to Salient Thresholds and Investment – Difference in Means
This table presents the percentage of firms that reduce R&D or SG&A investment policies during the year
leading up to getting a bond rated. Column (1) presents overall sample means, Columns (2) and (3) present
mean investment decisions for those not near a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold (H-I Zone = No) and those
that are near a salient threshold (H-I Zone = Yes). Columns (4) and (5) present the difference in means
for these two groups in percentage points (pps) and percent difference. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal
to one if the issuer is near a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see
Section 1.3 for details).
Overall H-I Zone Difference
Investment P(Cut Investment) No Yes pps %
R&D 51.4% 44.9% 63.5% 18.6∗∗∗ 41.5%
SG&A 52.4% 50.5% 55.5% 5.0∗∗ 9.9%
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: Proximity to Salient Thresholds and Investment
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of an indicator of whether the firm reduces R&D (Columns
(1)-(2)) or SG&A (Columns (3)-(4))investment during the year leading up to getting a bond rated on the
issuer’s proximity to a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated and firm
characteristics. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is near a salient Debt/EBITDA
threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see Section 1.3 for details). Table A.1 in the Appendix
outlines the construction of the control variables. Columns (2) and (4) include SIC 2 digit industry code
dummies. All standard errors are clustered by issuer.
Cut R&D Cut SG&A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-I Zone 0.184∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02)
log(Assets) -0.000 -0.007 0.015 0.009
(0.98) (0.69) (0.21) (0.49)
Tobin’s Q -0.028 -0.038 0.035∗ 0.022
(0.45) (0.33) (0.09) (0.32)
Cash flow -0.842∗∗ -0.871∗∗ -0.029 0.002
(0.05) (0.04) (0.89) (0.99)
log(Debt/EBITDA) -0.082 -0.136 0.030 0.027
(0.35) (0.12) (0.55) (0.62)
log(Firm Age) 0.067∗ 0.080∗∗ -0.009 -0.031
(0.07) (0.05) (0.69) (0.24)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 807 807 1770 1770
R2 0.186 0.236 0.097 0.129
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Tests Using Continuous Variables
Columns (1)-(2) present OLS estimates from regressions of an indicator of whether the firm reduces R&D or
SG&A during the year leading up to getting a bond rated on the issuer’s proximity to a salient Debt/EBITDA
threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated and firm characteristics. The dependent variables for columns
(3)-(4) are the percent change in the relevant investment policy during the year leading up to getting a bond
rated. dist equals the distance between the firm’s Debt/EBITDA and the adjacent better threshold (e.g.,
for Debt/EBITDA = 2.1, dist = 0.1) and dist2 is its square. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal to one if
the issuer is near a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see Section 1.3
for details). Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables. All specifications
include SIC 2 digit industry code dummies. All standard errors are clustered by issuer.
1{Cut Investment} %∆ Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R&D SG&A R&D SG&A
HI Zone -0.099∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
dist -0.644∗∗ -0.382∗∗
(0.02) (0.04)
dist2 0.765∗∗ 0.374
(0.04) (0.15)
log(Assets) -0.004 0.010 -0.002 -0.01∗∗∗
(0.81) (0.44) (0.85) (0.01)
Tobin’s Q -0.060 0.041∗∗ 0.032 -0.019∗∗
(0.10) (0.04) (0.21) (0.03)
Cash flow -1.025∗∗ -0.003 0.108 0.183∗
(0.02) (0.67) (0.24) (0.06)
log(Debt/EBITDA) 0.041 0.101∗ -0.003 -0.057∗∗∗
(0.70) (0.07) (0.95) (0.01)
log(Firm Age) 0.083∗∗ -0.028 -0.027 0.015
(0.04) (0.28) (0.33) (0.15)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 807 1770 807 1770
R2 0.211 0.129 0.306 0.146
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Proximity to Salient Thresholds and Investment When Credit Spreads Are
High
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of an indicator of whether the firm reduces R&D (Columns
(1)-(2)) or SG&A expenditures (Columns (3)-(4)) during the year leading up to getting a bond rated on
the issuer’s proximity to a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated and firm
characteristics. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is near a salient Debt/EBITDA
threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see Section 1.3 for details), and High Spread is a dummy
variable equal to one for time periods when the Baa-Aaa spread exceeds the median for the sample period.
Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables. Columns (1) and (3) reproduce
results from Table 1.4 for comparison. All specifications include SIC 2 digit industry code dummies. All
standard errors are clustered by issuer.
Cut R&D Cut SG&A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-I Zone 0.188∗∗∗ 0.007 0.062∗∗ -0.013
(0.00) (0.93) (0.02) (0.78)
H-I Zone * High Spread 0.241∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.01) (0.04)
Controls, Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 807 807 1770 1770
R2 0.236 0.246 0.129 0.132
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: Future Declines in Operating Performance and Innovation Output
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of an indicator of future performance declines on whether
the issuer is near a salient threshold one year prior to issuing a bond and a vector of firm controls.
1{Perft+τ < Perft} = α+ ρ(H-I Zone)it +
∑
βXit + qt + it
The dependent variables in Panels A and B are dummy variables equal to one when the issuers average
patent productivity, measured as number of patents and citation-weighted patents, respectively, in the τ
years after bond issuance is lower than its average patent productivity one year prior to getting a bond
rated. The dependent variable in Panels C and D are dummy variables equal to one when the issuer’s ROA
(operating income/assets) or ROE (net income/shareholder equity) in τ years is lower than its respective
value one year prior to getting a bond rated. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is near
a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see Section 1.3 for details). The
vector of controls includes log(Assets), Tobin’s Q, Cash flow/Assets, log(Debt/EBITDA) and SIC 2 digit
industry code dummy variables. R&D/Assets is included as a control in Panels A and B. Table A.1 in the
Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables. All standard errors are clustered by issuer.
Panel A: P(Lower Future Number of Patents)
+1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
H-I Zone 0.085∗ 0.024 0.006 0.031
(0.07) (0.57) (0.90) (0.47)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 557 548 496 450
R2 0.161 0.227 0.302 0.323
Panel B: P(Lower Future Patent Citation)
+1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
H-I Zone 0.041 0.056∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.052∗
(0.16) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 557 548 496 450
R2 0.454 0.563 0.571 0.521
Panel C: P(Lower Future ROA [operating income/assets])
+1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
H-I Zone 0.055∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.01) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1691 1528 1429 1205
R2 0.162 0.180 0.199 0.219
Panel D: P(Lower Future ROE [net income/shareholder equity])
+1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
H-I Zone 0.045∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.051∗ 0.036
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.20)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1691 1528 1429 1205
R2 0.177 0.195 0.171 0.169
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Future Changes in Tobin’s Q
This table presents estimates of changes in future industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (QIA). Panel A presents the
difference in QIA for the treatment (HI-Zone) and control firms for four years following issuance, followed
by the difference in differences across these groups. Panel B presents OLS estimates from regressions of
future QIA on whether the issuer is near a salient threshold one year prior to issuing a bond and a vector
of firm controls: QIAi,t+τ = α + ρ(H-I Zone)it +
∑
βXit + qt + it. Q
IA is the firm’s Tobin’s Q minus the
industry median Tobin’s Q for that time period. H-I Zone is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer is
near a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated (see Section 1.3 for details).
Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construction of the variables. All regression specifications include
SIC 2-digit industry dummy variables and all standard errors are clustered by issuer.
Panel A: Future Changes in Q – Raw Differences
∆QIA
Baseline QIA +1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
Control (H-I Zone=0 ) 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01
Treatment (H-I Zone=1 ) 0.19 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05
Difference-in-Differences 0.00 -0.03** -0.04** -0.03 -0.06**
p-value (0.97) (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) (0.04)
Panel B: Future Q – Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
+1yr +2yr +3yr +4yr
HI-Zone -0.028∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.029 -0.048∗
(0.06) (0.02) (0.18) (0.07)
log(Assets) -0.001 0.004 0.007 0.009
(0.95) (0.73) (0.59) (0.56)
Industry-Adjusted Q 0.831∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(Debt/EBITDA) 0.014 -0.014 -0.049 -0.115
(0.74) (0.79) (0.39) (0.14)
log(Firm Age) 0.002 0.012 0.019 0.008
(0.89) (0.57) (0.48) (0.80)
Leverage -0.054 0.018 0.123 0.178
(0.54) (0.89) (0.45) (0.41)
ROA 0.765∗∗ 0.659 0.229 0.307
(0.02) (0.11) (0.64) (0.65)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1691 1528 1429 1205
R2 0.767 0.664 0.590 0.461
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Crossing Thresholds, Cutting Investment and Credit Rating Improvement
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of changes in the issuer’s credit rating from one year prior
to getting rated and bond issuance on the key drivers of corporate credit ratings. 1{Improve Debt/EBITDA
bin} is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer crossed a salient threshold into a better Debt/EBITDA
bin during the year leading up to getting a bond rated. Cut R&D, SG&A are dummy variables equal to
one if the issuer cut the respective investment in the year prior to getting rated. Table A.1 in the Appendix
outlines the construction of the control variables. Include SIC 2 digit industry code dummies. All standard
errors are clustered by issuer.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Rating ∆Rating ∆Rating ∆Rating
Stock Return 0.339∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
∆log(Assets) 0.288 0.313 0.312 0.337∗
(0.14) (0.11) (0.39) (0.10)
∆Leverage -2.480∗∗∗ -2.483∗∗∗ -2.540∗∗ -2.464∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
∆Profitability 0.599∗∗ 0.505∗∗ 1.658 0.307
(0.04) (0.04) (0.20) (0.14)
∆Debt/EBITDA -0.061∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.064 -0.053∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.23) (0.01)
1{Improve bin} 0.260∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Cut R&D -0.155∗
(0.06)
1{Improve bin} * Cut R&D -0.031
(0.81)
Cut SG&A -0.130∗∗
(0.03)
1{Improve bin} * Cut SG&A 0.053
(0.58)
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1498 1498 687 1498
R2 0.236 0.252 0.311 0.263
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Crossing Thresholds, Cutting Investment and Yields
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of the yield of newly issued bonds on the key drivers of
default risk. For firms that issue multiple bonds in the same quarter, I use a dollar-weighted average yield of
the bonds. 1{Improve Debt/EBITDA bin} is a dummy variable equal to one if the issuer crossed a salient
threshold into a better Debt/EBITDA bin during the year leading up to getting a bond rated. Cut R&D,
SG&A are dummy variables equal to one if the issuer cut the respective investment in the year prior to
getting rated. Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables. Include SIC 2
digit industry code dummy variables, dummy variables for each credit rating, and dummy variables for each
salient Debt/EBITDA bin (described in Section 1.3. All standard errors are clustered by issuer.
(1) (2) (3)
Yield Yield Yield
Log(Assets) -0.146∗∗ -0.131∗ -0.162∗∗
(0.03) (0.09) (0.02)
Leverage 0.027 -0.675 0.083
(0.96) (0.33) (0.88)
Profitability -2.978∗∗∗ -2.998 -2.917∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.22) (0.00)
Stock Return -0.028 -0.755∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.88) (0.01) (0.95)
log(Bond Amount) -0.098 -0.276∗∗ -0.067
(0.35) (0.02) (0.53)
1{Improve bin} 0.090 0.096 0.177
(0.31) (0.60) (0.16)
Cut R&D 0.059
(0.66)
1{Improve bin} * Cut R&D 0.036
(0.88)
Cut SG&A 0.091
(0.43)
1{Improve bin} * Cut SG&A -0.125
(0.48)
Debt/EBITDA Bin FE Yes Yes Yes
Rating FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1140 551 1096
R2 0.619 0.685 0.626
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: Additional Tests
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of an indicator of whether the firm reduces R&D or
SG&A expenditures during the year leading up to getting a bond rated on the issuer’s proximity to a salient
Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond rated and firm characteristics. Panel A presents
estimates using the subsample of bonds that are more likely to be used for refinancing existing debt. These
are observations where the debt in current liabilities one quarter prior to issuance is at least as large as
the size of the bond issuance. Panel B presents the baseline regression, controlling for whether the issuer is
in violation of a financial covenant during the year leading up to getting a bond rated (Cov Violation=1).
Columns (1) and (3) use all observations that can be matched to the covenant violation data and columns (2)
and (4) re-estimate the specification with violating issuers dropped from the sample. H-I Zone is a dummy
variable equal to one if the issuer is near a salient Debt/EBITDA threshold one year prior to getting a bond
rated (see Section 1.3 for details). All the control variables used in the main specification are included in
these regressions. Table A.1 in the Appendix outlines the construction of the control variables. All standard
errors are clustered by issuer.
Panel A: Refinancing Bonds
(1) (2)
Cut R&D Cut SG&A
H-I Zone 0.261∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗
(0.00) (0.01)
Controls, Industry FE Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes
Observations 417 634
R2 0.395 0.264
Panel B: Covenant Violations
Cut R&D Cut SG&A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H-I Zone 0.198∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗ 0.080∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
Cov Violation 0.107 0.076
(0.36) (0.36)
Controls, Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 512 490 1116 1063
R2 0.259 0.258 0.125 0.127
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
42
CHAPTER II
Signaling, Financial Constraints, and
Performance-Sensitive Debt
2.1 Abstract
This paper examines how good borrowers use the design of performance-sensitive debt
contracts to alleviate financial constraints. I show that borrowers use a convex pricing grid
(i.e., a contract where the increase in the loan spread following a decline in performance
exceeds the decrease in the spread following a performance improvement) to signal their
unobservable creditworthiness and receive better bank loan terms. I find that constrained
firms who use convex pricing grids receive loans that are 21-28% larger with a spread that is
31-37 basis points lower than observationally similar borrowers who use fixed spread loans.
Consistent with the notion that a costly signal should positively correlate with future finan-
cial health, I find that constrained borrowers who use a loan with a convex pricing grid are
one third less likely to experience financial distress during the term of their loans.
2.2 Introduction
Asymmetric information causes high quality, but opaque, borrowers to face costly fi-
nancing constraints if they are unable to convince investors of their creditworthiness. These
constraints distort both the allocation of capital in the economy and borrowers’ real and
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financial policies.1 While there are multiple potential channels through which financial con-
straints may be relieved (e.g., better governance, different ownership structure, improved
legal systems and investor protection, etc.), this paper focuses on security design. Given
that information asymmetry plays a large role in the activities of the firm, it is impor-
tant to understand if, and by what means, borrowers design contracts to alleviate financial
constraints to move them closer to their first best policies.
A large theoretical literature suggests that signaling may mitigate information asymme-
try.2 In the spirit of the classic Leland and Pyle (1977) paradigm, I examine whether good
borrowers use contract design as a costly signal to separate themselves from bad borrowers
in the context of bank lending. If good borrowers can achieve this separation, they should
receive better terms of credit than if lenders pool them with bad borrowers. Specifically,
I test whether good borrowers use the presence and design of performance pricing in bank
loans as a credible signal of creditworthiness.
A state contingent mapping from performance to loan spread, which I refer to as the
pricing grid, is the defining feature of performance-sensitive debt (PSD) bank loans. This
feature is present in 54% of the 11,297 loans in my sample. As the firm performs better
(worse), the spread on the loan decreases (increases). A borrower exposes himself to more
risk by accepting a loan with a pricing grid instead of using a fixed spread loan. Looking
only at the presence of pricing grids, though, ignores the heterogeneity in their shape across
contracts. To exploit this variation in the design of the pricing grids, I construct a measure
of the pricing grid’s convexity. I define a PSD loan to be convex if the pricing grid has the
following property: the loan spread is more sensitive to decreasing borrower performance than
to increasing performance. Said differently, the punishment for diminishing performance is
more severe than the reward for improvement. Accepting a contract with this potentially
costly asymmetric response to changes in performance can signal good borrowers’ private
1For example, Stein (2003) reviews how asymmetric information influences investment behavior and
Campello et al. (2010) provide survey evidence on the role of financial constraints from the global financial
crisis in 2008.
2See Riley (2001) for a survey of signaling models in economics.
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information that they are less likely to arrive in lower performance states in the future. Thus,
I interpret higher convexity as a stronger signal of creditworthiness. Figure 2.1 presents a
graphical example a convex grid from a 1998 term loan to Central Parking Corp.
I classify all loans in my Dealscan-Compustat sample into one of three categories – fixed
spread (weakest signal), low convexity, and high convexity (strongest signal) – and I propose
that good borrowers can use a more convex contract as a costly signal to alleviate financial
constraints. Following specific predictions of this signaling hypothesis, I estimate the rela-
tionship between signal strength and loan size and spread and then between signal strength
and the borrower’s future financial health. By revealing themselves as good borrowers, those
that send a strong signal should receive more favorable terms of credit and be less likely
to experience future financial distress relative to observationally similar borrowers. These
effects should be strongest among opaque, financially constrained borrowers since lenders
are most uncertain about these borrowers’ creditworthiness.
First, I examine how PSD use and pricing grid convexity relate to loan size and spread.
While controlling for observable borrower credit risk characteristics, I find that borrowers
that use PSD contracts receive loans that are 16% larger and have a spread that is 22 basis
points lower than those that use fixed spread loans. I then exploit differences in pricing
grid convexity and find that the more costly high convexity signal is associated with the
best terms of credit. Controlling for observable credit risk, high convexity loans are 20%
larger and have a spread that is 27 bps lower than those that use fixed spread loans. To
test for differential effects for constrained versus unconstrained borrowers, I use various
sorting schemes to divide the sample according to ex ante financial constraint measures.
High convexity loans in the unrated, low payout policy, and “no prior relationship with
the lender” subsamples are 21-28% larger and have spreads that are 31-37 bps lower than
observationally similar fixed spread loans. These estimates are statistically different from
and economically larger than the corresponding effects in the unconstrained subsamples.
Next, I examine borrowers’ ex post financial health. Signaling mitigates information
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asymmetry only if it communicates information that is not otherwise observable. The hy-
pothesis that strong borrowers use convex contracts to signal otherwise unobservable cred-
itworthiness predicts that signaling borrowers are less likely to experience financial distress
in the future. I define borrowers as entering financial distress based upon their interest
coverage ratio during the term of the loan. I include convexity along with other observ-
able measures of credit risk from the default literature in regressions that predict distress
to test this hypothesis. The regression estimates show that opaque, financially constrained
borrowers that use high convexity PSD are approximately one third less likely to experience
financial distress during the stated term of the loan compared to those that use a fixed
spread. The relationship is not present for more transparent, less financially constrained
borrowers. These results support the notion that signaling matters most for transactions
with more severe information asymmetry.
This paper contributes to the bank loan contracting, signaling, and financial distress
literatures. The bank loan contracting literature examines how banks use monitoring and
security design to mitigate market imperfections and alleviate financial constraints. Much
of this literature focuses on the roles of collateral, maturity, and loan covenants. Despite its
widespread use, extant research largely overlooks the presence and heterogeneity of PSD con-
tracts. The studies that do acknowledge performance pricing typically consider its presence
a binary outcome. I exploit heterogeneity in the shape of these contracts to demonstrate that
a “dummy variable” approach misses much of the richness and versatility of PSD. A clear
picture of how borrowers and lenders design and use PSD is important to better understand
bank lending and PSD’s role in the financial contracting toolbox.
Related, but more broadly, this paper contributes to the literature on signaling in finance.
While there is a large, rich theoretical literature on the role of signaling in finance, empirical
evidence supporting these theories is somewhat scarce. Much of the empirical contracting
literature studies the effects of contract design on ex post firm behavior or how observable
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firm characteristics affect loan spreads.3 The literature is mostly silent on how borrowers
can use financial contract design as a signal to mitigate information asymmetry between
themselves and lenders to ease financial constraints. To help fill this gap, I provide empirical
support for the signaling hypothesis that borrowers can use the convexity of a performance
pricing grid as a costly signal of creditworthiness.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on predicting financial distress. I show
that constrained borrowers can design contracts that reveal information about their likeli-
hood of future distress beyond what is explained by observable credit risk variables from
previous literature. Specifically, I show that when opaque borrowers use convex PSD con-
tracts, they reveal otherwise unobservable positive information about their creditworthiness
that variables such as leverage, volatility, size, profitability, and credit rating do not capture.
The papers that most closely relate to mine are Manso et al. (2010), Asquith et al.
(2005), and Tchistyi et al. (2011). Manso et al. (2010) model PSD as a screening device
used to separate high growth firms from low growth firms. They provide empirical evidence
supporting the predictions of their theoretical model by using a sample of contracts from
Thomson Financial’s SDC database that use credit rating based PSD. They show that these
firms were more likely to improve their credit rating than firms using fixed spread loans. My
paper is distinct from theirs in two key ways. First, while they shed light on some of the
determinants of PSD use as a binary outcome, I exploit the heterogeneity in the shape of the
pricing grid to study the implications of PSD use in alleviating financial constraints. I use
the degree of PSD contract convexity as a measure of the costliness of a signal to quantify
the economically significant relationship between signal strength and loan size and spread.
Second, while credit rating based PSD contracts constitute an important portion of the PSD
universe (18% of the PSD loans in my sample), their use is by definition restricted to those
that have a credit rating. Though the presence of a credit rating is endogenous, firms with a
credit rating are quite different from those without a credit rating (Faulkender and Petersen,
3See Roberts and Sufi (2009a) and the references therein for a recent review of this literature.
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2006a). Rated firms are less likely to face problems of asymmetric information to the extent
of unrated firms, so the value of the signal to these borrowers is lower. My study includes
performance-sensitive debt that is tied to accounting ratios (with debt-to-cash flow being by
far the most prevalent) as well as credit ratings, which allows for a more general analysis of
PSD use.
Asquith et al. (2005) provide exploratory analysis of the determinants of “interest-
increasing” performance pricing (i.e., interest spread increases when credit quality dete-
riorates) and “interest-decreasing” performance pricing. Their tests show that interest-
increasing performance pricing is correlated with contracting environments where renego-
tiation is likely to be more costly and where adverse selection may be a concern. They also
argue that interest-decreasing performance pricing is more prevalent when moral hazard
costs are higher. While their study provides plausible predictions, they do not study the
convexity of the pricing grids and do not provide evidence that corroborates their predictions
with ex post outcomes.
While I argue that signaling is one reason for borrowers to use PSD, this is surely not its
only use. Tchistyi et al. (2011) consider a subset of PSD contracts based on credit ratings
and show how managers can exploit the leveraging characteristic of PSD to increase financial
risk for their own personal gain through their compensation structure.
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. Section 2.3 discusses theoretical motivations
and empirical predictions. Section 2.4 describes the sample and the construction of my
measure of convexity. Section 2.5 tests the predictions and presents the results and Section
2.6 concludes.
2.3 Background and Predictions
High quality, but opaque, borrowers may have difficulty communicating their ex ante un-
observable quality to potential capital providers. The uncertainty about the these borrowers’
creditworthiness may lead lenders to ration or completely deny them credit. A lower quan-
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tity and higher cost of capital can constrain investment or lead to other suboptimal policies.
Effective financial contracting minimizes the impact of asymmetric information and allows
capital to flow more smoothly to productive users, allowing borrowers to move closer to their
first best policies.
Costly signaling is one way to solve this “unobservable type” problem. To separate
themselves, good borrowers need a mechanism through which they can credibly signal pri-
vate information about their type to lenders. Theoretical signaling models explain many
phenomena in finance including capital structure (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977), IPO
underpricing (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Welch, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989) and pay-
out policy (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). Within
the lending literature, theory suggests that high quality borrowers can signal their type
through, for example, collateral pledging (Besanko and Thakor, 1987) and debt maturity
choice (Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991). Though this theoretical literature is rich and the
idea of signaling is intuitively appealing, there is little empirical support for signaling mod-
els.4
PSD’s key feature is that it allows the interest rate spread on the debt to adjust without
intervention or renegotiation. The structure of the pricing grid is set during origination and
then the spread follows a mapping from a performance variable (e.g., debt-to-cash flow ratio)
to the loan spread during the life of the loan. Financial covenants are the most closely related
contract feature to PSD in that covenants make control contingent on a performance variable.
As opposed to having the spread automatically adjust as with PSD, control rights effectively
shift to the creditor if the borrower passes the covenant threshold. Following a covenant
violation, the borrowers and lenders typically renegotiate the contract and the lender often
waives the violation in exchange for concessions such as an increase in spread, an increase
4Jime´nez et al. (2006) provide a recent exception. Using a sample of Spanish business loans, the authors
show that while the overall driver of collateral use is observable credit risk, among young borrowers with no
previous record of financial or commercial activity, collateral is more likely to be pledged by high quality
borrowers. Thus among those with the largest information asymmetry, they find that collateral serves as a
signal of low credit risk.
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in collateral, or restricting the borrower’s credit access or investments (Chava and Roberts,
2008; Nini et al., 2009; Sufi, 2009). It would seem that PSD’s state contingent pricing may
substitute for covenants as a means to reduce the likelihood of costly renegotiation (Asquith
et al., 2005). However, Roberts and Sufi (2009b) show that the presence of performance
pricing is largely unrelated to the likelihood of renegotiation. Alternatively, I propose that
PSD contract design can serve as a costly signal of creditworthiness.
A hallmark of signaling models is that the “good type” must take an action that is too
costly for the “bad type” to mimic. For a contract to be a credible signal, it should include a
potentially costly feature that good borrowers can accept to separate themselves. From a risk
sharing perspective of contracting, the more diversified lender should bear more of the risk
than the smaller, relatively risk averse borrower. That is, the optimal risk sharing contract
would give the borrower a fixed interest rate. By accepting a PSD contract, the borrower
increases their exposure to their own specific risk since the borrower’s spread varies inversely
with their performance. Instead of smoothing outcomes across high and low performance
states of the world, PSD contracts amplify shocks to performance and increase the risk borne
by its users.
A convex pricing grid further increases the potential cost to the borrower. Convexity
causes the spread on the loan to asymmetrically respond to changes in performance. Specifi-
cally, convexity mutes the rewards in high performance states but maintains the penalties in
low performance states. By accepting a convex contract, the borrower can signal his private
information that he is less likely to arrive in low performance states. Creditors value this
information because it is the likelihood that borrowers will fall into a low performance state
that defines the borrower’s creditworthiness and directly relates to the success of the lender’s
investment.
Since borrowers’ types are inherently unobservable (hence the information asymmetry),
I examine observable outcomes to test the signaling hypothesis. The signaling hypothesis
motivates three testable predictions. First, the signaling borrowers should receive better
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loan terms. By using the costly signal, borrowers reveal themselves as good types. This
action should lead to an outward shift in the supply curve of credit, effectively providing the
signaling borrowers with access to larger loans and a lower interest rate spread.
Prediction 1: Borrowers that use a convex pricing grid receive larger loans and lower
spreads than observationally similar borrowers.
Second, signaling borrowers’ ex post outcomes should be consistent with the information
their signal communicates. If borrowers are indeed signaling higher creditworthiness by
accepting a convex pricing grid, they should have a lower incidence of future financial distress.
Prediction 2: Borrowers that use a convex pricing grid are less likely than observationally
similar borrowers to become financially distressed during the term of the loan.
Finally, the value of the signal hinges on the ex ante level of information asymmetry. If
lenders already know a borrower’s type, then signaling is informationally vacuous in addition
to being inefficient in terms of optimal risk sharing. On the other hand, where there is more
uncertainty about the borrower’s type, any information about creditworthiness is valuable
and increasingly so in transactions where the informational gap between the borrower and
lender is larger. Thus opaque, financially constrained borrowers should derive the most value
from signaling.
Prediction 3: Predictions 1 and 2 are strongest for opaque, financially constrained
borrowers.
2.4 Sample Construction and Key Variables
Data Sources
Loan data are from the Loan Performance Corporation’s Dealscan database. The database
contains detailed information on the performance pricing grids when they are present in a
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loan in addition to the other standard loan terms. To be included in the sample, a loan must
be originated in the USA, dollar denominated, and have a LIBOR base rate. Accounting
data are from the Compustat database. I match the Dealscan data to Compustat data
using a linking table from Michael Roberts (Chava and Roberts, 2008). Since the tests in
this paper require the borrower’s accounting variables, the final sample only includes loans
where I can match the borrower to Compustat. As a result, the sample consists of borrowers
that are, on average, larger than the universe of Dealscan borrowers as a whole. I winsorize
all variables at 1 percent to minimize the impact of outliers and I adjust all dollar amounts
to year 2000 price levels. Dealscan began recording pricing grid data in 1994, so the sample
period is 1994-2010.
Pricing Grid Convexity
Dealscan provides detailed data on the pricing grids for loans that have a performance pricing
feature. The database provides the complete mapping from the performance variable (e.g.,
debt-to-cash flow ratio) to a corresponding loan spread. Figure 2.1 from earlier illustrates an
example pricing grid. The solid line traces out the pricing grid, while the dotted line simply
connects the grid’s endpoints. To measure convexity, I compute the difference between the
level of the spread in the contract and the predicted value of the spread based on the linear
interpolation of the pricing grid endpoints.
Figure 2.2 presents a kernel density of the convexity measure for the sample of loans
with a debt-to-cash flow performance pricing grid. The densities using other performance
measures (e.g., leverage, credit rating, fixed charge coverage ratio, etc.) are similar. I set a
dummy variable High Convexity equal to one if the convexity measure is in the top tercile
of the distribution (shaded in Figure 2.2) for that performance variable.5 I set a dummy
variable Low Convexity equal to one for the remaining loans with performance pricing. For
the regression analysis, the omitted category is loans with a fixed interest rate spread (i.e.,
5I discretize the measure to provide a simpler interpretation. The results are robust to adjustments to
this threshold, which I use for the analysis because it is a natural cutoff in the empirical distribution. Using
continuous measures of convexity for the analysis yields qualitatively similar results.
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no performance pricing feature).
Ex Ante Financial Constraints Sorting
I focus on three ex ante financial constraint measures to test if the signaling mechanism
has differential effects for borrowers with different degrees of financing frictions (Prediction
3): whether the borrower (i) has a credit rating, (ii) paid a dividend during the prior year
and (iii) had a prior relationship with the lender. I present the results using these sorting
schemes for their simplicity in interpretation, but the results of the analysis are robust to
various other ex ante measures of financial constraint.6
First, borrowers without a credit rating are more likely to be financially constrained.
These firms are less likely to have easy access to public debt markets and they lack the
information production and certification that comes with a credit rating (Faulkender and
Petersen, 2006a).
Second, to the extent that external funds are more costly than those generated internally,
firms that pay dividends are likely to be less constrained than those that do not. Dividend
payers always have the option to redirect funds to investment rather than pay them out.
Third, no prior relationship between the borrower and lender indicates a larger infor-
mation gap. While borrowing from a lender for the first time is not a sufficient condition
for financial constraint, the first time that the borrower and lender enter into a lending
transaction, the lender knows less about the borrower than if there has been prior dealings.
As such, an informative signal is more valuable in this setting. Following the relationship
banking literature (see Bharath et al., 2011), I code a loan as having no prior relationship if
the borrower and lender have not transacted a loan package during the last five years.
Measuring Financial Distress
I use the borrower’s future interest coverage ratio as a measure of financial distress to in-
vestigate ex post outcomes (see Asquith et al., 1994; Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). I define
borrowers as financially distressed if they satisfy at least one of the following two conditions:
6Section 2.5.3 presents these robustness checks.
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(i) the borrower has an interest coverage ratio, defined as EBITDA divided by interest ex-
pense, below 1.0 for two consecutive years or (ii) the borrower has an interest coverage ratio
below 0.8 for one year. In case (i), I consider the first of the two years to be the year that the
firm begins to experience financial distress. The outcome measure I use in the specifications,
Future Distress, is an indicator variable equal to one if the borrower enters financial distress
prior to the stated maturity date of the loan. I drop observations where the borrower is in
financial distress at the time of origination, loans with a maturity of less than 12 months to
allow time for the measurement of distress, and loans that have a stated maturity after 2011
since these data are incomplete for the financial distress analysis.
Control Variables
For the multivariate analysis of the terms of credit, I include several variables that are
important in determining loan size and spreads. Previous research shows that characteristics
such as the borrower’s asset size, profitability, leverage, market-to-book ratio, and prior
relationships with the lender are important drivers of these outcomes. I lag all accounting
variables two quarters prior to the origination date. Though simultaneously determined, the
presence of collateral and financial covenants and the maturity of the loan could also affect
the pricing and size of the loan. I include these loan characteristics in the full specifications
to better isolate the impact of PSD. All results are robust to their exclusion.
The financial distress literature provides guidance on predictors of future financial dis-
tress. I include those variables as controls when investigating the ability of pricing grid
convexity to explain future distress. The structural modeling approach (see Merton, 1974)
and the hazard modeling approach (see Shumway, 2001a) suggest that firms with higher
leverage, higher volatility, lower profitability and smaller size are more likely to experience
financial distress. To further capture available information, I also include a full set of credit
rating dummies in the distress specifications.
Summary Statistics
The final sample consists of 11,297 loans with 3,592 unique borrowers from 1994-2010. Table
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2.1 presents summary statistics. While the sample attributes are standard for papers in this
literature, it is worth noting that 54% of the loans in the sample have the performance pricing
feature. The sample is also split relatively well between constrained and unconstrained
borrowers: 55% do not have an S&P credit rating, 63% have not paid a cash dividend in
the year prior to the loan, and 39% have no prior lending relationship with their lender.
These statistics also reveal that the borrowers experience financial distress prior to maturity
in about 12% of the loans in the sample.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Bivariate Analysis
Table 2.2 presents average borrower and loan characteristics for loans that have a fixed
spread (i.e., no pricing grid), use low convexity PSD, and use high convexity PSD. The last
column presents differences in means between loans with high convexity and those with a
fixed spread. The mean (median) size of loans with high convexity pricing grids is about
50% (over 100%) larger than loans with a fixed spread and 15% (45%) larger than PSD loans
with low convexity. The mean (median) spread for loans with a high convexity pricing grid
is about 93 bps (100 bps) lower than loans with a fixed spread and 40 bps (50 bps) lower
than contracts with low convexity pricing grids. Loans with high convexity also tend to have
longer maturity, are less likely to be secured, and contain more financial covenants.
While the differences in loan size and spread are sizable, Table 2.2 also illustrates non-
trivial differences in the average borrowers that use of each style of contract. Borrowers
using high convexity contracts tend to be larger, more profitable firms with slightly lower
leverage and higher market-to-book ratio. They also are more likely to have a credit rating,
pay dividends and have a prior relationship with their current lender. These characteristics
suggest that, on average, these borrowers may face less severe financing frictions. Finally,
despite having a longer average maturity than fixed spread loans, borrowers with high con-
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vexity loans are about half as likely to find themselves in financial distress prior to the stated
maturity of the loan.
These statistics show that loans with high convexity pricing grids tend to be larger, have
a lower spread, and their borrowers are less likely to find financial distress. However, these
statistics also suggest that observable credit risk characteristics could drive these differences.
I now turn to multivariate analysis to better separate the impact of pricing grid design from
observable credit risk factors.
2.5.2 Multivariate Analysis
2.5.2.1 Ex Ante Outcomes: The Terms of Credit
In the ensuing tests, I estimate the relationship between PSD and loan size and spread
while controlling for observable borrower and loan characteristics using the following speci-
fication:
Loan Size or Spread = α+βHC(High Convexity)+βLC(Low Convexity)+ΓXborrower+ΛXloan+
High Convexity (Low Convexity) is a dummy variable equal to one when the loan includes a
performance pricing grid with high (low) convexity as defined in Section 2.4. The coefficient
estimates on these variables represent the difference in loan size and spread for these styles
of loans compared to fixed spread loans, which is the omitted category in the specification.
I include year dummies to control for macroeconomic conditions, industry dummies for
persistent differences in risks across industries, loan type and purpose dummies since different
loan types and purposes may be priced differently and credit rating dummies to more fully
control for observable information about creditworthiness. I cluster all standard errors by
borrower.
Prediction 1 implies |βˆHC | > |βˆLC | > 0 with the point estimates positive when the
dependent variable is Loan Size and negative when the dependent variable is Spread. That
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is, after controlling for observable credit risk characteristics, PSD users should receive larger
loans and lower spreads and the magnitude of the PSD effect should increase monotonically
with the strength of the signal. Table 2.3 presents the results.
Models (1)-(3) present regression estimates with Loan Size, defined as the log of the
size of the loan (in millions), as the dependent variable. Before considering the differential
impacts of high and low convexity PSD, model (1) presents estimates of the impact of
the basic presence of PSD on loan size. The estimate indicates that PSD loans are about
16% larger than fixed spread loans after controlling for borrower characteristics. Model
(2) separates PSD into high convexity and low convexity categories to test the relationship
between signal strength and loan size. The estimates of βˆHC = 0.25 and βˆLC = 0.11 represent
a large differential impact of high convexity contracts over both low convexity and fixed
spread contracts. These estimates are economically significant and statistically different
from both zero and each other with p < 0.01. Model (3) includes loan maturity, number of
financial covenants, and a dummy for secured loans to better isolate the specific correlation
between the PSD variables and loan size. The magnitude of the point estimates for High
Convexity and Low Convexity are smaller in this model, but they remain economically large
and statistically different from both zero and each other. Overall, models (1)-(3) show
that borrowers who use PSD receive much larger loans than those who do not and that
high convexity loans drive this effect. Controlling for borrower and loan characteristics, the
average loan with a high convexity pricing grid is about 20% larger than one with a fixed
spread and low convexity loans are about 7% larger than fixed spread loans. For the average
loan in the sample, the coefficient estimate on High Convexity represents an increase of about
$48 million in loan size from $241 million to $289 million.
Models (4)-(6) present estimates with Spread as the dependent variable. Model (4) shows
that PSD loans have a spread that is 22 bps lower than fixed spread loans after controlling
for borrower characteristics. Model (6) presents the estimate of the full specification. Both
βˆHC = −27 bps and βˆLC = −12 bps are economically significant and statistically different
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from both zero and each other. At the sample mean loan size of $241 million, contracts with
high convexity have an annual interest expense that is $650 thousand less than fixed spread
loans, which adds up to $2.68 million over the life of the average maturity loan. Along with
the results of the Loan Size estimates in model (3), these results support Prediction 1 that
a stronger signal is associated with better terms of credit.
The coefficient estimates on the other covariates shown in Table 2.3 are consistent with
previous studies in this literature. Larger, more profitable borrowers with higher growth
prospects and stronger lending relationships tend to get better terms of credit. Whereas PSD
is associated with stronger borrowers and better terms of credit, the presence of collateral
and more financial covenants is associated with worse terms of credit.
Prediction 3 states that the effects of signaling should be larger for transactions where
the informational gap is more severe. I estimate the models separately for the financially
constrained and financially unconstrained observations to test this prediction.7 Empirically,
Prediction 3 implies |βˆConstrainedHC | > |βˆUnconstrainedHC |. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the subsample
regression estimates of the impact of convexity on loan size and spread, respectively. As
discussed in Section 2.4, I sort observations according to the presence of a credit rating
(models (1)-(2)), dividend policy (models (3)-(4)), and prior lending relationship (models
(5)-(6)).
Table 2.4 shows that the presence of a high convexity pricing grid has a larger impact
on loan size in the constrained subsample relative to the unconstrained subsample for each
sorting scheme. Borrowers who are unrated, non-dividend payers, and those in a new lending
relationship that use a high convexity pricing grid have, on average, loans that are 21%, 23%,
and 28% larger than those with a fixed spread. The increase in loan size with high convexity
for the constrained subsample (βˆConstrainedHC ) exceeds that of the corresponding unconstrained
subsample (βˆUnconstrainedHC ), though the estimates are economically large for both. Wald tests
7I estimate the models separately because lenders may have a different lending model for these different
subsets of firms. In unreported results, I estimate a full specification that includes the measures of convexity
interacted with the financial constraint sorting variable and find quantitatively similar and qualitatively
identical results.
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reject βˆConstrainedHC = βˆ
Unconstrained
HC at conventional levels for each sorting scheme (I present
p-values from these tests at the bottom of the table). The difference is particularly large
for borrowers entering their first loan with a lender. High convexity has twice the impact
for borrowers with no prior relationship compared to those that are in repeat relationships
(βˆConstrainedHC = 0.28 versus βˆ
Unconstrained
HC = 0.14). Within the constrained subsamples, the
weaker signal of low convexity is also associated with larger loans, though the effect is less
than half as large as high convexity in all cases and there is no effect of low convexity among
unconstrained borrowers.
Table 2.5 presents similar results from regressions where Spread is the dependent variable.
High convexity pricing grids are associated with a much larger reduction in loan spread in
the constrained subsamples relative to the unconstrained subsamples, though the impact is
economically significant for both groups. Borrowers that are unrated, non-dividend payers,
and those with no prior lending relationship that use a high convexity loans have, on average,
a spread that is 36 bps, 31 bps, and 37 bps lower than those with fixed spread loans. These
estimates are both statistically different from and 20 bps, 8 bps, and 14 bps greater in
magnitude than the point estimates for High Convexity in the corresponding unconstrained
subsamples.
Overall, the results in Tables 2.3-2.5 support Predictions 1 and 3. A strong signal through
a high convexity pricing grid has a large positive impact on terms of credit and the results
are largest for opaque, financially constrained borrowers about whom lenders face more ex
ante uncertainty.
2.5.2.2 Ex Post Outcomes: Predicting Financial Distress
There is certainly no random assignment of the presence and shape of PSD among good
type borrowers in this study. Because of this, the results of the previous section may be
subject to the endogeneity concerns that pervade nearly all studies in this literature. For
example, some worries may include that it may be loan demand that drives the results
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(though a positive shift in the demand curve would predict higher, not lower, spreads) or
that PSD users, despite their small size relative to large diversified lenders, get better loan
terms as a premium for bearing additional risk. This section focuses on ex post outcomes to
alleviate some of these worries.
If pricing grid convexity signals otherwise unobservable creditworthiness, then those that
signal should be less likely to experience future financial distress (Prediction 2). As I de-
scribed in Section 2.4, I follow previous literature and use thresholds of the borrower’s interest
coverage ratio for the periods following loan origination as a measure of financial distress. For
each loan, I set the variable Future Distress equal to one if the borrower’s interest coverage
ratio falls below that threshold prior to the stated maturity of the loan.
The bivariate results from Table 2.2 show that borrowers who use high convexity loans are
about half as likely to experience financial distress as those that use fixed spread contracts.
These simple averages, however, do not control for observable credit risk variables. To make
a more fitting comparison, I use multivariate regression to control for observable borrower
specific characteristics at the time of origination that relate to credit risk with the following
specification:8
Future Distress = α + δHC(High Convexity) + δLC(Low Convexity) + ΨXcredit risk + 
The financial distress literature has shown that borrowers with higher leverage, higher volatil-
ity, lower profitability and smaller size are more likely to experience financial distress. In
addition to these variables, I include a full set of credit rating dummy variables to incorporate
the observable opinion of credit rating agencies on borrowers’ creditworthiness. I include the
loan maturity as a control variable since loans with longer maturities have more time to find
trouble. I also include year, industry, loan type and loan purpose dummies in Xcredit risk. If
a high convexity pricing grid indeed signals unobservable creditworthiness, then its presence
8I present results using a linear probability model for ease of interpretation. Estimation using logit and
probit regression models provide similar results.
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should be negatively related to future financial distress after controlling for other observable
measures of credit risk. Empirically, Prediction 2 states δˆHC < 0.
A potential concern with the distress specification is the effect of the incremental interest
expense burden from the new loan on future distress. As earlier results showed that high
convexity loans have a lower spread, these loans will have an interest expense that is smaller
for each dollar borrowed. However, it is not clear that the total interest expense burden will
be lower on net since the earlier results also show that high convexity loans are larger. In
any case, I control for incremental impact of the current loan’s interest expense by including
the ratio of the new interest payment to total assets (New Interest Expense) in the full
specification. To ensure that the results reflect future distress, I drop all observations where
the borrower is below the distress threshold at loan origination. Table 2.6 presents the
results.
Model (1) indicates that borrowers with loans that have a performance pricing feature
are about 2 percentage points (or about 17% based on the sample average of 12%) less
likely to enter financial distress than those with loans that have a fixed spread loan. In
model (3), with high convexity and low convexity indicators in the place of the generic PSD
indicator, the High Convexity point estimate δˆHC is negative, but not statistically significant
at conventional levels with p = 0.11. Models (2) and (4) include the incremental interest
expense of the loan. A larger incremental interest expense burden is associated with a
higher likelihood that the borrower will experience future financial distress, but including
this variable has little effect on the point estimates of the PSD signaling variables.
The full sample regression estimates in Table 2.6, however, ignore the level of ex ante
information asymmetry. A signal is only useful to the extent that it conveys new informa-
tion, so if there exists a relationship between the high convexity signal and future finan-
cial distress, it should be strongest in transactions where there is more uncertainty about
the borrower’s creditworthiness (Prediction 3). To test this, I estimate the specification
separately for the constrained and unconstrained subsamples. Predictions 2 and 3 imply
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δˆConstrainedHC < δˆ
Unconstrained
HC ≤ 0 since there is more uncertainty about the prospects of con-
strained borrowers. Table 2.7 presents results.
Estimates from all three ex ante sorting schemes support the notion that the high convex-
ity signal is more informative for opaque, financially constrained borrowers. For borrowers
who are unrated, non-dividend paying, or have no prior relationship with the lender, high
convexity is associated with a 4, 5, and 6 percentage point lower likelihood of experiencing
financial distress prior to maturity. These estimates are statistically distinct from both zero
and Low Convexity point estimates. In the unconstrained subsamples, the estimates of the
PSD variable coefficients are not statistically different from zero. The point estimates on High
Convexity support the prediction that loans using high convexity pricing grids communicate
information about constrained borrowers’ creditworthiness that conventional predictors of
financial distress do not capture. With mean future distress rates that range from 13% to
15% for the constrained subsamples, borrowers who use high convexity PSD contracts are
approximately one-third less likely to experience financial distress during the stated term of
their loan than are observationally similar fixed spread borrowers.
2.5.3 Robustness: Alternative Ex Ante Sorting Schemes
In the main results section, I use the presence of a credit rating, borrower payout policy
and prior lending relationship to divide the sample between borrowers who are more or less
likely to face informational frictions and financial constraints. To test the sensitivity of the
results to the sorting schemes, I repeat the regressions with the sample sorted along the
following dimensions: (i) Size (total assets), (ii) age (number of years in Compustat), (iii)
Whited and Wu (2006) index, and (iv) analyst estimates dispersion.9 Table 2.8 presents the
results of the subsample analysis for loan size, spread, and likelihood of distress. I include
the full set of covariates from the earlier analysis, but only display the estimates for High
Convexity and Low Convexity to save space.
9All results are also robust to using the SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) which combines size and
age and analyst coverage to categorize the sample.
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The results broadly support the earlier findings. While the results when dividing by age
are not as strong for the Spread specification and not statistically significant for the distress
specification (p-value of 0.12), high convexity is associated with much larger loans for young
firms. Overall, Table 2.8 shows that the earlier results do not critically depend on specific
ex ante sorting schemes.
2.6 Conclusions
Previous research has shown that asymmetric information and financial constraints can
cause suboptimal firm policies and an inefficient allocation of capital in the economy. In this
paper, I show how contracting parties design performance pricing grids in PSD bank loans
mitigate informational frictions and ease financial constraints.
After establishing that PSD contracts, in general, receive more favorable terms of credit, I
exploit the rich heterogeneity in the shape of the pricing grids to construct a measure of con-
vexity which I interpret as the strength of the signal. High convexity contracts are costly for
borrowers because they expose the borrower to additional risk and provide a smaller reward
for improved performance with a larger punishment for decreased performance. I find that
good borrowers, by subjecting themselves to these costly convex pricing grids, can effectively
signal their otherwise unobservable high quality and receive larger loans and lower spreads.
The effects of this costly signal are largest among opaque, financially constrained borrowers.
I then test the relationship between convexity and ex post financial health. Consistent with
the signaling hypothesis, I find that opaque, constrained borrowers who use convex PSD
are about one third less likely to face financial distress than observationally similar borrow-
ers. Together, these results highlight the ability of security design to communicate ex ante
unobservable credit quality to ease financing frictions.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Performance Pricing Grid.
This figure presents an example pricing grid from a 1998 term loan to Central Parking Corp that maps their
debt-to-cash flow ratio to a loan spread (basis points). The bold line is the actual grid and the dotted line
represents a linear interpolation of the endpoints. The actual pricing grids are flat in each interval, with a
step increase at each intermediate point (e.g., at 2.0, 2.5, and so on. I simply connect the points in the figure
for illustrative purposes. With an initial spread of 100 bps and the linear interpolation predicting 125 bps,
the convexity measure is 25 bps.
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Figure 2.2: Sample Density of Pricing Grid Convexity: Debt-to-Cash Flow.
This figure presents the empirical distribution of the measure of convexity (in basis points) which I define
as the difference between the level of the spread in the contract and the predicted value of the spread based
on the linear interpolation of the pricing grid endpoints. For the analysis, I code the PSD loans that fall in
top tercile of the distribution (the shaded region) as “High Convexity” and the remainder of the PSD loans
as “Low Convexity.”
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Sample Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for loans from 1994-2010. See Table B.1 in the appendix for variable
definitions.
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max count
Loan Characteristics:
Spread (bps) 200.79 119.85 17.50 112.50 200.00 275.00 750.00 11297
Loan Size (mil) 241.39 385.28 1.00 35.00 100.00 262.00 2250.00 11297
Maturity (months) 49.31 22.79 5.00 36.00 58.00 60.00 180.00 11297
Secured 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 11297
Financial Covenants 1.68 1.17 0.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 6.00 11297
PSD 0.54 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 11297
Borrower Characteristics:
Assets (mil) 2260.55 5371.48 8.56 194.89 594.25 1836.68 49221.90 11297
Leverage 0.34 0.27 0.00 0.18 0.31 0.46 6.92 11297
Market-to-Book 1.45 0.97 0.31 0.87 1.18 1.69 7.07 11297
Profitability 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.69 11297
Interest Coverage 16.79 44.85 -61.57 2.63 5.51 12.14 310.21 11297
EBITDA Volatility 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.15 11297
Constrained & Future Distress:
Prior Lender Relationship 0.61 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 11297
Not Rated 0.55 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 11297
Non-Dividend Payer 0.63 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 11297
Future Distress 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 7208
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics by Contract Type
This table presents subsample means [medians] of loans from 1994-2010. Fixed Spread represents loans with
no performance pricing grid. High Convexity dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a performance
pricing grid that is in the top tercile of the convexity measure (see Section 2.4 for details). Low Convexity
dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a performance pricing grid that is not in the top tercile of the
convexity measure. HC-Fixed is the difference in means of the High Convexity and Fixed Spread subsamples.
See Table B.1 in the appendix for variable definitions.
Fixed Spread Low Convexity High Convexity HC-Fixed
Loan Characteristics:
Spread (bps) 236.72 183.84 143.91 -92.82∗∗∗
[225.00] [175.00] [125.00]
Loan Size (mil) 198.85 264.58 303.06 104.21∗∗∗
[75.00] [110.00] [160.00]
Maturity (months) 46.92 51.52 51.11 4.19∗∗∗
[47.00] [60.00] [60.00]
Secured 0.85 0.73 0.60 -0.25∗∗∗
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Financial Covenants 1.29 2.02 2.02 0.73∗∗∗
[1.00] [2.00] [2.00]
Borrower Characteristics:
Assets (mil) 1916.12 2555.15 2564.38 648.26∗∗∗
[434.01] [673.54] [806.59]
Leverage 0.36 0.34 0.32 -0.04∗∗∗
[0.32] [0.31] [0.30]
Market-to-Book 1.39 1.48 1.55 0.16∗∗∗
[1.08] [1.25] [1.30]
Profitability 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.04∗∗∗
[0.10] [0.14] [0.14]
Interest Coverage 14.76 17.94 19.66 4.90∗∗∗
[4.17] [6.36] [7.36]
EBITDA Volatility 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01∗∗∗
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Constrained & Future Distress:
Prior Lender Relationship 0.54 0.65 0.71 0.17∗∗∗
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Not Rated 0.59 0.50 0.52 -0.07∗∗∗
[1.00] [0.00] [1.00]
Non-Dividend Payer 0.69 0.59 0.54 -0.15∗∗∗
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Future Distress 0.17 0.11 0.08 -0.09∗∗∗
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations† 5239 3915 2143
†Observations applies to all variables with the exception of Future Distress, whose proportions are similar,
but has less observations due to data restrictions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
67
Table 2.3: Terms of Credit - Full Sample
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of log(Loan Size) in Models (1)-(3) and Spread in Models
(4)-(6) on borrower and loan characteristics. log(Loan Size) is the log of the loan facility amount in millions
of dollars. Spread is the interest rate spread in basis points. High Convexity dummy variable equal to one if
the loan has a performance pricing grid that is in the top tercile of the convexity measure (see Section 2.4
for details). Low Convexity dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a performance pricing grid that is
not in the top tercile of the convexity measure. Table B.1 in the appendix presents the construction of the
other covariates. All specifications include a full set of year, 2 digit SIC industry, loan type, loan purpose,
and credit rating dummies. All standard errors are clustered by borrower.
log(Loan Size) Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PSD 0.16∗∗∗ -21.57∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
High Convexity 0.25∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ -34.96∗∗∗ -27.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Low Convexity 0.11∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ -14.51∗∗∗ -12.38∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(Assets) 0.70∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ -14.55∗∗∗ -14.27∗∗∗ -2.18
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13)
Leverage 0.21∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 25.23∗∗∗ 25.39∗∗∗ 26.01∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market-to-Book 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ -6.28∗∗∗ -6.03∗∗∗ -4.74∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Profitability 0.27∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.23∗ -44.16∗∗∗ -44.82∗∗∗ -38.82∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
log(1+Interest Coverage) 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 -24.19∗∗∗ -24.03∗∗∗ -20.10∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CF Volatility 2.25∗∗∗ 2.30∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗∗ 180.23∗∗∗ 173.18∗∗∗ 190.06∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Relationship 0.14∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ -5.45∗∗ -4.93∗∗ -4.22∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
log(Maturity) 0.35∗∗∗ -10.93∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Financial Covenants -0.02∗∗ 2.56∗∗
(0.04) (0.03)
Secured -0.20∗∗∗ 55.95∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
log(Loan Size) -11.62∗∗∗
(0.00)
Constant -0.47∗∗ -0.45∗ -1.42∗∗∗ 537.66∗∗∗ 534.44∗∗∗ 495.30∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 10842 10842 10842 10842 10842 10842
R2 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.56 0.56 0.59
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Loan Size - Subsample Analysis
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of log(Loan Size) on borrower and loan characteristics
within subsets of the sample sorted by ex ante measures of financial constraint and information asymmetry.
log(Loan Size) is the log of the loan facility amount in millions of dollars. High Convexity dummy variable
equal to one if the loan has a performance pricing grid that is in the top tercile of the convexity measure
(see Section 2.4 for details). Low Convexity dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a performance
pricing grid that is not in the top tercile of the convexity measure. Table B.1 in the appendix presents the
construction of the other covariates. βˆConstHC = βˆ
Unconst
HC presents the p-values for the Wald test statistic of
equality of the coefficients on High Convexity between complementary subsamples. All specifications include
a full set of year, 2 digit SIC industry, loan type, loan purpose, and credit rating dummies. All standard
errors are clustered by borrower.
Credit Rating Dividend Payer Prior Relationship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yes No Yes No Yes No
High Convexity 0.14∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Low Convexity 0.03 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05 0.07∗∗∗ 0.02 0.13∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.00) (0.17) (0.01) (0.34) (0.00)
Relationship 0.12∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(Assets) 0.60∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Leverage 0.12∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Market-to-Book 0.07∗∗∗ -0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 0.04∗∗ 0.01
(0.00) (0.49) (0.00) (0.52) (0.01) (0.64)
Profitability 0.18 0.35∗∗ 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.25
(0.32) (0.02) (0.38) (0.13) (0.25) (0.11)
log(1+Interest Coverage) 0.04∗ -0.00 0.04∗∗ 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.87) (0.03) (0.68) (0.45) (0.40)
CF Volatility 1.86∗ 3.18∗∗∗ 0.76 3.11∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗ 2.62∗∗
(0.07) (0.00) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
log(Maturity) 0.32∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Financial Covenants -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.01
(0.11) (0.15) (0.80) (0.01) (0.02) (0.30)
Secured -0.29∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.50∗ -1.81∗∗∗ -1.42∗∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -1.72∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 5046 5796 4133 6709 6710 4132
R2 0.61 0.70 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.74
βˆConstHC = βˆ
Unconst
HC 0.07 0.04 0.00
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Interest Rate Spread - Subsample Analysis
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of Spread on borrower and loan characteristics within
subsets of the sample sorted by ex ante measures of financial constraint and information asymmetry. Spread
is the interest rate spread in basis points. High Convexity dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a
performance pricing grid that is in the top tercile of the convexity measure (see Section 2.4 for details). Low
Convexity dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a performance pricing grid that is not in the top
tercile of the convexity measure. Table B.1 in the appendix presents the construction of the other covariates.
βˆConstHC = βˆ
Unconst
HC presents the p-values for the Wald test statistic of equality of the coefficients on High
Convexity between complementary subsamples. All specifications include a full set of year, 2 digit SIC
industry, loan type, loan purpose, and credit rating dummies. All standard errors are clustered by borrower.
Credit Rating Dividend Payer Prior Relationship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yes No Yes No Yes No
High Convexity -16.07∗∗∗ -35.91∗∗∗ -22.81∗∗∗ -30.98∗∗∗ -22.43∗∗∗ -36.95∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Low Convexity -5.52 -18.50∗∗∗ -11.85∗∗∗ -12.38∗∗∗ -9.18∗∗∗ -17.07∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Relationship -3.53 -4.40 -0.03 -6.63∗∗ -4.73
(0.15) (0.13) (0.99) (0.01) (0.18)
log(Assets) 4.36∗∗ -5.08∗∗ -2.19 0.18 -0.28 -3.87∗
(0.05) (0.01) (0.29) (0.93) (0.87) (0.09)
Leverage 21.72∗∗ 45.09∗∗∗ 5.79 41.16∗∗∗ 33.83∗∗∗ 20.25∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09)
Market-to-Book -8.17∗∗∗ -3.70∗∗ -3.07 -6.10∗∗∗ -6.01∗∗∗ -4.07∗∗
(0.00) (0.02) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
Profitability -42.96∗∗∗ -34.17 -43.20∗∗ -33.22∗ -44.22∗∗ -22.44
(0.01) (0.10) (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.28)
log(1+Interest Coverage) -7.87∗∗∗ -19.74∗∗∗ -17.84∗∗∗ -19.78∗∗∗ -19.30∗∗∗ -19.95∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
CF Volatility 12.73 257.99∗∗∗ 314.73∗∗∗ 192.07∗∗∗ 151.12∗∗ 244.41∗∗∗
(0.90) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00)
log(Maturity) -11.54∗∗ -10.30∗∗∗ -4.60 -14.07∗∗∗ -15.70∗∗∗ -4.19
(0.02) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35)
Financial Covenants 1.92 3.04∗ 2.94∗ 2.75∗ 2.27 3.72∗∗
(0.21) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.12) (0.03)
Secured 42.94∗∗∗ 56.45∗∗∗ 57.27∗∗∗ 49.40∗∗∗ 53.61∗∗∗ 60.23∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
log(Loan Size) -13.44∗∗∗ -10.43∗∗∗ -10.64∗∗∗ -12.64∗∗∗ -12.10∗∗∗ -11.14∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 427.51∗∗∗ 485.78∗∗∗ 432.44∗∗∗ 510.36∗∗∗ 527.03∗∗∗ 431.41∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 5046 5796 4133 6709 6710 4132
R2 0.71 0.50 0.70 0.51 0.64 0.52
βˆConstHC = βˆ
Unconst
HC 0.00 0.09 0.01
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Predicting Financial Distress - Full Sample
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of Future Distress on borrower and loan characteristics
typically associated with predicting financial distress. High Convexity dummy variable equal to one if the
loan has a performance pricing grid that is in the top tercile of the convexity measure (see Section 2.4 for
details). Low Convexity dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a performance pricing grid that is not
in the top tercile of the convexity measure. New Interest Expense is the increase in the borrowers interest
expense burden from the current loan. Table B.1 in the appendix presents the construction of the other
covariates. All specifications include a full set of year, 2 digit SIC industry, loan type, loan purpose, and
credit rating dummies. All standard errors are clustered by borrower.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All All All
PSD -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗
(0.04) (0.05)
High Convexity -0.02 -0.02
(0.11) (0.12)
Low Convexity -0.01 -0.01
(0.50) (0.54)
log(Assets) -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗ -0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Leverage 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
Profitability -0.34∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
EBITDA Volatility 1.71∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Market-to-Book 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.20) (0.16) (0.17) (0.14)
log(Maturity) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
New Interest Expense 1.20∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.17
(0.14) (0.11) (0.16) (0.12)
Observations 7208 7208 7208 7208
R2 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Predicting Financial Distress - Subsample Analysis
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of Future Distress on borrower and loan characteristics
typically associated with predicting financial distress within subsets of the sample sorted by ex ante measures
of financial constraint and information asymmetry. High Convexity dummy variable equal to one if the loan
has a performance pricing grid that is in the top tercile of the convexity measure (see Section 2.4 for details).
Low Convexity dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a performance pricing grid that is not in the
top tercile of the convexity measure. New Interest Expense is the increase in the borrowers interest expense
burden from the current loan. Table B.1 in the appendix presents the construction of the other covariates.
δˆConstHC = δˆ
Unconst
HC presents the p-values for the Wald test statistic of equality of the coefficients on High
Convexity between complementary subsamples. The Mean Distress statistics at the bottom of the table
presents the sample mean Future Distress. All specifications include a full set of year, 2 digit SIC industry,
loan type, loan purpose, and credit rating dummies. All standard errors are clustered by borrower.
Credit Rating Dividend Payer Prior Relationship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yes No Yes No Yes No
High Convexity 0.00 -0.04∗∗ -0.00 -0.05∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.06∗∗
(0.81) (0.03) (0.91) (0.01) (0.87) (0.01)
Low Convexity 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.59) (0.35) (0.71) (0.35) (0.61) (0.46)
log(Assets) 0.00 -0.01 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.00 -0.02∗∗ 0.01
(0.68) (0.13) (0.00) (0.89) (0.02) (0.43)
Leverage 0.09 0.02 0.16∗∗ -0.01 0.06 0.03
(0.12) (0.67) (0.01) (0.71) (0.17) (0.49)
Profitability -0.11 -0.46∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.16 -0.49∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00)
EBITDA Volatility 0.99 1.58∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 0.90∗
(0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07)
Market-to-Book 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.14) (0.16) (0.21) (0.37) (0.62) (0.27)
log(Maturity) 0.00 0.07∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.99) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
New Interest Expense 2.88 1.10∗∗∗ -0.97 1.30∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.00) (0.68) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Constant -0.32∗∗ -0.09 0.08 -0.14 0.06 -0.41∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.35) (0.54) (0.28) (0.63) (0.01)
Observations 3099 4109 2604 4604 4378 2830
R2 0.27 0.17 0.26 0.17 0.19 0.21
δˆConstHC = δˆ
Unconst
HC 0.02 0.09 0.01
Mean Distress 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.15
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
72
Table 2.8: Robustness - Alternate Sorting Schemes
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of log(Loan Size) (Panel A), Spread (Panel B) and Future
Distress (Panel C) on the full set of covariates, whose point estimates are omitted to save space, used in
Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.7, respectively. The sort the sample to compare the top and bottom terciles of Size,
Age, Whited-Wu index, and Analyst Dispersion. High Convexity dummy variable equal to one if the loan
has a performance pricing grid that is in the top tercile of the convexity measure (see Section 2.4 for details).
Low Convexity dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a performance pricing grid that is not in the
top tercile of the convexity measure. βˆConstHC = βˆ
Unconst
HC presents the p-values for the Wald test statistic of
equality of the coefficients on High Convexity between complementary subsamples. The Subsample Mean
Distress statistics at the bottom of the table presents the sample mean Future Distress. All specifications
include a full set of year, 2 digit SIC industry, loan type, loan purpose, and credit rating dummies. All
standard errors are clustered by borrower.
Panel A: Loan Size
Size Age Whited-Wu Analyst Dispersion
Small Large Young Old Low High Low High
High Convexity 0.20∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Low Convexity 0.12∗∗∗ 0.01 0.06∗ 0.04 0.04 0.09∗∗∗ 0.02 0.07∗
(0.00) (0.81) (0.10) (0.22) (0.31) (0.01) (0.57) (0.09)
Observations 3177 3514 3372 3671 3370 3201 2242 2470
R2 0.53 0.43 0.71 0.78 0.52 0.61 0.75 0.68
βˆConstHC = βˆ
Unconst
HC 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.10
Panel B: Spread
High Convexity -32.87∗∗∗ -17.37∗∗∗ -22.98∗∗∗ -21.00∗∗∗ -22.25∗∗∗ -36.75∗∗∗ -14.38∗∗∗ -31.99∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Low Convexity -17.96∗∗∗ -8.52∗∗ -11.75∗∗∗ -9.16∗∗ -14.22∗∗∗ -16.72∗∗∗ 0.57 -15.09∗∗
(0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.89) (0.02)
Observations 3177 3514 3372 3671 3370 3201 2242 2470
R2 0.42 0.73 0.52 0.69 0.74 0.45 0.67 0.54
βˆConstHC = βˆ
Unconst
HC 0.02 0.74 0.03 0.01
Panel C: Distress
High Convexity -0.06∗∗ 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09∗∗ -0.03 -0.07∗
(0.05) (0.85) (0.12) (0.74) (0.24) (0.01) (0.16) (0.07)
Low Convexity -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.04
(0.27) (0.85) (0.99) (0.52) (0.33) (0.94) (0.61) (0.20)
Observations 2563 1909 2426 2166 1825 2170 1510 1385
R2 0.18 0.35 0.22 0.28 0.29 0.22 0.26 0.32
δˆConstHC = δˆ
Unconst
HC 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.27
Subsample Mean Distress 0.16 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.16
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER III
Design of Financial Securities: Empirical Evidence
From Private-Label RMBS Deals
3.1 Abstract
Using a representative sample of residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) deals
from the pre-crisis period, we show that deals with a higher level of equity tranche have
a significantly lower foreclosure rate that cannot be explained away by the underlying loan
pool’s observable credit risk factors. The effect is concentrated within pools with a higher
likelihood of asymmetric information between deal sponsors and potential buyers of the
securities. Further, securities that are sold from high-equity-tranche deals command higher
prices conditional on their credit ratings. Our study provides the first in-depth analysis of
the effectiveness of the equity tranche in mitigating informational frictions in this market.
3.2 Introduction
Securitization provides numerous economic benefits to borrowers and lenders such as
more favorable terms of credit for borrowers and better liquidity and risk sharing for lenders.
However, each step in the securitization process also introduces potentially costly conflicts
74
of interest.1 At the root of these frictions is the information asymmetry between different
agents along the securitization chain. Understanding the various institutional mechanisms
and security design solutions that can overcome these problems and facilitate the functioning
of these markets has important implications for both the economic theory underlying securi-
tization markets and ongoing policy debates.2 However, there is surprisingly little empirical
work in this area. To fill this gap in the literature, we examine the role of the equity tranche
in residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) deals in mitigating informational frictions
between deal sponsors and investors.
RMBS sponsors create financial securities by pooling several mortgages together and
then issuing marketable tranches against the pool’s combined cash flows. Security design,
therefore, is at the very core of the existence of this market. RMBS sponsors can convey their
private information to potential investors by retaining a larger financial interest in the asset’s
performance (Leland and Pyle, 1977). Motivated by theoretical models such as Gorton and
Pennacchi (1990), Boot and Thakor (1993), Riddiough (1997), DeMarzo and Duffie (1999),
DeMarzo (2005), and Hartman-Glaser et al. (2011), we analyze three main questions in this
paper. First, conditional on observable risk metrics of the underlying pool, does the size of
the equity tranche increase with the degree of information asymmetry between deal sponsors
and potential buyers of these securities? Second, conditional on the degree of information
asymmetry, do pools with a higher level of equity tranche perform better ex-post as compared
to observationally similar pools with lower levels of equity tranche? And third, do security
buyers pay higher prices for securities sold in high-equity-tranche deals as compared to a
1See, for example, Keys et al. (2012), Gorton and Metrick (2012) for recent surveys; Keys et al. (2010),
Mian and Sufi (2009), Purnanandam (2011), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), Je et al. (2012), Loutskina
and Strahan (2011), Acharya et al. (2009) for work related to the subprime mortgage crisis; and Ashcraft
and Schuermann (2008) for a detailed analysis of the securitization process.
2For example, issues surrounding the equity tranche of securitization deals form an important part of
the Dodd-Frank Reform Act. In discussing the effects of risk retention requirements pursuant to the Section
946 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the treasury secretary stresses the
importance of this tool in mitigating some contracting frictions and notes that: “. . . the academic literature
on risk retention with respect to asset-backed securitization is limited.” Scharfstein and Sunderam (2011)
examine some other recent policy proposals and provide suggestions for the more broad reform of the housing
finance system.
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similarly rated security in low-equity-tranche deals?
We carefully assemble a representative sample that comprises about 500,000 loans bun-
dled into 196 private-label RMBS deals from 2001-02 and 2005. Our sample covers a wide
cross-section of banks and borrowers. We combine tranche-level security data with the under-
lying pool characteristics at the time of RMBS issuance, and track the default performance
of each loan in these pools through December 2011. This comprehensive information on
the loan characteristics of the underlying pool, tranche-level security data, and the ex-post
foreclosure status of each loan in the pool allows us to examine the three questions posed
above.
We use the percentage of no-documentation loans in a pool as a cross-sectional measure
of information asymmetry between the deal sponsors and investors. There is no verification
of the borrower’s income or assets for these loans, and unlike full-documentation loans, they
are not accompanied by key information sources like federal and state income tax filings.
This leaves a great degree of discretion with the originating institutions in terms of verifying
employment and the level and stability of the borrower’s income. Soft pieces of information
like these are lost as loans pass through the securitization chain, widening the information
gap between the sponsor and the investor.3 We find that deals with a higher proportion of
no-documentation loans have significantly higher levels of equity tranche after controlling
for the effects of observable pool characteristics such as FICO score and Loan-to-Value ratio
(LTV). This finding is consistent with the key idea that investors are likely to have higher
adverse selection concerns in relatively opaque deals, which in turn motivates the sponsors to
create a larger informationally sensitive first-loss equity tranche (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999).
We also find that measures of observable credit risk, such as FICO score and loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, are unrelated to the size of the equity tranche. However, these variables, and not
the proportion of no-documentation loans in the pool, drive the division of the sold tranches
3The use of this measure is also in the spirit of the “opacity” measure of theoretical papers by Skerta
and Veldkamp (2009) and Sangiorgi, Sokobin, and Spatt (2009). Our assumption is that the information
asymmetry between sponsors and buyers increases with the loan opacity.
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between AAA and mezzanine groups. These results suggest that concerns about asymmetric
information explain the split between sold and initially unsold (equity) tranches, whereas
observable and easier to price characteristics of the pool explain the relative distribution
between AAA and mezzanine tranches.4
We next turn to our main question: does the size of the equity tranche serve as a signal
of the sponsor’s private information about the pool quality? While we do not, by definition,
observe the sponsor’s private information at the time of RMBS issuance, we do observe the
ex-post default performance (i.e., the foreclosure status) of every loan in our pools. The
ex-post default performance of a loan can be decomposed into three parts: (a) a component
that is entirely driven by observable information such as the borrower’s FICO score, LTV
ratio, the geographical location of the property, and the nature of interest rate on the loan;
(b) a component that is entirely driven by common macroeconomic shocks affecting all
loans in the economy; and (c) a residual component. We relate the level of equity tranche
created at the time of security issuance to the residual component to assess the relationship
between private information at issuance and subsequent loan performance. If the level of
equity tranche serves as a signal of the sponsor’s private information about the pool, then
we should find lower abnormal default (i.e., lower residual component) for loans from high-
equity-tranche pools. In contrast, if the level of equity tranche is unrelated to the seller’s
private information, it should not correlate with the residual component of default.
We implement this idea using two models of default prediction. In the first model, we
compute the expected default rate for each loan in the pool by fitting a default prediction
model that accounts for the component of default that is driven by observable loan and
property characteristics along with the year of loan origination. The difference between the
actual pool-level default rate we observe and the expected default rate of the pool from the
fitted model is our first measure of abnormal default rate. In the second model, we use
4Consistent with this idea, we also find that the hard pieces of information explain the pricing of indi-
vidual mortgages very well, whereas the extent of no-documentation loans has no effect on pricing measures
(see also Rajan et al., forthcominga).
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our sample of about 500,000 loans to create an observationally similar matched pool for
each actual pool. We use a loan-by-loan matching algorithm, which is then aggregated to
the pool level, that ensures that the actual and matched pools are similar on dimensions
such as FICO scores, LTV ratio, loan product type, and the property location. The default
rate of the actual pool over and above its match is our second measure of abnormal default
rate. By comparing the pool with their match, we effectively difference out the effects of
observable credit and macroeconomic risks as well as the correlation structure of the pool
to the extent that it is driven by geographical diversity. Critically, the matched pool, by
construction, lacks the private information component that is present in the actual pool.
Thus, the difference in the realized default rate of actual and matched pools’ default rates
provides our second measure of abnormal default.
We find that deals with higher equity tranche have significantly lower abnormal fore-
closure rate, and this effect is concentrated among pools with a higher proportion of no-
documentation loans. Said differently, for relatively opaque pools, higher equity tranche
predicts better performance in future. In economic terms, pools with above-median level of
equity tranche have 24-27% lower foreclosure rates that cannot be explained away by ob-
servable credit risk characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. The effect of the equity
tranche for relatively transparent pools is statistically indistinguishable from zero. These
results are consistent with the idea that sponsors create a larger equity tranche in deals with
favorable information on unobservable dimensions.
Are our results driven by asymmetric information concerns or simply a lack of information
with all agents in the opaque pools? To answer this question more precisely, we conduct
an important sub-sample test based on the originator’s affiliation with the sponsors. Prior
research suggests that sponsors are more likely to possess private information about the
underlying loan pools when they are also the loan originators (e.g., see Keys et al., 2010).
Consistent with our asymmetric information argument, we find that the effect of equity
tranche on ex-post loan performance is stronger in deals where the sponsors are also the top
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loan originators, i.e., in deals where the sponsors are likely to have better access to private
information.
We provide further evidence in support of private information content of equity tranche
by exploiting the passage of Anti-Predatory Lending (APL) laws across several states during
our sample period. These laws put stricter requirements on the lenders in terms of their
lending practices and disclosure policy which, on the margin, made it more difficult for
the lenders to originate poor-quality loans. Such a government regulation should reduce
the lemons problem in the market, making the use of private contracting mechanisms less
important. Therefore, prior to the passage of this law, the equity tranche is likely to serve
as a more important signal of private information for loans originated in APL states. At the
same time, the states that do not pass such laws should experience no systematic change
in the relationship between the equity tranche and abnormal default rate. Consistent with
this idea, we show that loans originated in APL states in the pre-passage period default at
disproportionately lower rate if they are backed by higher equity tranche.
In our third test, we study the pricing implications of equity tranche. If a higher level of
equity tranche conveys the sponsors’ positive private information about the pool, then the
market should respond to this signal by paying a higher price for the sold tranches of the
deal. To separate out the mechanical leverage effect of a higher level of equity tranche, we
condition our analysis on the credit ratings of sold tranches. Thus, we estimate the effect of
equity tranche on the yield spread of sold tranches after controlling for the credit rating of
the security. Since security prices are not directly available, following earlier literature we
take yield spread, defined as the markup over a risk-free benchmark rate, as the measure
of pricing (see Je et al. (2012)). We find that sold tranches command higher prices (i.e.,
lower yield spread) for the same credit rating class if they are backed by higher equity
tranche. Again, the effect is concentrated within opaque pools, giving further support for
the interpretation that the result is not driven by the mechanical leverage effect of equity
tranche. In addition, the effect is stronger for the more informationally sensitive non-AAA-
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rated tranches. Together, these results show that opaque pools with a higher level of equity
tranche have lower abnormal default rate ex-post, and ex-ante, they command a higher price.
These findings are consistent with the idea that the equity tranche serves as a mechanism
to convey the sponsor’s private information to potential buyers.
Some have argued that the equity tranche lost its signaling role during the pre-crisis
period because deal sponsors are free to sell them to other entities. Our empirical tests
provide evidence contradicting these claims. While we cannot track the ownership of the
equity tranche over time directly, sponsors did have a considerable amount of retained interest
in mortgage-backed securities on their balance sheets during our sample period.5 In addition,
the buyers of equity tranches in the secondary market were often active hedge funds or
CDO managers whereas the more senior tranches were typically bought by less sophisticated
investors such as retirement funds.6 Such a segmentation in this market is likely to provide
incentives to deal sponsors to retain relatively larger portion of better deals since equity
tranches are sold to relatively more informed buyers. In addition, some of the sales of equity
tranches were motivated by regulatory capital arbitrage considerations in which the sponsor
retained residual interest in the risk (see Acharya et al. (2013)). Our analysis shows that,
despite the possibility of subsequent sale, a higher level of equity tranche at issuance predicts
better future performance beyond what can be explained by observed credit risk factors, and
markets reflected this quality by paying a higher price for securities from these deals.
Our study connects to several strands of literature in banking, securitization, and real
estate finance. Griffin and Tang (2012b) study rating inflation in a large sample of CDOs
from 1997 to 2007 and conclude that rating agencies used their subjective assessment to
5For example, Goldman Sachs’ 2005 annual report states, “During the years ended November 2005 and
November 2004, the firm securitized $92.00 billion and $62.93 billion, respectively, of financial assets, includ-
ing $65.18 billion and $47.46 billion, respectively, of residential mortgage-backed securities.” The report also
shows the value of their retained interests in mortgage-backed securities to be $2.928 billion and $1.798 bil-
lion, respectively, for those time periods. A back of the envelope calculation suggests that (2.928-1.798)/62.93
= 1.73% was retained during this time period. While this is only a rough approximation, it clearly shows
that deal sponsors did retain at least a piece of these securities. A similar computation using information
from Merrill Lynch’s annual reports gives an estimate of 2.84%.
6For example, see the representative deal from CitiBank in Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Figure
7.2 on page 116.
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increase the size of AAA-rated tranche beyond the model-implied objective level. Ashcraft
et al. (2010) report a significant decline in RMBS subordination levels between 2005 and mid-
2007 and show that the ratings are correlated with ex-ante credit risk measures and they do
explain subsequent deal performance.7 Our study is related to Demiroglu and James (2012)
who show that linkages between syndicate members, namely the originators and sponsors,
can result in better ex-post performance of the securitization deals. Hartman-Glaser (2012)
studies the effect of seller’s reputation capital in these contracts. Je et al. (2012) show the
influence of large sponsors on credit rating agencies. An et al. (2011) study the role of
conduit lenders in mitigating informational problems in CMBS deals. Our work also relates
to a growing and large literature regarding the conflicts of interest in the securitization
market (see Je et al., 2012; Keys et al., 2010; Purnanandam, 2011; Downing et al., 2009).8
Unlike these studies, our paper does not study the motivations behind and differences in
securitized versus retained loans, or the possibility of originator moral hazard that comes
with securitization.9 Instead we highlight the effect of informational frictions within the set
of securitized deals and the RMBS contract’s ability to mitigate some of these frictions.
Much of the extant literature focuses on the informativeness of ratings, the optimal
subordination level, the effect of syndicate structure on deal performance, and the possibility
of rating inflation during the years leading up to the crisis. Our paper is the first to provide an
in-depth examination of the role of the equity tranche in mitigating informational frictions
between deal sponsors and investors in securitization markets. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical motivation and develops the main
hypotheses of the paper. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the results and
Section 5 concludes the paper.
7See Cornaggia and Cornaggia (forthcoming), Becker and Milbourn (2011) and Bongaerts et al. (2012)
for some recent studies on credit ratings for corporate bonds.
8See Benmelech et al. (2012) on securitization in the case of Collateralized Loan Obligations and Nadauld
and Weisbach (2012) for the effect of securitization on the cost of debt.
9An originate-to-hold model of lending can be viewed as a limiting case of an RMBS deal where the
entire stake is kept by the originating bank. From that perspective, our empirical findings are consistent
with the basic idea of this literature: as the sellers stake in the deal increases, the underlying loans perform
better in future.
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3.3 Hypothesis Development
Absent any market frictions, the pooling and tranching of securities cannot be a value
enhancing security design. Theoretical research, therefore, focuses on frictions such as in-
formation asymmetries, transactions costs, and market incompleteness to explain a financial
intermediary’s motivations behind asset-backed securitization. At a broad level, the optimal
design of financial securities serves as a mechanism to resolve inefficiencies through costly
signaling (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999), allocation of cash flow
rights (e.g., Townsend, 1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985), or allocation of control rights (e.g.,
Aghion and Bolton, 1992).10 We focus on the asymmetric information-based theories in the
paper for two main reasons. First, in recent years there has been considerable discussion and
debate among academics, practitioners, and regulators regarding the presence of information
problems in this market. Second, information-based theories provide testable cross-sectional
hypotheses that have important policy implications for this market.
We do not attempt to test any specific theoretical model in this paper. Instead, we develop
our hypotheses based on the collective insight of theoretical models of security sales in the
presence of asymmetric information. When an uninformed agent buys financial securities
from an informed seller, he faces an adverse selection problem which, in turn, imposes a cost
on the informed seller. This problem becomes more severe as the fraction of the asset the
seller desires to sell increases. However, by selling a higher fraction of assets to outsiders,
sponsors are able to redeploy their capital at attractive rates. Optimizing sellers, therefore,
face a trade-off between the benefits from selling a larger fraction of assets with the cost of
an adverse selection, or “lemons,” discount demanded by the buyer.11 In equilibrium, sellers
retain a fraction of the risky assets to signal the quality of the asset (Leland and Pyle, 1977).
10This is not a comprehensive list of design solutions. There are other motivations for security design
such as transaction costs and market incompleteness. For example, in an incomplete markets setting, Allen
and Gale (1988) argue that optimal security design assigns state-contingent cash flows to the agents that
values it the most in that state.
11Financial institutions face considerable regulatory capital charge for retaining equity tranche on their
balance sheets. This provides a direct justification for the use of equity tranche as a costly signal.
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Consider a mortgage i in pool p and denote its payoff by a random variable Y˜ip. Let
Xip be a set of publicly observable loan characteristics such as FICO score and loan-to-value
ratio. We can then express the loan’s payoff conditional on observable signals as follows:
Y˜ip|Xip = I˜ip + z˜ip (3.1)
I˜ip is the private information of the sponsor and z˜ip represents a random shock to the loan’s
performance. Iip is a known quantity to the sponsor, but remains a random variable to
outside investors.
As the distribution of I˜ip widens, the asymmetric information concerns increase and in-
vestors of debt securities issued against this payoff become more concerned about the adverse
selection problem (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999). In such pools, outside investors require the
sponsor to hold higher level of equity tranche in equilibrium. Therefore, considering two
pools with observationally similar loans (i.e., similar Xip), the pool with wider support of I˜ip
is likely to have a larger equity tranche. This argument forms the basis of our first test that
more opaque pools (i.e., those with a higher level of no-documentation loans) should have
larger equity tranche.
The optimal quantity of the security sold to outside investors depends on the sponsor’s
private information. Conditional on the degree of information asymmetry, sponsors sell a
relatively smaller fraction of claims on the pool to outsiders if their private information is
positive. Thus, an implication of the signaling models is that conditional on observable
characteristics, pools that are backed by a higher level of equity tranche should perform
better ex-post. This forms the basis of our second test that relates the level of the equity
tranche to ex-post default performance of loans.
Finally, an important implication of these models is that the demand curve for security
is downward sloping: as sponsors sell higher fraction of security to outsiders, outsiders
rationally infer the sponsor’s private information to be worse and demand a liquidity discount
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(DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999). This forms the basis of our third test that, after controlling for
leverage effects of the equity tranche size, the yield spread at issuance is lower for tranches
from deals backed by higher equity tranche.
The securitization of a pool of assets adds additional complexity to this standard lemons-
discount model. However these basic predictions apply equally well to the sale of securitized
assets. DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) show that the quantity of assets retained by the seller
serves as a costly signal of the asset’s cash flows in a similar manner as in the case of single
security sale. DeMarzo (2005) extends this model to address the sponsor’s choice between
selling assets individually versus selling them as a pool and then studies the optimal tranching
decisions. In addition to these key hypotheses, his model also provides some novel predictions
specific to the pooling and tranching of securities. We postpone the tests of these specific
predictions for future work.
3.4 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
We construct a novel dataset of RMBS pools and tranches using hand-collected data
from relevant SEC filings and matching them with loan-level data obtained from CoreLogic,
a private data vendor. We hand-collect the security level data from the SEC filings to
ensure that we do not miss any tranche in a specific deal. In addition, we hand-collect
several important pieces of information such as the proportion of no-documentation loans
in a pool and the identity of key players in the securitization chain from the SEC filings
that are not easily available from other sources. Our loan-level data contain information on
characteristics such as FICO scores and LTV ratios at the time of the deal as well as each
loan’s ex-post performance. In particular, we have information on whether the property
entered into foreclosure any time from the deal date through December 31, 2011. Since
we do not have data on the entire universe of RMBS deals during the pre-crisis period,
we take special care in ensuring that our sample is representative. We use a stratified
random sampling method to collect private-label RMBS deals covering a wide cross-section
84
of banks and borrowers. We provide detailed description of sample selection criteria and
data collection exercise in the Appendix C.1.
Figure 3.1 presents a schematic diagram of a representative deal and the relevant data
sources. Our random sample begins with 196 securitization deals from 2001-02 and 2005
covering a wide range of sponsors, originators, and servicers. Our main empirical tests
are based on a sample of 163 deals that have all the necessary information needed for the
analysis. These deals have approximately 3000 tranches issued against cash flows from
approximately 500,000 loans. The sample is approximately equally balanced between early
and late periods (defined as 2001-02 and 2005, respectively). Our sample represents about
12% of the dollar volume of securities issued in the market during the sample period. Thus,
we have a representative as well as an economically meaningful sample of deals from the pre-
crisis period. It is worth emphasizing that we draw our sample randomly from the universe
of all possible deals. This, in turn, provides confidence in the external validity of our results.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics. We winsorize all variables at 1% from both tails
to remove any outlier effects. Panel A of the table presents overall loan-, pool-, and tranche-
level descriptive statistics. Based on 501,131 loans that enter our full sample, the average
loan’s FICO score is 656 with an LTV ratio of 77%. These numbers are broadly in line
with Keys et al. (2012), who present detailed statistics on this market during 1998-2007. As
expected, there is considerable cross-sectional heterogeneity in these two key measures of
credit risk across loans. About 66% of the loans are classified as Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
(ARM) and 89% of loans are owner occupied residences. Turning to pool-level statistics, the
average pool has $776 million in principal amount and is backed by 3,150 loans.
We measure geographical diversification as the complement of one-state concentration of
the loan. We first compute the percentage of loans in a pool that comes from each state
and then identify the state with maximum share of loans in the pool. Our measure of
geographical diversification (GeoDiverse) is simply one minus this share.12 The average pool
12We perform several robustness tests using alternative measures of geographical diversification such as
Herfindahl index across states and concentration in top-three states. Our key results remain similar.
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in our sample has GeoDiverse score of 59, representing one-state concentration of 41%. Our
sample contains a wide variety of institutional players covering commercial banks, investment
banks, and mortgage companies. The full sample contains 22 unique sponsors and 32 unique
top originators. We present the list of institutions that are most frequently involved in the
deals in our sample in Table C.1 the Appendix.
The key measure of future performance of these loans is their foreclosure status. 16% of
the loans in the sample enter foreclosure anytime from the deal origination until December
2011. The dollar-weighted pool-level foreclosure rate has a mean of 12% which varies from
3% for the 25th percentile pool to 18% for the 75th percentile.13 Panel B in Table 3.1
provides some basic statistics relating borrower credit risk factors and eventual foreclosure.
Consistent with intuition and past literature, we show that borrowers with higher FICO
scores, lower LTV ratios, and fixed-rate mortgages default at lower rates. Also, loans from
the earlier period are about half as likely to end up in foreclosure, showing strong vintage
effect. We now describe the construction of our key variables that measure information
asymmetry and the level of the equity tranche.
3.4.0.1 No-documentation loans
We obtain the percentage of no-documentation (NoDoc) loans in a pool directly from the
deal prospectus. No-documentation loans are defined as loans that document neither the
income nor the assets of the borrowers. Since different originators label these loans differ-
ently, we read through all the deal prospectuses to ensure consistency in our definition across
deals. Originators classify these loans under various categories such as “stated documenta-
tion,” “LITE,” and “stated income, stated asset.” The prospectus provides further details on
the originator-specific underwriting criteria and terminologies, including the details on the
various documentation classifications and verification undertaken by the originator. Based
on this disclosure, we classify a loan under the no-documentation category if the originator
13The foreclosure information is available for a slightly lower number of deals because it is based on the
sample formed by the intersection of our hand-collected data with CoreLogic foreclosure data.
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has not verified both the borrower’s income and assets. We provide an example of these
differences in the classification of NoDoc loans in Appendix C.2. As shown in the Appendix,
the ABFC Mortgage Loan series has three categories of loans in it: “full documentation
loans,” “stated income, stated asset loans,” and “lite documentation loans.” Under the
full documentation loans, the lender obtains detailed documentations on information such
as borrower’s employment status, tax returns for the past two years, and pay-stubs. The
originator also performs a telephonic verification of employment for salaried employees. No
such attempt for income verification is made under the “stated income, stated asset” pro-
gram, leaving a great deal of discretion with the originator.14 We classify these loans under
the NoDoc category. Finally, under the “LITE” category the originator reviews the deposit
activity in the borrower’s bank account for the past six to twenty-four consecutive months.
We classify these loans as “limited documentation” category, and not “no documentation”
in our study. We follow such classification strategy for all deals in our sample. Based on
this classification scheme, NoDoc loans make up about 19% of all loans in the average pool.
There is significant variation in this measure as it ranges from about 3% of the pool in the
25th percentile to 35% of the pool in the 75th percentile.
3.4.0.2 Equity Tranche
Our main variable of interest is the level of the equity tranche in a deal. We collect
this information from the deal prospectuses that provide detailed security-level data on the
notional amount of each tranche in the deal, their credit ratings, and the offered yield spread.
We combine all tranches that are rated AAA by at least two rating agencies as the AAA-
rated tranche. All tranches that are rated below AAA but above the equity tranche are
clubbed together into the mezzanine tranche. Equity tranche is defined as the difference
14Specifically, the prospectus states, “The applicant’s income as stated must be reasonable for the ap-
plicant’s occupation as determined in the discretion of the loan underwriter; however, such income is not
independently verified. Similarly the applicant’s assets as stated must be reasonable for the applicant’s oc-
cupation as determined in the discretion of the loan underwriter; however, such assets are not independently
verified.”
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between the principal amount of loans in the pool and the sum of AAA and Mezzanine
tranche sold to outside investors. In effect, we create a balance sheet of each deal in our
sample and take the difference between the dollar value of assets and debt liabilities as
the equity tranche. Thus, our definition of equity tranche represents the residual interest
of the sponsors, which is precisely in line with the theoretical papers discussed earlier. In
practice, sponsors use two different deal structures for tranching: (i) a six-pack structure,
and (ii) an overcollateralization (OC) structure (see Gorton, 2010). In the six-pack structure,
the junior most tranche is a well-specified unrated tranche that provides protection to all
the senior tranches sold to the investors. In such deals the sum of sold tranches and the
equity tranche equals the principal amount of loans in the pool. In the OC structure, the
principal amount of loans in the pool exceeds the sum of securities on the liability side. The
excess amount – the overcollateralization – provides an additional level of residual interest
to the sponsor. Economically, the OC amount is the equity interest of the sponsor.15 Our
construction ensures that we capture the true economic interest of the sponsor, regardless
of whether it comes in the form of a well-specified security or by having additional residual
interest in the pool. It is worth emphasizing that investors are able to observe this measure
of equity tranche at the time of deal issuance since this information is readily available in the
deal-prospectus. We provide an example from each of these structures and the computation
of the equity tranche in each case in Table C.2 in the Appendix.
Panel C of Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics on the tranche structure. Overall,
90.40% of the average deal is tranched into AAA-rated security, while only 1.20% of the
average deal is in the equity tranche. Panel C also illustrates the evolution of the average
deal structure over our sample period. The size of the average AAA-rated tranche drops
from 92.56% in 2001-02 to 88.32% in 2005. The level of equity tranche more than doubled
from 0.72% to 1.63% over the same time period. To give these numbers some perspective,
Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) find that about 71% of CLO pools are rated AAA and 11%
15As noted by Gorton (2010): “The overcollateralization reverts to an equity claim if it remains at the
end of the transaction”.
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are unrated while Stanton and Wallace (2011) find about 84-87% of CMBS pools are rated
AAA and 3-4% are unrated equity tranche. Not surprisingly, RMBS tranching structure is
closer to the numbers reported by Stanton and Wallace (2011) as compared to the summary
statistics of Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), who include several other types of assets in the
pool.
We use the level of equity tranche at the time of security sale as the measure of the
sponsor’s retained interest in the pool. Some observers have argued that if sponsors oﬄoad
a bulk of this risky tranche in the secondary market, then it has no value as a signal of
private information. Ideally, we want the amount of securities retained by the sponsors for
a long time after the initial deal creation as the measure of retained interest. Unfortunately,
this information is not available due to limited disclosure requirements. In the absence of
this proxy, the unsold equity tranche at the time of security sale provides the most natural
alternative measure. There are several economic reasons to support the use of equity tranche
for our empirical exercise. First, anecdotal evidence suggests that banks often retained part of
this exposure on their balance sheet. For example, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s
Report presents a case study of an MBS deal issued by Citi Bank in 2006 called CMLTI
2006-NC2. They provide details on the identity of the holders of different tranches of this
deal (see page 116 of the report). The AAA-tranches were bought by foreign banks and
funds in China, Italy, France, and Germany, the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago, the
Kentucky Retirement Systems and a few other parties. The mezzanine tranches were mostly
bought by the sponsors of CDOs. More relevant to our work, Citi Bank did retain a part
of the equity tranche in the deal sharing the rest with Capmark Financial Group, a real-
estate investment firm. Similarly, Demiroglu and James (2012) provide an example from
a deal sponsored by Bear Stearns that shows the sponsor’s commitment to initially hold
the residual interest: “The initial owner of the Residual Certificates is expected to be Bear
Stearns Securities Corp.”
Second, as suggested by the Citi Bank sponsored deal above, the buyers of equity tranches
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are on average more informed than the buyers of safer tranches. The asymmetric information
problem between the buyers and sellers in this market is likely to be relatively lower than
the corresponding problem at the time of initial sale. Thus the sponsors’ incentive to keep
higher proportion of deals with favorable private information remains preserved.
Third, even though the sponsors can subsequently oﬄoad this risk in the secondary
market in the medium to long run, in the immediate aftermath of the deal the risk remains
with the sponsor. Indeed there have been numerous commentaries on the role of warehousing
risk in this market during the sub-prime mortgage crisis. Thus the extent of equity tranche
at the time of security sale provides a clean proxy for risk exposure during the initial period.
Fourth, as shown by Acharya et al. (2013), there are several instances of securitization
motivated by regulatory capital arbitrage. In such deals the residual credit risk stayed with
the sponsors.
Finally, we check the annual reports of major sponsors in our sample and find significant
equity tranche retention on their balance sheets. For example, Lehman Brothers had approx-
imately $2 billion of non-investment grade retained interests in residential mortgaged-backed
securitization as of November 30, 2006. We obtain similar evidence from the annual reports
of Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch during this period (see footnote 5). While this method
does not allow us to get pool level retention amount, it does show that in aggregate the spon-
sors were holding significant amount of unrated tranches on their balance sheets. Overall,
these arguments suggest that equity tranche created at the time of RMBS issuance imposes
significant cost on the sponsor consistent with the underlying theoretical assumption of the
signaling models.
Ultimately, the relationship between the level of the equity tranche and loan quality
remains an empirical question. If the deal sponsors did not care about the risk of equity
tranche because of the possibility of future sale, then we should find no correlation between
the level of the equity tranche and future default performance. In contrast, if they did care
about this risk, then we expect to observe better performance for deals with high equity
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tranche. Our empirical analysis allows us to test these competing hypotheses in the paper.
3.5 Empirical Results
In this section, we present the results of our empirical tests for the key predictions outlined
in Section 3.3. Our main interest lies in estimating the effect of equity tranche on future
default performance of the underlying pool. However, for expositional simplicity, we begin
our analysis by relating the level of equity tranche to asymmetric information concerns
of RMBS buyers. Next, we relate the level of the equity tranche to ex-post foreclosure
performance of the entire pool. Our final set of tests examine the ex-ante pricing effect of
equity tranche.
3.5.1 Cross Sectional Determinants of Tranche Structure
One of the key predictions of information-based models is that the level of the equity
tranche should increase with the asymmetric information concerns about the underlying pool.
In such deals, debt security buyers are more likely to demand a higher level of equity tranche
to mitigate their concerns about adverse selection. We estimate the following pool-level
regression model to examine this:
EquityTranchep = α + β(InfoAsymp) + θ(Latep) + γ(Creditp) + δ(GeoDiversep) + p (3.2)
As discussed earlier, we use the percentage of NoDoc loans in the pool as the proxy for the
extent of asymmetric information (InfoAsymp), or opacity of the underlying pool, faced by
the investors.
We separate out the effect of observable risk factors in this regression model by includ-
ing several pool-specific measures of credit risk, Creditp, as explanatory variables. These
variables include the weighted average FICO score, the weighted average LTV ratio, and the
fraction of adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) in the pool. The first two variables directly
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measure the credit risk and leverage of the deal, and hence are predictors of future default by
the borrower. We include percentage of ARM in the pool as an additional control variable
for both credit and interest rate risks of the pool. We control for the time effect by includ-
ing an indicator variable Late that equals one for deals from 2005, and zero for the earlier
period.16 Inclusion of this variable in the regression model allows us to separate the effect of
aggregate macroeconomic shocks such as the level of interest rate and the demand of such
securities from the outside investors. We include a measure of geographical diversification
(GeoDiversep) of the pool as an additional variable to capture the effect of correlations of
loans within the pool.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.2 present the results. In column (1), which only includes
Late as a control variable, we find a positive and significant (at 1%) coefficient on the
%NoDoc variable. In economic terms, one standard deviation increase in no-documentation
loans (17.8 percentage points) is associated with an increase of about 0.45 percentage points,
or a 60% increase in the equity tranche level for the median deal. The coefficient estimate
on Late shows that the extent of equity tranche increased in later periods. In column (2),
we include all the control variables and find that the estimate on %NoDoc remains virtually
unaffected. In Column (3) we include sponsor fixed effects in the model. This specification
ensures that our results are not driven by sponsor’s unobserved characteristics such as its
reputation in the market. Our results remain robust to this specification. Overall, these
estimates show that the opacity of the loan pool is a key driver of the size of the equity
tranche. Observable credit risk characteristics of the pool such as FICO score and LTV
ratio do not explain significant variation in equity tranche across deals. These results are
consistent with our first prediction that the level of equity tranche increases with the size of
the wedge between sponsors’ and buyers’ information sets.
We next turn to the division of sold tranches (i.e., the complement of the equity tranche)
into AAA and Mezzanine categories. The dependent variable in these specifications measures
16In unreported regressions we control for even finer time-periods such as the month or quarter of the
deal. Our results do not change.
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the ratio of Mezzanine tranche to the sum of AAA-rated and mezzanine tranche in the deal.
The Mezzanine-to-Sold ratio is 8.57% for the average deal in our sample with significant
cross-sectional variation. Using the same modeling approach as above, we regress explanatory
variables capturing credit risk and information concerns on this dependent variable. Columns
(4), (5) and (6) in Table 3.2 present the results.
While %NoDoc has no effect on the division of sold tranches across Mezzanine and AAA
category after controlling for observable measures of credit risk in the full specification in
column (5), this division is explained well by observable credit risk factors such as FICO
score and LTV ratio. As expected, pools with lower FICO score and higher LTV ratio have
relatively higher proportion of Mezzanine (lower AAA) tranche within the sold portion of
the deal. Loan pools with more geographical diversity have relatively higher proportion of
AAA-rated tranche. These results show that pools with lower observable credit risk and
higher risk diversification have relatively higher AAA-rated tranche.
Taken together with the earlier results, we find that concerns about private information
drive the cross-sectional dispersion in the level of the equity tranche, whereas hard pieces
of information such as FICO score, LTV ratio, and geographical diversification drive the
division of the sold tranche into AAA and mezzanine categories. In addition to the slope
coefficients, the R2 of the models provides an interesting insight as well. For the equity
tranche regression, inclusion of observable credit risk variables improves the model’s R2
from 26.8% to a marginally higher 31.8% (columns 1 and 2), whereas the corresponding R2
improves from 33.4% to 85.7% for the Mezzanine-to-Sold regression (columns 4 and 5). Hard
pieces of information are easier to price and therefore can be incorporated in the security
pricing relatively easily. In contrast concerns about information asymmetry are harder to
price and the level of the equity tranche emerges as an additional contracting tool in such
settings. Our results provide evidence in support of these arguments.
A potential concern with our analysis is the omission of some observable credit risk
factors that correlate both with %NoDoc and the extent of equity tranche. Note that
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after controlling for FICO score, LTV ratio, %ARM , geographical diversity, time effects,
and sponsor fixed effects, %NoDoc does not have any explanatory power in explaining the
division of sold tranches between Mezzanine and AAA categories. If we miss a correlated
omitted variable from the model that is observed to the investors, then it is likely to influence
both the level of equity tranche and the division of sold tranches across Mezzanine and AAA
category. In light of our results on Mezzanine-to-Sold tranches, it is unlikely that our results
suffer from any serious omitted variable bias. As an additional test (unreported), we include
the weighted average interest rate on mortgages in the pool as an explanatory variable in the
regression. Interest rates are likely to capture a bulk of the publicly available information
about the credit risk of the borrowers. Thus the inclusion of interest rate in the model
provides a reasonable control for the measures of credit risk that may be known to the
investors, but not to us as econometricians. The estimate shows that the coefficient on
%NoDoc remains unaffected. We repeat the same exercise for the division between AAA
and mezzanine tranche in column (6) and show that our results remain unchanged for that
model as well.
As an alternative estimation technique, we also estimate a seemingly unrelated regression
model for the proportion of AAA, mezzanine, and equity tranche in a deal, which we do not
tabulate for brevity. Our key results are stronger for this specification. We also perform
our tests with standard errors clustered at the sponsor level and find that our inferences
are unaffected. However, we need a sufficiently large number of clusters to obtain consistent
standard errors using this method. Since we only have 22 clusters, we present our results
without clustering.
3.5.2 Ex-Post Performance of Pools
We have shown that more opaque pools have a relatively larger equity tranche. While
consistent with the broad idea behind adverse selection models, this test is not conclusive
in terms of evaluating the role of the equity tranche as a signal of the underlying pool
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quality. Does the creation of a larger equity tranche indicate deal sponsors’ favorable private
information about the underlying loans in the pool? Are these effects mainly concentrated
in pools with higher concerns about asymmetric information? We exploit the cross-sectional
variation in equity tranche along with data on ex-post performance of mortgages to answer
these questions. If sponsors with favorable private information about the underlying pool
create a larger equity tranche, then we expect to observe relatively better ex-post default
performance by such pools after conditioning on observable pool characteristics. In other
words, we expect abnormal default performance of high equity tranche pools to be better,
where abnormal default performance measures the actual default rate of the pool against a
benchmark default rate based on ex-ante observable information. We use a standard default
model and then a matched pool exercise to create two benchmarks of expected default
rates to test these predictions. We first describe the empirical design and then discuss the
construction of abnormal default performance measures in greater detail.
We want to estimate the relationship between the equity tranche and abnormal default
rate, conditional on the degree of asymmetric information concerns. We do so by estimating
the following empirical model:
AbDefaultp = β0 +β1(Opaquep)+β2(HighEqp)+β3(Opaquep×HighEqp)+
∑
γXp+p (3.3)
AbDefaultp is the abnormal default rate of pool p. Opaque equals one for pools that have an
above-median percentage of no-documentation loans, and zero otherwise. HighEq equals one
for pools that have an above-median level of equity tranche, and zero otherwise. Xp measures
some pool level control variables such as the pool’s weighted average FICO scores and the
LTV ratio and the year of the deal. We include them in the regression model to capture any
remaining pool specific variation that does not get captured by the loan-level default model
described later. Our regression model uses a difference-in-differences design to estimate the
effect of the equity tranche across opaque and transparent pools. Consistent with theoretical
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models, this empirical approach estimates the relationship between the level of the equity
tranche and abnormal default, conditional on the degree of the buyer’s asymmetric infor-
mation concerns. That is, the model allows us to separately examine the relationship of
interest for both high-information-asymmetry pools (Opaque) and transparent pools. For
easier economic interpretation, we use indicator variables for opaque and transparent pools
as well as high and low equity tranche pools in the regression. The regression coefficients in
this model estimate the abnormal default rate across different pools as shown below:
Transparent Pool Opaque Pool
Low Equity Tranche β0 β0 + β1
High Equity Tranche β0 + β2 β0 + β1 + β2 + β3
Difference β2 β2 + β3
Our interest lies in both βˆ3, the difference-in-differences estimator, and the sum of coeffi-
cients βˆ2+βˆ3. The sum of these coefficients provides an estimate of the difference in abnormal
default rates across high and low equity tranche deals for opaque pools. If sponsors used
equity tranche as a tool to signal their favorable private information, then we expect the
sum of these coefficients to be negative. βˆ3 provides an estimate of the differential effect of
equity tranche on default rate for opaque pools as compared to the corresponding difference
for the transparent pools. In other words, βˆ3 differences out the effect of equity tranche on
abnormal default rate that we observe within the relatively transparent pools. We expect
this difference-in-difference estimate to be negative as well. If the equity tranche correlates
with abnormal default rate of pools for reasons unrelated to information asymmetry at the
time of issuance, then this estimator provides a useful way to separate out those effects. For
example, factors such as economy wide abundance of capital or investment opportunity set
of the sponsors can potentially affect both the level of equity tranche and the ex-post default
rates for all the pools. Our estimator is able to remove all such effects as long as they affect
opaque and transparent pools in similar manner.
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3.5.2.1 Standard Default Model
Our goal is to parse out the effect of observable loan and property characteristics from
the default performance (i.e., foreclosure rate) of the loans, which we do as follows. We
create a benchmark model of loan level foreclosure probability based on publicly available
information at the time of issuance. Next, we aggregate this at the pool level to compute
the expected default rate of the pool. We then take the ratio of actual foreclosure rate we
observe ex post to the expected foreclosure rate as the measure of abnormal default.
We estimate a benchmark model of foreclosure probability for every loan based on the
following logistic regression model:
Pr(foreclosurei = 1) =
1
1 + e−βXi
(3.4)
foreclosurei equals one for loans that enter foreclosure any time up to December 31, 2011.
Xi is a set of observable loan and property characteristics that are likely to predict the loan’s
default rate. We choose these variables based on economic intuition and previous research
in the area (see e.g., Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011). They include the borrower’s FICO
score, LTV ratio, state of the property’s location, the purpose of the loan, the year of loan
origination, and the type of the loan product. FICO score and LTV ratio are the main
drivers of the loan’s default risk. The property location and the year of origination control
for geographical and temporal variations in the house price appreciation and credit risk of
the borrowers. In addition, we include a rich set of control variables based on the purpose
of the loan and the type of mortgage product. CoreLogic classifies loans into six buckets
based on their purpose. The six categories are: (i) purchase, (ii) refinancing without cash
out, (iii) refinancing with cash out, (iv) the remaining refinancing loans (i.e., loans with no
information on cash out), (v) second mortgage, and (v) others. Finally, we include the nature
of interest rate offered on the loan and its reset terms as additional explanatory variables.
Based on CoreLogic data, loans are divided into categories based on the following broad
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criteria: (i) the nature of interest rate (Fixed Rate, ARM, or Balloon), (ii) the number of
years for the reset of loan terms (such as 5 year ARM or 7 year Balloon), and (iii) the special
structure of the interest or principal payments (such as interest only loans for the first n
number of years). Different combinations of these attributes result in 46 distinct categories
of product type, and we include them as fixed effects in the model. In addition to default
risk, these variables also control for the cross-sectional differences in the loan’s prepayment
risk in our sample.
The estimated default model uses roughly 500,000 loans originated primarily during the
years of 2001-2005.17 Of these loans, about 16% enter foreclosure during our sample period.
As noted earlier, the foreclosure rates of loans based on observable metrics such as FICO
score, LTV ratio, loan interest rate type and time period correlate in the expected directions
as shown in Panel B of Table 3.1.
The estimates of the logistic regression are consistent with previous findings in the lit-
erature (see Appendix 3 for the estimates). Borrowers with higher FICO scores and lower
LTV ratios are significantly less likely to get into foreclosure. Loans with features such as
ARM and Balloon payments are significantly more likely to default. All other categorical
variables (state, year of origination, and the product type) have significant predictive power
in explaining the foreclosure rate as well.18
After estimating the model, we use the fitted values from the model to obtain the pre-
dicted default likelihood ̂foreclosureip of each loan i in pool p. The predicted foreclosure
rate provides us with an in-sample benchmark for the expected default rate of the loan con-
17The results we present are based on a pooled model using all available data. Our results are unchanged
if we compute our benchmark default model separately for the early and late time periods as well as using
different performance horizons (e.g., two years, five years, etc.).
18We consider several alternative models of default prediction in unreported robustness tests. In partic-
ular, we include additional variables such as: (a) the second LTV ratio of the loan (if any), (b) whether the
loan is for single-family housing or other assets such as condominiums or manufactured housing, (c) whether
the loan has a negative amortization feature, (d) the debt-to-income ratio of the borrower, and (e) the margin
on the interest rate. Our results remain robust to these alternative specifications. Some of the additional
variables are not available for all loans in the sample. Thus, when we include these covariates in the model,
we lose some observations. More important, addition of these variables do not considerably improve the fit
of our model as compared to the base case analysis that captures all the key drivers of default. Therefore,
we only report results based on the base case model to save space.
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ditional on key observable characteristics. We aggregate this measure at the pool level to
compute a predicted foreclosure rate of the pool. The abnormal default rate for the pool
(AbDefaultp) with Np loans in it is then calculated as follows:
AbDefaultp =
∑Np
i=1wi(foreclosureip)∑Np
i=1wi( ̂foreclosureip)
(3.5)
Our measure computes the dollar-weighted ratio (weights wi with
∑Np
i=1wi = 1) of number of
loans in a pool that actually defaulted to the number of loans that were expected to default
based on observable characteristics at the time of issuance.19 We plot the kernel density
of AbDefault measure in Figure 3.2a. As expected, the average number is centered around
one with significant cross-sectional variation. The 75th percentile pool has abnormal default
ratio of 1.18, indicating that the pool’s actual default rate is 18% higher than the expected
default rate based on observable characteristics. In contrast, the 25th percentile pool has a
ratio of 0.47 indicating 53% lower default rate than its benchmark.
We estimate regression equation (3.3) based on this measure of abnormal default and
report the results in column (1) of Table 3.3. Since the signaling value of the equity tranche
should be most useful when there is more opacity about the underlying asset, the key variable
of interest is the interaction of the strength of the signal, HighEq, and pool opacity, Opaque
(βˆ3 from the earlier discussion). Column (1) reports an estimate of βˆ3 = −0.244, which is
significant at 1% level. Opaque pools with a higher level of equity tranche have significantly
lower abnormal default rates than those with lower equity tranche, as compared to the
corresponding difference for the transparent pools. The difference-in-differences coefficient
translates into a lower default rate of 24.4% for higher equity tranche pool. The second
estimate of interest is the difference in abnormal default between deals with higher and
lower levels of equity tranche within opaque pools, which is βˆ3 + βˆ2 = −0.134 and significant
at the 6% level (not tabulated). Thus, pools with higher level of equity tranche have 13%
19Alternatively, we compute our default benchmark measures of abnormal default based on the number
of loans that enter foreclosure (i.e., equal weighting) and find similar results for our tests.
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lower abnormal default rate within opaque pools. These results show that equity tranche
predicts better future performance conditional of ex-ante loan characteristics.
In Column (2) of the Table we show that these results are driven by the level of equity
tranche, and not by the level of Mezzanine tranche in the same deal. We do so by including
an indicator variable HighMezz that equals one for deals with higher than median level of
Mezzanine tranche and its interaction with Opaque as additional regressors in the model.
The coefficients on these additional variables are not significant, while the estimates on
HighEq ∗Opaque are strengthened both economically and statistically. This result contrasts
the difference between equity and mezzanine tranches and emphasizes the importance of
equity tranche, not just the level of AAA subordination, in predicting the future performance
of the entire pool. Finally, in Column (3) we include the sponsor fixed effects in the model,
and show that our results remain practically unchanged, both in statistical and economic
terms.
3.5.2.2 Matched Sample Benchmark Model of Default
One of the basic rationales behind the creation of mortgage-backed securities is the benefit
of diversification that can be achieved by pooling several loans together. Indeed, a key input
to the RMBS pricing models is the underlying correlation matrix of the loans in a pool. Our
default risk model in the previous section ignores the within pool correlation of default risk
of loans. We now account for this effect as well the effects of macroeconomic shocks through
a matching exercise which we describe below.20
For every loan in a given pool, we find a matching loan with similar observable character-
istics from the universe of all loans in our sample excluding the loans in the loan’s own pool.
The matched loan is similar on key dimensions of default and interest rate risk such as FICO
20An alternative approach to parse out the effect of latent macroeconomic shocks is to use a frailty
correlated default model. Duffie et al. (2009) propose such a model and estimate it for a sample of U.S.
nonfinancial firms. They find strong evidence for the presence of common latent factor even after controlling
for commonly used firm specific default predictors. In unreported robustness test, we estimate a maximum
likelihood based frailty model and obtain similar results. We prefer the matching based approach for our
exercise as it allows us to account for correlation structure of the loans in a relatively straightforward manner.
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score, LTV ratio, loan amount, year of origination, type of interest rate on the loan (e.g.,
ARM, balloon or fixed rate) and geographical location. We outline the precise matching al-
gorithm in Appendix C.3. The key idea is to match the actual pool created by the informed
sponsor to a hypothetical pool that is, by construction, from an uninformed sponsor. Our
matched pool lacks the sponsor’s pool-specific private information component, while retain-
ing the similarity along observable dimensions. Loans in the hypothetical pool are likely to
have similar correlation structure as the actual pool, especially since we match these loans
based on the geographical location as well. Since the hypothetical pool is observationally
similar and the loans in the pool are subjected to similar macroeconomic shocks as the actual
pool, the foreclosure rate on hypothetical pool provides us with a benchmark that accounts
for ex-ante loan characteristics, macroeconomic shocks and the correlation structure of the
loans in a non-parametric way. In particular, the matched sample approach allows us to
difference out the effect of house price appreciation and the prepayment risk of the loans
on default rates, since these factors are likely to be driven by geographical location of the
property, the timing of the loan origination, and the nature of interest rate on the loan.21 As
before, we take the ratio of the actual pool’s default rate to its matched hypothetical pool’s
default rate as the measure of abnormal default.
A kernel density of the abnormal default rate based on this measure is provided in Figure
3.2b. Like our first measure, the average performance is centered around 1 with a large cross-
sectional variation. The ratio ranges from 0.67 to 1.21 as we move from the 25th to the 75th
percentile of the distribution.
We estimate regression equation (3.3) based on this measure of abnormal default and
report the results in Column (4) of Table 3.3. The estimates on our variables of interest
largely mirror our findings from our first measure of abnormal default. Column (3) reports
an estimate of βˆ3 = −0.221, which indicates that opaque pools with a higher equity tranche
21In unreported tests, we also consider matching the property location at the zip-code level. Our results
remain similar. However, we are unable to find a match in the same zip-code for several loans in our sample.
Hence we prefer the state-level matching for our main analysis.
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have a 22.1% lower default rate as compared to the corresponding difference for relatively
transparent pools. The difference in abnormal default rate between deals with higher and
lower levels of equity tranche within opaque pools is (i.e., βˆ3 + βˆ2) -0.188 which is significant
at the 2% level (not tabulated). Thus, pools with higher level of equity tranche have an
18.8% lower abnormal default rate within opaque pools. We re-estimate these models with
HighMezz and its interaction with Opaque as additional regressors and present the results
in column (5). We find that the difference-in-differences estimator is strengthened with
βˆ3 = −0.270. Finally, in Column (6) we include the sponsor fixed effects in the model, and
show that our results remain practically unchanged, both in statistical and economic terms.
These findings indicate that equity tranche created at the time of security sale forecasts
better than expected foreclosure outcomes for loans in the underlying pool.
Our results also highlight an important distinction across pools with varying degree
of no-documentation loans. The effect of equity tranche on future loan performance is
concentrated within the opaque pools, i.e., pools with higher proportion of no documentation
loans. Prior literature has argued that soft information is more important for loans with poor
documentation (e.g., see Keys et al. (2010) and Demiroglu and James (2012)). Our results
extend the literature by showing that in such deals, the equity tranche conveys important
information about the underlying loan quality.
3.5.3 The Channel of Private Information
Where do sponsors get information about the underlying loan quality? As a part of the
securitization chain, sponsors are likely to have access to much more detailed documents
from the originators as compared to the buyers in addition to other informal channels of
information exchange. If the loans are originated by the sponsors themselves, the information
advantage over potential RMBS investors increases even more (e.g., see Keys et al. (2010)).
We collect the identity of top originators for each pool in our sample from the deal prospectus.
In almost half the cases, sponsors are also the top originators of the loan pool. In such cases,
102
sponsor’s information advantage over the buyers is likely to be higher, and we expect equity
tranche to play an even more meaningful role here. This sub-sample test allows us to establish
that our results are driven by asymmetric information concerns, and not by a pure absence
of information with the sponsors. Thus, it establishes an important economic channel of
private information.
In Table 3.4, we re-estimate our main regression specification (3.3) across these two
groups. For expositional clarity, we reproduce the full sample results in Column (1), and the
sub-sample results in Columns (2) and (3). While the estimated coefficient on (Opaquep ×
HighEqp) remains negative for both subgroups, it is statistically and economically significant
only in the sub-group where sponsors are also the top originators. In fact the economic mag-
nitude of the coefficient increases by almost 70% for this sub-group. When the information
advantage of sponsors is likely to be higher, equity tranche forecasts the default rate better.
This is consistent with our main assertion that the equity tranche captures the sponsor’s
private information in RMBS deals.22
3.5.4 Identification Using Anti-Predatory Lending Laws
A potential concern with our analysis may be that opaque pools with a higher level of
equity tranche are systematically better on observable dimensions that we, as econometri-
cians, are unable to control for. If that be the case, we would find lower ex-post default
for such pools even without any private information component of the equity tranche. Note
that we have already controlled for some of the most important observable loan character-
istics such as FICO score, LTV ratio, the purpose of the loans, the nature of interest rate,
year of origination, and geographical location of the property in our default model. Earlier
research has shown that these variables explain most of the variation in ex-post default of
mortgages. Second, our matched sample exercise eliminates the effect of any observable
characteristics that remains similar across the actual and matched pool. Third, we focus on
22In unreported tests, we estimate this model in a triple-interaction framework as well and obtain similar
results. We do not report them for brevity.
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the difference-in-differences coefficient in our empirical tests. This design ensures that we
eliminate the effect of any differences in missing observables that correlate with the levels
of loan opacity and equity tranche on an unconditional basis. Therefore, it is unlikely that
our results are simply an artifact of missing observable characteristics. To further support
this claim, we exploit the passage of state-level Anti-Predatory Lending Laws (APLs) as a
source of exogenous variation in concerns about lenders’ private information.
Several states passed these laws during our sample period to protect homeowners from
predatory lending practices. These laws are structured along the lines of Federal Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), and they typically impose more stringent
restrictions on lending practices at the state level as compared to the Federal Act. APLs vary
across states in terms of the type of loans they cover and the restrictions they impose on the
lenders in terms of required lending practices and information disclosure rules. For example,
some of these restrictions include limits on allowable prepayment penalties and balloon
payments, borrower counseling requirements, and restriction on mandatory arbitration. Ho
and Pennington-Cross (2005, 2006) provide detailed explanations of these laws and the timing
of their passage by different states.
The passage of the law is likely to decrease the lenders’ ability to originate and package
predatory or abusive loans at the margin (see Agarwal et al., 2012). Such a government
regulation should make the use of private contracting mechanisms less important. Therefore,
prior to the passage of this law, the equity tranche is likely to serve as a more important
signal of private information. Said differently, if the equity tranche indeed conveys private
information, then it should have a higher impact in the pre-APL period, i.e., during the
period with relatively less government regulation on information disclosure rules.
Ho and Pennington-Cross (2005, 2006) provide an index of the strength of APLs across
states as well as the date of the law passage. Their index varies from 4 to 17 with a
median score of 10, where a higher index level indicates stronger laws in the state. Based
on this measure, we classify all states with index value of 10 or above as the states with
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strong APL. These states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Washington DC. Of these
states, all but Massachusetts and Connecticut, passed their law during our sample period
(i.e., between 2002 and 2004), providing us with data on both before and after the law
passage. For our test, we create an indicator variable APL that takes a value of one for
states with strong APL, and zero otherwise. We create an indicator variable Before that
equals one for loans that belong to states before the passage of law, and zero after that. As
in our earlier tests, we create an indicator variable for high equity tranche (HighEq) based
on the median level of this variable in our sample. With these three variables, namely APL,
HighEq, and Before, we estimate a triple-difference model to estimate the difference in the
effect of high equity tranche on future loan foreclosure rate for the APL states before and
after the passage of the law as compared to the corresponding difference for states without
the law. In this estimation strategy, we separate out the unconditional level effects of each
one of these variables on the foreclosure rate as well as all the double-interaction effects. The
coefficient on the triple-interaction term presents us with the estimate of interest.
We first estimate the model at loan-level. In this specification, we fit a loan level logistic
regression model with foreclosure status as the dependent variable. Column (1) of Table 3.5
presents results estimated with the entire sample. Since HighEq is a pool-level variable, we
cluster all standard errors at the pool level.23 We find a negative and significant coefficient
on APL * HighEq * Before indicating that equity tranche conveys stronger information
about the future loan performance for APL states before the passage of the law. This is
consistent with our prediction outlined above. In column (2), we restrict our sample to only
23The use of clustered standard errors for logistics regressions requires a caveat. The estimates produced
by standard maximum likelihood estimates (i.e., the ones produced by statistical packages such as STATA)
may not be the true estimates when we have clustered observations. This happens because the observations
are no longer independent within clusters. Hence the joint distribution function for the sample may no
longer be the product of the distribution functions for each observation. Without a precise knowledge of
the correlation structure within clusters, one cannot write down the true likelihood of the sample. Thus the
estimates are consistent only under special cases. Considering these limitations, we also estimate the model
by collapsing loan-level observations to pool level. While we lose the loan-level granularity in this approach,
we are able to avoid the econometric concerns with clustered logistics regression model. Our main results
remain similar across these modeling approaches.
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Opaque pools and find the point estimate on the triple interaction term to be over twice as
large, which indicates that the effect is especially strong for pools with higher concern about
information asymmetry.
In columns (3) and (4), we collapse the data at the pool level. In the process we lose the
loan-level variation since loans in a pool often come from different states. We compute the
fraction of loans that comes from APL states and classify pools as HighAPL if the fraction
of loans from APL states in the pool exceeds the sample median (59%). With this definition
of pool-level APL, we estimate the triple-interaction model using an OLS approach. Despite
the loss in variation arising out of pool-level aggregation, we find a negative and significant
coefficient on the triple-interaction term.
Overall, these findings are consistent with equity tranche being an indicator of sponsors’
favorable private information. Did investors recognize and respond to this indicator? To
answer this question, we look at the pricing effect of the level of equity tranche in the
following section.
3.5.5 Pricing Effect of Equity Tranche
Did investors pay higher prices for securities backed up by higher equity tranche? An
important prediction of signaling models is the presence of a downward sloping demand curve:
as sponsors sell more of their assets, investors demand lower prices (e.g., see DeMarzo and
Duffie, 1999). Sponsors trade off the resulting liquidity discount from selling more of their
assets with the cost of retaining higher equity tranche. Since pricing data for sold tranches
is unavailable, following the prior literature we use yield spread on these securities to test
this prediction (Je et al., 2012). It is relatively straightforward to compute yield spread for
floating rate coupons. It is estimated as the spread over LIBOR benchmark reported in the
deal prospectus. For the fixed rate tranches, we need to know the duration of these securities
to be able to compute the benchmark rate more precisely. Absent this information, we only
focus on floating rate tranches for this part of the analysis. Despite this limitation, we are
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able to cover about 70% of tranches in our sample.24
We want to estimate the effect of equity tranche on the pricing of sold tranches in the
same deal. An immediate implication of higher equity tranche is that there is less leverage in
the deal. In such deals, superior tranches that are sold to the investors are safer and therefore
they should command attractive prices. This effect is independent of any information reve-
lation via the equity tranche that we are interested in. To separate out the leverage effect,
we condition our analysis on the credit rating of sold tranches. We compare the pricing of
two similarly rated tranches coming from deals with different levels of equity tranche. We
maintain our basic empirical design that estimates the effect of equity tranche separately
across opaque and transparent pools. If the effect of equity tranche on prices come entirely
due to the leverage effect, then we should find no difference across opaque and transpar-
ent pools. On the other hand, if the effect comes via the revelation of private information,
then we expect to see higher prices for tranches backed by higher equity tranche only in the
opaque pools.
We divide all tranches into broad credit rating classes: AAA, AA, A, and BBB.25 For
deals with multiple tranches within one rating class, we compute a dollar-weighted average
yield spread and consolidate them into one observation. This aggregation leads to 549 sold
tranches in our sample, out of which 379 are floating rate. We break all pools into two
categories based on whether they have above or below the median level of equity tranche.
Table 3.6 presents the cross-tabulation of the average yield spread of sold tranches across
high and low equity tranche groups for every credit rating category. There is a clear pattern
in the data: within each credit rating class, the yield spread is lower for pools with higher
equity tranche. As sponsors sell more of their pool’s cash flows to outside investors, the price
decreases (yield spread increases).
We estimate a regression model relating yield spread to level of the equity tranche in
24In a robustness exercise, we include fixed rate tranches as well, and obtain similar results. For this
analysis, we subtract the 5-year risk-free treasury rate from the fixed coupon rate of the tranche.
25There are a very small number of sold tranches below the BBB rating. We include them in the BBB
category.
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the deal after controlling for the credit rating fixed effects. Columns (1)-(2) of Table 3.7
present our base results. The significant negative coefficient on HighEq indicates that after
controlling for the credit rating class, high-equity-tranche deals have 27 basis points lower
yield spread. More important, the effect comes entirely from the Opaque deals. This is
precisely the group where we find a considerably lower foreclosure rate in our earlier tests.
We further break our analysis down to AAA-rated and non-AAA rated securities and report
the results in columns (5)-(6). The effect is concentrated among the non-AAA rated tranche
backed by opaque deals. With their higher informational sensitivity, we expect the pricing
effect to be higher for these pools and the empirical results confirm this intuition. Taken
together with the abnormal default rate results, our results show that equity tranche did
contain the sponsor’s private information, and market prices reflect this ex ante in a cross-
sectional sense.
3.5.6 Alternative Channels
It has been recognized in the literature that in addition to tranche structure, concerns
such as sponsor’s reputation, servicing rights, and influence over credit rating agencies can
play important roles in the way participants contract in this market. These considerations
could potentially interact with the retention of equity tranche, creation of AAA-tranche and
other related features of the RMBS design. While we do not explore these interactions in
detail, this section presents several tests to establish the robustness of our analysis even in
the presence of these competing influences. We first consider the possibility that our results
are driven by deals where sponsors and originators have more “skin in the game” by holding
servicing contracts (e.g., Piskorski et al., 2010; Demiroglu and James, 2012). In addition to
earning fees from the origination of loans, lenders sometimes retain servicing rights on loans
that provide them with an additional stream of income for the life of the loan. This income
averages about 37 basis points per year for the deals in our sample. If the sponsors hold
servicing rights on the loans, this implicit equity stake may provide stronger incentives for
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them to ensure that the pool is populated with higher quality loans. If deals with higher ser-
vicing “skin in the game” coincide with those with higher equity tranche, then our inferences
maybe contaminated. To empirically separate out this alternative channel, we collect data
on the identity of primary servicer for the loans in the pool. We create a dummy variable
that indicates if the sponsor is also the servicer (SellAndService) and a dummy variable that
indicates if the top originator for the pool is also the servicer (TopOrigAndService).26
Another mechanism that can potentially confound our results is the reputational concerns
of the members of the syndicate (Hartman-Glaser, 2012). In our main tests, we already in-
clude sponsor fixed effects in the estimation exercise. This ensures that we are able to
separate out time-invariant reputational effect of the sponsors. Since we consider a short
time-period (2002-2005) for our analysis, it is reasonable to assume that a sponsor’s repu-
tation remained practically constant during the sample period. As an alternative test in a
similar spirit, we consider the heterogeneity in the sponsor-type to control for the reputa-
tional concerns. We expect that long-lived and established commercial banks such as JP
Morgan Chase have different concerns about protecting their franchise values as compared
to specialized mortgage originating institutions such as Ameriquest. Also, large commercial
and investment banks may be able to exert more influence over the credit rating agencies
to receive inflated ratings relative to smaller stand-alone mortgage lenders (Je et al., 2012).
To address these issues, we classify each sponsor as a commercial bank, investment bank,
savings and loan institution, or mortgage lender and then include dummy variables for these
categories in the regression model.
Table 3.8 reproduces the main results from earlier sections of the paper alongside a speci-
fication that includes the variables mentioned above. All our key results remain qualitatively
similar. Among the additional control variables, we do find some effect consistent with “skin
in the game” hypothesis as deals where the top originator is also the servicer have better
ex-post performance. However, inclusion of this control variable does not change any of our
26We perform the same tests using a dummy variable that indicates if the servicer is any of the top four
originators and get qualitatively identical results.
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results. In unreported tests, we repeat these analyses for other tests of the paper as well,
and our main results remain robust to these controls. Overall, our results are unlikely to be
affected by these alternative channels.
3.6 Discussions and Conclusion
This paper empirically examines the role of equity tranche in residential mortgage-backed
securities during the build-up to the sub-prime mortgage crisis. We document that the level of
equity tranche conveys the sponsor’s private information in opaque pools. Within such pools,
higher levels of equity tranche is associated with significantly lower future foreclosure rates
after parsing out the effects of loan characteristics, macroeconomic shocks and the correlation
structure of loans in the pool. Further, investors paid higher prices for sold securities in such
deals. These pieces of evidence provide support for some of the fundamental predictions of
security design models based on asymmetric information (e.g., Leland and Pyle (1977) and
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999)).
Overall, our findings show that market participants understood informational frictions in
the RMBS market to some extent and incorporated them in the design of these securities.
In other words, the design of mortgage-backed securities was able to mitigate some of the
contracting frictions as predicted by extant theoretical models in the literature. By design,
our study is cross-sectional in nature. Therefore, we are able to comment on the ability of
equity tranche in explaining economic outcomes only in a relative sense. Our study does
not rule out the possibility that the absolute level of equity tranche supporting these deals
was too low during the sample period. Indeed, Stanton and Wallace (2011) show that in the
period leading up to the crisis, the rating agencies allowed subordination levels in CMBS
markets to fall to suboptimal levels. The key contribution of our paper is to show that
cross-sectional pattern in securitization design does follow the predictions of asymmetric
information models. This finding has important implications for the development of future
theoretical models in this area as well as for informing policy debates surrounding this
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market.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Full Sample Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for our sample. Panel A presents various loan level, pool level,
and tranching structure characteristics, Panel B presents ex-post foreclosure rates, divided by various loan
characteristics and Panel C presents the tranche structure of deals in our sample across time periods.
Panel A: Loan, Pool, and Tranche Structure Summary Statistics
Mean Std Dev Min 25% 50% 75% Max N
Loan Level:
Loan Amount 259781.43 206639.42 3150.00 110000.00 196000.00 365000.00 4350000.00 501131
FICO 656.26 76.92 496.00 599.00 657.00 716.00 799.00 501131
LTV 77.27 13.59 31.25 71.93 80.00 85.00 100.00 501131
ARM 0.66 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 501126
Single Family Residence 0.76 0.42 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 501131
Owner Occupied 0.89 0.30 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 501131
Foreclosure 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 501131
Pool Level:
PrincipalPoolAmount (mil) 775.85 507.28 151.84 422.34 664.12 1000.08 3267.41 196
NumLoans 3150.46 2535.52 340.00 1343.50 2269.00 4409.75 12202.00 196
% NoDoc 18.77 17.84 0.00 2.94 14.34 34.68 79.13 172
GeoDiverse 59.47 17.26 0.00 49.48 61.31 74.15 87.54 196
Late 0.52 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 196
Subprime (FICO<660) 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 194
Foreclosure (dollar weighted) 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.18 0.41 152
Tranche Structure:
% AAA Tranche 90.40 7.17 72.40 82.80 93.52 96.51 98.75 196
% Mezzanine Tranche 8.40 6.70 0.00 2.77 5.48 15.67 27.60 196
% EquityTranche 1.20 1.27 0.00 0.50 0.75 1.70 7.43 196
Mezzanine-to-Sold 8.57 6.83 0 2.80 5.49 15.86 21.99 196
Panel B: Ex-post Default Probabilities Across Risk Factors (loan counts in brackets)
No Yes
Above median FICO 0.22 0.11
[251,350] [249,781]
Above median LTV 0.15 0.20
[346,616] [154,515]
Fixed-rate Mortgage 0.19 0.11
[353,342] [147,789]
Late period (2005) 0.09 0.19
[135,474] [365,657]
Panel C: Tranche Structure Across Time
Piece All Early (2001-02) Late (2005)
AAA 90.36 92.59 88.32
Mezzanine 8.44 6.69 10.05
Equity 1.20 0.72 1.63
Observations 196 94 102
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Table 3.2: Cross-Sectional Determinants of Deal Structure
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of %Equity Tranche (columns (1)-(3)) and Mezzanine-
to-Sold (columns (4)-(6)) on loan pool characteristics. %Equity Tranche is the percent of the principal pool
amount that is not publicly offered, Mezzanine-to-Sold is computed as the ratio of principal dollar amount
of the mezzanine tranche to the total principal dollars amount publicly offered (mezzanine plus AAA),
Late is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deals from 2005, % NoDoc is the percent of the loan pool with
no documentation, FICO is the pool’s weighted average FICO score, LTV is the pool’s weighted average
loan-to-value ratio, % ARM is the percent of the loan pool with adjustable rate mortgage loans, GeoDiverse
measures the geographic diversity and is 100 - (percent of largest one state origination concentration) in the
mortgage pool. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
%Equity Mezzanine-to-Sold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Late 0.886∗∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗ 2.751∗∗ 3.181∗∗∗ 3.167∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
% NoDoc 0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.200∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.007
(0.00) (0.04) (0.06) (0.00) (0.67) (0.77)
FICO -0.004 0.004 -0.101∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00)
LTV -0.025 0.034 0.301∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.20) (0.00) (0.01)
% ARM 0.005 0.006∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗
(0.14) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
GeoDiverse -0.008 -0.005 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.62) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.295∗∗ 5.268 -3.850 3.847∗∗∗ 58.015∗∗∗ 61.686∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.11) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sponsor FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163
R2 0.268 0.318 0.577 0.334 0.857 0.869
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Ex-Post Outcomes: Abnormal Default
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of AbDefault on loan pool characteristics. In columns
(1) and (2), AbDefault is the ratio of the actual ex-post pool default rate to a predicted default rate based
on a default model calibrated using the full sample. In columns (3) and (4), Abnormal Default is the ratio
of the actual ex-post pool default rate to the default rate on a pool of loans that are matched, loan by loan,
to the actual pool based on observable characteristics. Opaque is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deals
with %NoDoc greater than that of the median deal, HighEq is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with
%Equity Tranche greater than that of the median deal, HighMezz is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deals
with %Mezzanine Tranche greater than that of the median deal, Late is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
deals from 2005, FICO is the pool’s weighted average FICO score, and LTV is the pool’s weighted average
loan-to-value ratio. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
Default Model Matched Pool
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Late 0.321∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ -0.006 0.008 0.037
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.92) (0.68)
FICO 0.001 0.002∗ 0.002 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.001
(0.38) (0.08) (0.13) (0.05) (0.10) (0.58)
LTV 0.052∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Opaque 0.163∗ 0.109 0.140 0.099 0.057 0.123
(0.06) (0.26) (0.20) (0.49) (0.73) (0.47)
HighEq 0.110 0.139∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.033 0.062 0.138
(0.13) (0.06) (0.02) (0.72) (0.50) (0.14)
HighEq * Opaque -0.244∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗ -0.221∗ -0.265∗∗ -0.267∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)
HighMezz 0.080 0.155 -0.115 -0.027
(0.51) (0.27) (0.36) (0.86)
HighMezz * Opaque 0.115 0.113 0.141 0.088
(0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.54)
Constant -3.783∗∗∗ -4.477∗∗∗ -4.315∗∗∗ -5.588∗∗∗ -5.473∗∗∗ -4.130∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Sponsor FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151
R2 0.650 0.659 0.723 0.440 0.444 0.518
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: Ex-Post Outcomes: The Channel of Private Information
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of AbDefault on loan pool characteristics. Abnormal
Default is the ratio of the actual ex-post pool default rate to the default rate on a pool of loans that are
matched, loan by loan, to the actual pool based on observable characteristics. Opaque is a dummy variable
equal to 1 for deals with %NoDoc greater than that of the median deal, HighEq is a dummy variable equal to
1 for deals with %Equity Tranche greater than that of the median deal, HighMezz is a dummy variable equal
to 1 for deals with %Mezzanine Tranche greater than that of the median deal, Late is a dummy variable equal
to 1 for deals from 2005, FICO is the pool’s weighted average FICO score, and LTV is the pool’s weighted
average loan-to-value ratio. Sponsor is Top Originator indicates deals where the deal sponsor originated
more loans in pool than any other originator. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
(1) (2) (3)
All Sponsor not Top Originator Sponsor is Top Originator
Late 0.008 0.035 -0.050
(0.92) (0.74) (0.71)
FICO 0.002∗ 0.000 0.003∗∗
(0.10) (0.92) (0.05)
LTV 0.069∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Opaque 0.057 0.021 0.027
(0.73) (0.93) (0.90)
HighEq 0.062 -0.062 0.126
(0.50) (0.71) (0.21)
HighEq * Opaque -0.265∗∗ -0.074 -0.421∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.72) (0.01)
HighMezz -0.115 -0.370 -0.060
(0.36) (0.19) (0.65)
HighMezz * Opaque 0.141 0.241 0.149
(0.32) (0.33) (0.34)
Constant -5.473∗∗∗ -4.368∗∗ -7.325∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.05) (0.00)
Observations 151 73 78
r2 0.444 0.398 0.538
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Anti-Predatory Lending Laws, Equity Tranche, and Ex-Post Outcomes
Columns (1) and (2) present loan-level logistic regression estimates where the dependent variable is an in-
dicator variable equal to one if the loan ends up in foreclosure. Columns (3) and (4) present pool-level
OLS regression estimates where the dependent variable is the pool level abnormal default, AbDefault, which
is the ratio of the actual ex-post pool default rate to a predicted default rate based on a default model
calibrated using the full sample. We compute heteroskedasticity robust standard errors for these specifica-
tions. Columns (2) and (4) present estimates from regressions including only Opaque pools, which are those
with %NoDoc greater than that of the median deal. HighEq is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with
%Equity Tranche greater than that of the median deal, APL is a dummy variable equal to 1 for loans from
states that enact anti-predatory lending laws, HighAPL is a dummy variable equal to 1 for pools where the
proportion of loans from APL states is greater than sample median, Before is a dummy variable equal to 1
for the time period prior to the passage of APL laws. FICO is the FICO score and LTV is the loan-to-value
ratio, where we use dollar-weighted averages for the pool-level specifications. The loan level regressions also
include dummies for different loan purposes and loan types (coefficients not reported).
Loan Level Pool Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Opaque All Opaque
FICO -0.006∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.19)
LTV 0.018∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HighEq -0.153 -0.208∗∗ -0.077 -0.162
(0.10) (0.02) (0.29) (0.11)
Before -0.053 -0.086 -0.342∗∗ -0.407∗∗
(0.86) (0.74) (0.02) (0.02)
HighEq * Before 0.611∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.396∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
APL 0.337 0.451
(0.22) (0.15)
APL * HighEq 0.256∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
APL * Before -0.297∗∗∗ -0.021
(0.01) (0.86)
APL * HighEq * Before -0.226∗ -0.463∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.00)
HighAPL -0.050 0.061
(0.60) (0.55)
HighAPL * HighEq 0.036 -0.234
(0.78) (0.12)
HighAPL * Before -0.085 0.027
(0.62) (0.91)
HighAPL * HighEq * Before -0.443∗∗ -0.486∗
(0.04) (0.09)
Constant -13.685 0.621∗ -4.034∗∗∗ -5.041∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 497367 254774 151 72
Pseudo R2 0.110 0.092
R2 0.688 0.569
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: Equity Tranche and Yield Spreads Cross-tabulation
This table presents the mean yield spread for variable rate tranches in the sample according to the size of
the equity tranche and the tranche’s rating class. For deals with multiple tranches within a rating class,
the observation is the dollar-weighted average of the coupons. High Equity indicates that the pool under
consideration has %Equity Tranche greater than that of the median deal.
Tranche Rating
Equity Tranche Size AAA AA A ≤ BBB
Low Equity 0.44 1.27 1.50 2.43
(0.06) (0.30) (0.25) (0.22)
High Equity 0.34 0.77 1.25 2.24
(0.03) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 3.7: Price Response to Equity Tranche
This table presents OLS estimates from regressions of the yield spread (in percentage points) on loan pool
characteristics. Each observation represents a Pool × Rating Class dollar-weighted spread for variable rate
tranches, where we define Rating Class as AAA, AA, A, and BBB and below. Late is a dummy variable
equal to 1 for deals from 2005, Opaque is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with %NoDoc greater than
that of the median deal, and HighEq is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with %Equity Tranche greater
than that of the median deal. All standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All non-AAA AAA non-AAA AAA
Late -0.49∗∗∗ -0.58∗∗∗ -0.62∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
HighEq -0.27∗∗ -0.38∗∗ -0.09
(0.01) (0.02) (0.13)
Opaque -0.18 -0.35 -0.07
(0.44) (0.38) (0.48)
HighEq * Opaque -0.34∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗ -0.09
(0.00) (0.00) (0.34)
HighEq * Not Opaque -0.08 -0.21 -0.06
(0.74) (0.58) (0.49)
Rating Class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 379 379 262 117 262 117
R2 0.43 0.45 0.30 0.15 0.34 0.17
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Robustness – Alternate Channels
This table presents our main results from earlier tables alongside specification that include other variables
that capture the roles and connections of the various agents in the securitization chain. Late is a dummy
variable equal to 1 for deals from 2005, %NoDoc is the percent of the loan pool with no documentation
loans, FICO is the pool’s weighted average FICO score, LTV is the pool’s weighted average loan-to-value
ratio, % ARM is the percent of the loan pool with adjustable rate mortgage loans, GeoDiverse measures
the geographic diversity and is computed as 100 - (percent of largest one state origination concentration) in
the mortgage pool, Opaque is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with %NoDoc greater than that of the
median deal, HighEq is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with %Equity Tranche greater than that of the
median deal, and SellAndService is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deals where the issuer is also the primary
servicer. TopOrigAndService is a dummy variable equal to 1 for deals where the top originator in the pool
is also the primary servicer. Institution-Type effects refers to the inclusion of a set of dummy variables that
identify sponsors as a commercial bank, investment bank, savings and loan or strictly mortgage lender. All
standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
%Equity Mezzanine-to-Sold Abnormal Default Match
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Late 0.943∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 3.181∗∗∗ 3.235∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.044
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.56)
NoDoc 0.023∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ -0.007 -0.012
(0.01) (0.04) (0.55) (0.38)
FICO -0.004 0.004 -0.101∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001
(0.16) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.25)
LTV -0.025 0.009 0.301∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ARM 0.005∗∗ 0.006∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GeoDiverse -0.008 -0.010 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00)
Opaque 0.099 0.138
(0.49) (0.29)
HighEq 0.033 0.074
(0.72) (0.46)
HighEq * Opaque -0.221∗ -0.300∗∗
(0.07) (0.02)
SellAndService -0.453∗ -0.632 0.218∗∗
(0.10) (0.29) (0.02)
TopOrigAndService -0.210 0.196 -0.361∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.70) (0.00)
Constant 5.268∗ -2.111 58.015∗∗∗ 60.044∗∗∗ -5.588∗∗∗ -4.546∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.59) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Institution Type FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 163 163 163 163 151 151
R2 0.318 0.494 0.857 0.860 0.440 0.540
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1: Example Deal: Fremont Home Loan Trust Series 2002-1
This figure provides an example deal from our sample to illustrate the construction of a typical deal and the
sources of our data. Loan specific characteristics such as FICO score, loan amount, loan type, LTV, etc. are
from CoreLogic. Aggregate deal statistics, including the tranche structuring of the deal, were hand collected
from the Form 424(b)(5) filings to the SEC.
Individual Loans
CoreLogic
Loan Pool
CoreLogic/SEC Filings
Tranche Structure
SEC Filings
Loan Amount: $400,000,
FICO: 663, LTV: 69%,
ARM: Yes, State: WA
Originator: Fremont
. . .
AAA: 81.50%
...
Loan Amount: $346,000,
FICO: 640, LTV: 100%,
ARM: Yes, State: CA
Originator: Fremont
. . .
Issuer: Fremont Loan
Principal: $217,100,160
Loans: 1,346
WtAveFICO: 611
WtAveLTV 80%
ARM: 84%
. . .
Mezzanine: 17.60%
Loan Amount: $486,000,
FICO: 544, LTV: 90%,
ARM: Yes, State: CA
Originator: Fremont
. . .
Equity: 0.90%
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Figure 3.2: Measures of Abnormal Default
This figure presents kernel densities of our measures of abnormal default. Panel (a) presents a
kernel density of our first measure of abnormal default which we calculate as the ratio of the actual
ex-post pool default rate to a predicted default rate based on a default model calibrated using the
full sample. Panel (b) presents our second measure of abnormal default which we calculate as the
ratio of the actual ex-post pool default rate to the default rate on a pool of loans that are matched,
loan by loan, to the actual pool based on observable characteristics.
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APPENDIX A
The Real Costs of Corporate Credit Ratings
A.1 Variable Construction
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Table A.1: Variable Definitions
This table identifies the data sources and describes the construction of variables used in the analysis. Com-
pany financial data are from Compustat, returns are from CRSP, and bond data are from the fixed income
securities database (FISD). For firm financial data, quarterly data are used if the firm reports at that
frequency.
Variable Definition
Assets
Total assets [atq].
Leverage
Total debt [dlcq + dlttq] / assets [atq].
Tobin’s Q
(Assets [atq] + market value of equity [prccq * cshoq] - common equity [ceqq]
- deferred taxes [txditcq]) / assets [atq].
Debt/EBITDA
Total debt [dlcq + dlttq] / trailing four quarters EBITDA [oibdpq].
Return on Assets
Trailing four quarters of EBITDA [oibdpq] / lagged assets [atq].
Return on Equity
Trailing four quarters net income [niq] / lagged common equity [ceqq]
Cash flow
Trailing four quarters of income plus depreciation [ibq + dpq] / lagged assets
[atq].
R&D
Research and development expenditures [xrd] / lagged total assets [atq].
SG&A
Selling, general, and administrative expenditures [xsga] / lagged total assets
[atq].
Stock Return
Equity stock return over the past year.
Bond Yield
Yield to maturity of the bond at issuance. When multiple bonds are issued in
the same quarter, this is computed as the dollar-weighted yield of the issuances.
Bond Amount
Amount of issuance in millions. When multiple bonds are issued in the same
quarter, this is computed as the sum issuances.
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APPENDIX B
Signaling, Financial Constraints, and
Performance-Sensitive Debt
B.1 Variable Construction
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Table B.1: Variable Definitions
This table defines the construction of borrower characteristics in terms of Compustat variables. All measures
are taken from the quarter prior (or year prior when the data item is available only on an annual basis) to
loan origination.
Variable Definition
Compustat Data Items:
Assets
total assets [atq].
Leverage
total debt [dlcq + dlttq] / assets [atq].
Market-to-Book
market value of firm [prccq * cshoq + dlcq + dlttq + pstkq + txditcq] / total assets [atq].
Profitability
previous four quarters of EBITDA [oibdpq] / previous four quarters of sales [atq].
Interest Coverage
previous four quarters of EBITDA [oibdpq] / previous four quarters of interest expense
[xintq].
EBITDA Volatility
ratio of the standard deviation of the past eight earnings [oibdpq] changes to average book
asset [atq] size over the past eight quarters.
Future Distress
dummy variable equal to one if (i) the borrower has two consecutive years where the interest
coverage ratio falls below 1.0 or (ii) the borrower has one year where the interest coverage
ratio is below 0.8.
Dealscan Data Items:
Spread
loan spread in basis points [allindrawn].
Loan Size
facility amount in millions of dollars [facilityamt / 1000000].
Secured
dummy variable equal to one if the loan is secured by collateral.
Financial Covenants
total number of financial covenants in the loan.
Relationship
log(1 + number of loans with the current lender in the five years prior to the current loan).
New Interest Expense
annual interest expense from the loan [allindrawn/10000 * facilityamt] / total assets [atq].
PSD
Dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a performance pricing grid.
High Convexity
dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a performance pricing grid that is in the top
tercile of the convexity measure (see Section 2.4 for details).
Low Convexity
dummy variable equal to one if the loan has a performance pricing grid that is not in the
top tercile of the convexity measure.
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APPENDIX C
Design of Financial Securities: Empirical Evidence
From Private-Label RMBS Deals
C.1 Sample Construction and Data Collection
We use a stratified random sampling method to select private-label (i.e., non-agency
backed) RMBS deals for inclusion in our study. We choose two time periods for our sample
selection: an “early period” that covers deals from 2001-02 and a “late period” that covers
deals from 2005. This stratification strategy allows us to separate out time-specific effects
from our main cross-sectional results. It also allows us to investigate the time variation in
the functioning of this market and exploit changes in anti-predatory-lending laws. Ashcraft
and Schuermann (2008) report that the issuance of non-agency mortgage-backed securities
increased eight-fold from $99 billion in 2001 to $797 billion in 2005 in the sub-prime and Alt-
A segment. Thus our sample covers both an early/nascent period and a relatively matured
period of RMBS market. We also stratify the sample along the prime-subprime dimension,
slightly over-sampling the subprime pools to make sure that portion of the sample is large
enough to make statistically meaningful inference. Our random sample begins with 196 deals.
Due to variation in the data items included in the filings, our main regression specifications
include 163 deals that have full data on all variables of interest.
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We collect data on mortgage pools and their tranches from Form 424(b)(5) filings which
are submitted to the SEC pursuant to SEC Rule 424(b)(5). While the detail of the in-
formation provided varies slightly from deal to deal, the form typically contains data on
all the major participants in the deal (e.g., sponsor, originators), pool-level characteristics
and tranche-level data. Among other items, these data specifically include the loan orig-
inators and the share of the deal they originated, weighted average loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio, weighted average FICO score, and a breakdown of loan types, geography and loan
documentation levels within the pool.
Form 424(b)(5) also provides a listing of each tranche in the pool along with its principal
amount and credit rating. For our analysis, we aggregate the tranches into three bins: AAA-
rated tranches, mezzanine tranches and equity tranches. We present a detailed discussion of
the equity tranche in Section 3.4. The AAA tranche is self-explanatory and the mezzanine
tranche is simply the subordinated tranche that lies between the AAA and equity tranches.
The publicly offered tranches (AAA and mezzanine) include ratings from at least two major
credit rating agencies. While disagreements in ratings among the ratings agencies are rare
for the senior tranches, we use the lower of the ratings when conflicts occur.
We match these deals with detailed loan-level data obtained from CoreLogic. Pools in
our sample cover over 500,000 individual mortgages. We obtain key information for each
loan in a given pool from CoreLogic such as the loan amount, FICO score, LTV ratio, and
loan type along with location of the property and various other characteristics. Finally, we
obtain the ex-post performance of these loans from CoreLogic as well. We obtain information
on the incidence of foreclosure anytime from the origination of the deal through December
2011. This information allows us to conduct our test relating tranche structure to ex-post
loan performance. Our sample size drops slightly to 151 deals for which we are able to match
our pool level data with CoreLogic database.
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C.2 Example of Documentation Description from a Deal Prospec-
tus
Series Name: ABFC Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificate, Series 2002-WF2
The Originator’s subprime mortgage loan programs include a full documentation pro-
gram, a “stated income, stated asset” program and a “lite” documentation program.
Under the full documentation program, loans to borrowers who are salaried employ-
ees must be supported by current employment information in the form of one current
pay-stub with year-to-date information and W-2 tax forms for the last two years (a
complete verification of employment may be substituted for W-2 forms). The Origina-
tor also performs a telephone verification of employment for salaried employees prior
to funding. In some cases, employment histories may be obtained through V.I.E., Inc.,
an entity jointly owned by the Originator and an affiliated third party, that obtains
employment data from state unemployment insurance departments or other state agen-
cies. Under the full documentation program, borrowers who are self-employed must
provide signed individual federal tax returns and, if applicable, signed year-to-date in-
come statements and/or business federal tax returns. Evidence must be provided that
the business has been in existence for at least one year. If the business has been in
existence less than two years, evidence must be provided that the applicant had previ-
ously been in the same line of work for at least one year. Under the full documentation
program, at certain loan-to-value ratio levels and under certain circumstances not all
sources of funds for closing are verified as the borrowers.
Under the Originator’s “Stated Income, Stated Asset” program, the applicant’s em-
ployment, income sources and assets must be stated on the initial signed application.
The applicant’s income as stated must be reasonable for the applicant’s occupation
as determined in the discretion of the loan underwriter; however, such income is not
independently verified. Similarly the applicant’s assets as stated must be reasonable
for the applicant’s occupation as determined in the discretion of the loan underwriter;
however, such assets are not independently verified. Except under the Stated Asset
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Program, verification of funds sufficient to close the mortgage loan is performed. Under
the “LITE” Documentation program, the Originator reviews the deposit activity re-
flected in the most recent six or twenty-four consecutive months of the applicant’s bank
statements as an alternative method of establishing income. Maximum loan-to-value
ratios within each credit level are lower under the stated income, stated asset program
than under the full documentation program.
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C.3 Matched Pool Construction
We construct a hypothetical pool of loans that look observationally similar to loans in
actual pools. As described in Section 3.5.2.2, our goal is to create a random pool of loans that
is likely to have similar foreclosure performance as the actual pool in terms of observable loan
and property characteristics, macroeconomic shocks, and correlation structure of loans with
the pool. For every loan i in pool p, we start with all other loans in our sample, excluding
the pool where loan i resides, and follow the following matching algorithm:
1. Drop potential matches that were not originated in the same (early or late) as loan i.
2. Drop potential matches that are not sufficiently close to loan i in terms of two most
important observable characteristics of this market: FICO scores and LTV ratio. We
ensure that potential control loans are within one-tenth of the standard deviation of
FICO and LTV of the loan being matched. This criteria ensures that LTV ratio of
matched firms fall within 1.4 percentage points and FICO score within 11.2 points of
loan i.
3. Drop potential matches that are not located in the same state as loan i.
4. We break all loans into three groups based on the nature of interest rate: fixed rate
loans, ARM, and Balloons. Drop potential matches that do not have the same interest
rate type as loan i.
5. Drop potential matches that are not within 25% of the principal loan amount of loan
i.
6. Drop potential matches that whose origination date is not within ±90 days of loan i.
7. From the remaining set of potential matches, assign the loan with LTV ratio closest
to loan i as the matched loan.
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We repeat this exercise for all loans in a pool. We are able to obtain matches for 401,228
loans based on this criteria. This leaves us with approximately 100,000 loans that remains
unmatched after the first iteration. For loans without a match, we continue as follows:
8. Return to Step (2) above, but drop the requirement that the matched loan be within
1.4 percentage points of loan i in terms of LTV ratio.
This iteration yields another 101,963 matches and almost completes the matching. For a
very small number of loans (19,079) that remain unmatched, we continue as follows:
9. Return to Step (2), dropping the LTV caliper requirement as in Step (8), and widen
the range of FICO scores to be within one-fifth of the standard deviation and allow
the loan origination date to be within ±180 days of that of loan i.
With less than 4% of loans matched based on the looser criteria of Step (9), our results do not
change if we drop these loans altogether from the sample. Based on this matching procedure,
we are able to create a hypothetical pool that has loans with extremely similar characteristics
on observable dimensions (with exact matches for state, loan type, and early/late period).
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C.4 Tables
Table C.1: Institutions and their Various Roles
This table presents the most common institutions in the sample and the frequency in which they participated
in various roles.
Institution Seller Top Originator Type
Ace 5 0 Mortgage Lender
Ameriquest 14 15 Mortgage Lender
Bear Stearns 17 0 Investment Bank
Bank of America 28 23 Commercial Bank
Citi 8 4 Commercial Bank
Credit Suisse 16 10 Investment Bank
Countrywide 6 10 Savings and Loan
Deutsche Bank 5 0 Commercial Bank
Goldman Sachs 16 0 Investment Bank
HSBC 3 0 Commercial Bank
IndyMac 10 11 Savings and Loan
JP Morgan 9 5 Commercial Bank
Lehman Brothers 6 4 Investment Bank
Merrill Lynch 8 1 Investment Bank
Option One 8 13 Mortgage Lender
Stanwich 3 0 Mortgage Lender
UBS 6 0 Commercial Bank
Washington Mutual 11 14 Savings and Loan
Wells Fargo 12 24 Commercial Bank
Other 5 62
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Table C.2: The Equity Tranche
This table presents examples of two common tranche structures used for RMBS and how the equity tranche
is computed for each case.
Panel A: Six-pack
Offered Class Principal ($) Rate Rating S&P Rating Moody’s
Y A 399,181,000 LIBOR+0.34 AAA Aaa
Y M-1 35,789,000 LIBOR+0.65 AA+ Aa2
Y M-2 27,530,000 LIBOR+1.20 A+ A2
Y M-3 23,776,000 LIBOR+2.00 BBB Baa2
Y M-4 6,757,000 LIBOR+2.30 BBB- Baa3
N CE 7,508,765 NR NR
Sum 500,541,765
Pool: Mortgages 3,737
Principal 500,541,765
Equity Tranche = 7,508,765/500,541,765 = 1.50%
Panel B: Overcollateralization
Offered Class Principal ($) Rate Rating S&P Rating Moody’s
Y A 154,414,000 5.50 AAA Aaa
Y M-1 27,440,000 LIBOR+0.50 AA Aa2
Y M-2 12,267,000 LIBOR+0.75 A A2
Y M-3 4,196,000 LIBOR+0.80 A- A3
Y B-1 5,058,000 LIBOR+1.25 BBB+ Baa1
Y B-2 3,336,000 LIBOR+1.30 BBB Baa2
Y B-3 6,564,000 LIBOR+2.15 BBB- Baa3
Sum 213,275,000
Pool: Mortgages 1,039
Principal 215,212,063
Equity Tranche = (215,212,063–213,275,000)/215,212,063 = 0.90%
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Table C.3: Default Model
This table presents the results of the default model. We use the estimated coefficients of this model to
predict the loan-by-loan probability of foreclosure to construct our measure of Abnormal Default used for
the estimates in Table 3.4. Following prior literature (e.g., see Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011), we include
the borrower’s FICO score, the loan-to-value ratio, loan purpose (e.g., Refinancing with Cash-Out), loan
type, (e.g., 5-year Interest Only), state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The results below show the
key drivers of default risk, with the point estimates on the other variables in the estimation omitted in the
interest of space.
Prob(Foreclosure)
b se
FICO -0.0059*** (0.000)
LTV 0.0180*** (0.000)
Refinancing with Cash-Out -0.2455*** (0.000)
Refinancing w/o Cash-out -0.3458*** (0.000)
5-year Interest Only 0.8339*** (0.000)
10-year Interest Only 0.8071*** (0.000)
Adjustable Rate Mortgage 0.2906*** (0.000)
5-year I.O. ARM 0.6705*** (0.000)
10-year I.O. ARM 0.6598*** (0.000)
7-year I.O.ARM 0.0436 (0.441)
2-year I.O. ARM 0.8834*** (0.000)
7-year Balloon 1.9788 (0.185)
15-year Balloon -1.0840*** (0.000)
ARM Balloon 0.8550*** (0.000)
Balloon-Other 1.0936*** (0.000)
Arizona 0.3898** (0.019)
California 0.4543*** (0.006)
Florida 0.8219*** (0.000)
Georgia 1.0356*** (0.000)
Nevada 1.2092*** (0.000)
State Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Other Controls Yes
Observations 497367
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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